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ABSTRACT

In this study the techniques of collective "biography and roll«

call analysis have been used to determine and analyze the response of
185 Representatives from ten ex-Confederate states (excluding Tennessee)
to a broad range of economic issues selected from the Fortieth through
the Forty-Fourth Congresses (1868-1877) • Particularly at question is
the assumption that Southern Republican Representatives disregarded the
interests of their constituencies and voted with Northeastern party
colleagues on economic measures.

Secondarily, an effort has been made

to investigate the relationships that may have existed between voting
behavior on economic issues and personal and constituent characteristics
of each Representative.
Economic measures considered include those relating to internal
taxation, the tariff, federal aid to internal improvements, contraction
and expansion of the currency, the remonetization of silver, public
credit, and the overriding issue of specie resumption.

A special effort

has been made to collect surviving "biographical data on each Southern
Representative for the purposes of constructing biographical profiles
of the section's delegations and for analytical use.

Other bodies of

quantifiable data compiled include social and economic profiles of
each Southern congressional district and complete county-level election
returns for the House of Representatives from 1868 to IB76 . The latter
ix

were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political
Research at the University of Michigan, Aon Arbor.

Non-quantifiable

sources such as newspapers, manuscript collections, and government
documents have been surveyed to help determine Southern attitudes on
economic questions.

All quantifiable biographical information,

election return data, and census statistics on each congressional
district have been coded in machine-readable form for correlation with
House roll-call records obtained from the ICER.

The Consortium's

OSIRIS II package of computer programs designed for analysis of social
science data were used to manipulate and analyze the quantifiable data
and to construct Guttman scales on certain economic issues.
When judged by their response on recorded roll-call votes in the
five Reconstruction Houses, the Southern Republicans, often under
difficult circumstances, served the economic interests of their section
in a creditable manner.

They were particularly responsive to their

section's need for federal aid for internal improvements, for reduction
of internal taxes, and for the expansion of currency and banking
facilities.

The associations between voting behavior on specific

economic issues and personal and constituent characteristics were for
the most part insignificant as economic questions usually split the
House along either regional or, more rarely, party lines.

Southern

Representatives commonly voted as a bipartisan unit on economic
questions of major importance to their section.

The most evident

coalition on economic questions was that between the South and Midwest
against the Northeast, but on some questions, such as that of federal
subsidies for Internal improvements, Southerners often found more

support In the Northeast than in the Midwest.

Xt is quite clear,

however, that the issues of race and political reconstruction were more
important to conservative Southerners than were economic questions.
The responsible voting record of Southern Republicans on economic
issues mattered little to conservatives

and the Republicans were

slowly but surely eliminated from Southern politics by the process of
redemption on the one hand and by declining Northern support for
reconstruction on the other.

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION:
HISTORIOGRAPHY AND METHODOLOGY
Toward the end of the First Session of the Forty-Third Congress,
the conservative Democratic editor of the New Orleans Picayune noted
with pleasure that the two most important measures of the session,
the postponing of specie payments and the empowering of a commission
to regulate railroad rates, had been passed by the votes of the South
and the Vest against the East.

Most importantly, the affirmative

votes of Southern Republican congressmen had made the sectional
victory possible:
But for the almost solid vote of the Southern carpetbaggers
both would have failed to become laws. Thus the two great
principles for which the states-rights men of the South
battled for half a century— a hard cash currency and the
right of each State to regulate its own domestic affairs—
find their supporters only in the East, which built up the
carpet-bag Governments, and new find their instruments
returning to plague the inventors.!
The reaction of Southern Republicans to the specie resumption
and railroad rate issues was not the first nor would it be the last
time they would break with their Northeastern party colleagues and
vote for what the South perceived to be its economic interests.

And

yet such evidence belies the most pervasive historical interpretation
~*The (New Orleans) Daily Picayune. April 2, 1874.

of the role ployed hy economic factors in the reconstruction process.
That interpretation, which may he termed the Beard-Beale thesis,
holds that Northeastern business interests ("capitalists") dominated
the Republican party and that Republicans,readily supported the
economic and political interests of that group in Congress.

The

Beard-Beale thesis explains the harsh military reconstruction measures
as the result of a Republican desire to fasten the Republican parlyon the South.

The transformed region would then return Republicans

to Congress to offer further support for the economic as well as the
political program of the Republican party.

Evidence indicates that

this facet of the Beard-Beale thesis is deserving of re-examination.
A primary consideration of the present study is to examine the
validity of the thesis as it applies to Reconstruction in the South.

p

^The Beard-Beale thesis, named after the independent work of
Charles and Mary Beard and Seward K. Beale, is examined more fully
below. For specialized historiographical assessment of the economic
element in Reconstruction historiography see: T. Harry Williams, "An
Analysis of Some Reconstruction Attitudes" Journal of Southern
History. XII (November, 1946), 469-73, in which the author first
isolated and labeled the economic interpretation the "Beale thesis";
Robert P. Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party: An Economic Interpre
tation of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959; paperback edition, 1966}, Chapter VII, and Sharkey*s
"Preface to the Paperback Edition," 3-14; Irwin Unger, The Greenback
Era: A Social and Political History of American Finance. 1565-1679"
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), 3-11; B. P. Gallaway,
"Economic Determinism in Reconstruction Historiography," Southwestern
Social Science Quarterly. XLVT (Decenber, 1965), 244-54; Walter T. K.
Nugent, The Money Question During Reconstruction (New York: W. W.
Norton and Company, 1957), 107-21; and Larry Kincaid, "Victims of
Circumstance: An Interpretation of Changing Attitudes Toward
Republican Policy Makers and Reconstruction," Journal of American
History. LVTI (June, 1970), 48-66.
For essays that set the economic interpretation in the general
context of Reconstruction historiography, see in particular: Howard
K. Beale, "On Rewriting Reconstruction History," American Historical
Review, XLV (July, 1940), 807-27; Bernard A. Weisberger, "The Dark
and Bloody Ground of Reconstruction Historiography," Journal of
Southern History, XXV (November, 1959), 427-47; Vernon L. Wharton,

3
The economic interpretation of Reconstruction had its origins
in Charles and Mary Beard's highly influential Rise of American
Civilization (1927 ). With their emphasis on the role of economic
factors in American history, the Beards depicted nineteenth century
history as essentially a struggle Between agrarian and capitalist
forces for control of the federal government.

The struggle's water

shed was the Civil War— "the social cataclysm in which the capitalists,
laborers, and farmers of the North and West drove from power in the
national government the planting aristocracy of the South."3 in
effect, the war' was the "Second American Revolution" in which the
forces of capitalism finally triumphed over those of agrarianism.
With the planting South out of the Union, the Beards concluded that
Northeastern capitalists, through their faithful Republican agents
in Congress, not only secured political power, hut also reaped longsought and highly profitable economic gains; in fact, "all that two
generations of Federalists and Whigs tried to get was won within four
short years and more besides."1*

For the capitalists, the spoils

included a high protective tariff, huge federal subsidies for Northern
internal improvements, profitable interest rates on war bond issues, a
national banking system, and a sound currency.

Throughout the

"Reconstruction" in Writing Southern History; Essays in Historiography
in Honor of Fletcher M. Green, ed. Arthur S. Link and Rembert W. Patrick
1[Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965 )> 295-315; and
Gerald N. Grob, "Reconstruction: An American Morality Play," in American
History: Retrospect and Prospect, ed. George Atban Billias and Gerald
N. Grob (New York: Macmillan, 1971)* 191-231.
^Charles and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization,
(2 vols., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1927), XI, 51!.
4bid., 105.

"Second American Revolution," the Republicans, "the party of indus
trial progress and sound money," functioned as the loyal executors of
capitalistic interests
Howard K. Beale, in his The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew
Johnson and Reconstruction (1930), corroborated and extended the
Beard's economic interpretation into the Reconstruction period.
According to Beale, the Radical Republicans feared that under the
terms of Johnsonian Reconstruction a readmitted and solidly Democratic
South would unite with Western agrarian interests in Congress and
dismantle the new economic order created by the Republicans and their
^Ibid., 105-110, 111. In their cataloging of the economic gains
of the capitalists during the war, the Beards almost totally ignored
the farmer and labor components of the Republican coalition. Only
brief mention is made of the Homestead Act and the general war
prosperity as beneficial to farmers. The Beards later imply that
the war actually hurt labor as wages failed to keep pace with prices;
ibid., 114-15, 212-13. Other historians have concluded that Mid
western agrarians were persuaded to support the economic program of
the Northeastern branch of the party through such inducements as
generous federal subsidies for internal Improvements including rail
roads, the Homestead Act, pensions, and by "such emotional, and
psychological appeals as habitual use of the bloody shirt"; see
Helen J. and T. Harry Willisms, "Wisconsin Republicans and Recon
struction, 1865-1870," Wisconsin Magazine of History. XXIII (September,
1939) » 17-39; and Williams, "An Analysis of Some Reconstruction
Attitudes," 473.
g
Howard K. Beale, The Critical Year: A Study of Andrew Johnson
and Reconstruction (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930). In
his ''Forward to the 1958 Edition" of The Critical Year (New York:
Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1958), Beale noted that he had arrived
at his interpretation of economic issues during Reconstruction prior
to the publication of the Beards' Rise of American Civilization. In
his later article, "On Rewriting Reconstruction History," 813, Beale
indicated his acceptance of the Beard's pronouncement that the Civil
War was a revolution.

capitalist backers.

In Beale's vords:

If Southern economic interests had. coincided with those of
the rising industrial groups of the North, there would have
been no Radical reconstruction. The real danger from "a
return to rebels to power” was not overthrow of the Onion,
but an ousting of the new industrial forces from control
in Washington through a renewed union of Southern planters
and Western farmers.7
In the critical congressional campaign of 1866, one of Pres
ident Andrew Johnson's fatal political errors was his failure to
exploit potential divisions in the Republican party— particularly the
Midwestern wing's natural dislike of the Northeasterners' position on
economic questions.

As a result the Radical Republicans glossed over

the divisive economic issues with a bloody-shirt campaign which
rallied the North to defeat the Johnsonian forces and their recon
struction policy.

With Johnson's effectiveness stymied and a con

gressional majority for their reconstruction program, the Radicals
drove a series of harsh military reconstruction measures through
Q
Congress.
As another member of the Beard-Beale school expressed it,
"the Radicals in Congress had determined to force negro suffrage on
the South in order to maintain the Republican party in power. "9 The
Radicals professed no interest in the Democratic-minded "small
^Beale, The Critical Year, 225.
^Ibid., 297-99* 397-99, U06. For more recent statements of
similar conclusions, see George Ruble Woolfoik, The Cotton Regency;
The Northern Merchants and Reconstruction (New York: Bookman
Associates, 1953)> 191-93; and William B. Besseltine (ed.), The
Tragic Conflict: The Civil War and Reconstruction (New York: George
Braziller, 1962), 26-29.
^William B. Hesseltine, "Economic Factors in the Abandonment of
Reconstruction," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XXII (September,
1935), 19^-

farmers, laborers and poor whites" of the South.

Instead, they feared

that "these groups would stop the acquisitive activities of the South
ern and Northern businessmen and, as representatives of agricultural
communities, might oppose legislation for the benefit of industri
alists."10
The key technique employed by Radicals

to achieve their

objective, according to another historian, was disfranchisement of
Southern whites.

In addition to punishment of rebel leaders, dis

franchisement "comprehended in its purpose the formation of a
Republican party in the South in order to keep rebel Democrats from
uniting with cheap money advocates of the Northwest, and from their
endangering the victory of the eastern capitalists." With the ex
leaders of the South excluded from Congress, the Radicals could then
proceed "to establish the sanctity of the tariff, national debt,
and monetary system, [so] that when the southerners returned to
Washington, it was too late to change the new industrial order which
had became firmly intrenched in the interim. "11 To the Beard-Beale
school, the political purpose of congressional reconstruction was to
make the South Republican, thereby thwarting a Southern and Western
10Hesseltine (ed.), The Tragic Conflict. 29. See also:
Hesseltine, Confederate leaders in the New South (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1950), 13^-37.
•^William a. Russ, Jr., "Registration and Disfranchisement
Under Radical Reconstruction," Mississippi Valley Historical Review.
XXI (September, 193*0* 179-80* For a rebuttal to Russ' argument on
the extent and effectiveness of disfranchisement, see Forrest G. Wood,
"On Revising Reconstruction History: Negro Suffrage, White
Disfranchisement, and Common Sense," Journal of Negro History. II
(April, 1966), 98-113.

agrarian alliance on economic issues and guaranteeing further support
for the Radicals' political and economic program.
As a logical corollary to the Beard-Beale thesis, historians
have tended to accept the undocumented conclusion that Southern
Democrats worked diligently in Reconstruction Congresses for their
section* s economic interests while Southern Republicans voted with
their Northern party colleagues to preserve and consolidate wartime
gains of Northern capitalists.

On the tariff question, for example,

Rembert Patrick recently asserted that Southern Republican congress
men "followed the leadership of protectionists in the House and
Senate, disregarding the benefits of a low tariff for their raw
material-producing region."

In return the congressmen "demanded

approval of the Southern Republican state governments."^

In C. Vann

Woodward's seminal work on the Compromise of 1877 (which he refers
to as the "Theimidor" of the "Second American Revolution"), he notes,
without documentation, that during Reconstruction "the votes of both
Carpetbagger and Negro in Congress had proved a prep to the new
economic order":
So long as Republican rule lasted in the South the region had
proved a bulwark to the new economic order, for however radical
the party bad been in realizing its more idealistic aims of
equality and freedom within the South, the congressmen it sent
to Washington had voted solidly with Northern Republicans in
support of the more pragmatic aims of economic privilege.^3
i2Rembert Patrick, The Reconstruction of the Nation (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967), 177.
^C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of
1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston: little, Brown and
Company, 1951JT"13,

Those ’bore pragmatic aims" of the Republican party were "centered
in the protection of a sectional economy and numerous privileged
interests, and were reflected in new statutes regarding taxes, money,
tariffs, banks, land, railroads, subsidies, all placed upon the law
books while the South was out of the Union. "ll+ Woodward* s emphasis
on the role of economic factors in the Compromise of 1877 dovetails
neatly with the Beard-Beale thesis; the Compromise serves as the final
dramatic episode in the "Second American Revolution."
Revisionist historians began to question certain aspects of the
Beard-Beale thesis in the late 1950* s.

In the first of a series of

revisionist studies utilizing an interest-groip approach, Irwin
Unger investigated the attitudes of Northern businessmen toward specie
resumption and concluded that it was "clearly not valid to speak of
a single business attitude toward the money question after the Civil
War. "3-5 In another article published in 1959, Stanley Coben found
sharp divisions in both the Northeastern business community and the
Republican party on the tariff and currency questions.

Instead of

being protectionists and contractionists as Beard and Beale had con
cluded, large segments of the Northeastern business community
favored lower tariffs and opposed currency contraction.

"Since

neither business leaders nor Radicals were united in support of any
specific set of economic aims," Coben concluded that Radical Recon-

^Ibid.t 12.
^Irwin Unger, "Businessmen and. Specie Resumption," Political
Science Quarterly, LXXIV (March, 1959), *t6-70. For a fuller account
see Unger, "Men, Money and Politics: The Specie Resumption Issue,
1865-1^879" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1958).

struction "cannot be explained as an organized attempt by the business
interests of the Northeast either to preserve and promote their own
economic advantage or to obtain protection for economic exploitation
of the South. "16
The publication of Robert Sharkey's Money* Class, and Party
(l959) marked the first full-scale assault on the validity of the
Beard-Beale thesis.

In an astute analysis of the complex interests

of Northern economic groups, Sharkey dismissed the agrarian-capitalist
dualism of the Beards as simplistic and destroyed their "conceptual
monolith" of the interests of "capitalists."

Sharkey did not quarrel

with the Beards' emphasis on the importance of economic factors,
but rather with their failure "to disentangle the interests of the
various triumphant economic groups and to show that they were
frequently contradictory."^

In particular, Sharkey found that the

"capitalists" were split between industrial and the financial capital
ists; the former profited from wartime inflation and favored high
protective tariffs and easy money while the latter group suffered
from inflation ana leaned toward free trade and sound money.^
Sharkey also seriously undermined the basic premise of the
Beard-Beale thesis by demonstrating that the Republicans were far
•^Stanley Coben, "Northeastern Business and Radical Recon
struction: A Re-examination," Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XLVT (June, 1959), 67 -68 .
*
^Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 11-12, 292-93, 300.
^Ibid., 293, 299-300. See also: Peter Kolchin, "The Business
Press and Reconstruction, 1865-1868," Journal of Southern History,
XXXIII (May, 1967 ), 183-96.

from united behind a specific economic program.

The party harbored

free traders and protectionists, currency expansionists and
contractionlsts, greeribackers and bullionists, and resumptionlsts
and anti-resumptionists in a bewildering array of combinations.

Nor

could have the Radicals conspired to keep the South out of the
Union because of a fear that the South would unite with the West to
inflate the currency as Beale had claimed.

In the first place,

Sharkey found that the prosperous Western farmers showed little
concern over financial questions until after I869 , and secondly, the
most extreme radicals were often the Republicans who leaned toward
the soft-money inflationist philosophy. ^
Other revisionists have continued the onslaught on the BeardBeale thesis.

Irwin Unger*s prize-winning study of American finance

from 1865 to 1879 makes clear the complex patterns of opinion on
postwar financial questions among the various interest groups of
the North.

In his search for the underlying determinants for

Northern financial opinion, Unger shifts the emphasis from economic
factors to non-quantifiable ethical and ideological considerations.
In doing so he takes issue with the economic determinism of the
Beards and Sharkey and questions their concept of the Civil W elt as
the great watershed of American history.
^Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party, 302-301*.
PO

Unger, The Greenback Era, 3-9, passium. See also: Unger,
"Money and Morality: The Northern Calvinist Church and the Recon
struction Financial Issue," Journal of Presbyterian History, XL
(March, 1962), 38-55; and James K, Kindahl, "Economic Factors in
Specie Resumption: The United States, l865-79»,, Journal of Political
Economy, IXIX (February, 1961), 30-1*8.

While the revisionists have overturned the "basic tenets of
the Beard-Beale thesis, the corollary to that thesis— the notion that
readmitted Southern Republicans ignored constituent interests on
economic measures to vote with the Northeast on such questions— has
escaped historical analysis*

Historians such as Hesseltine, Patrick,

and Woodward have assumed that Southern Republicans responded to
economic issues in accordance with the Beard-Beale thesis, and the
revisionists, lacking a specific study to attack, have overlooked the
problem.

On the national level, historians have concentrated on the

period from the close of the war to the Implementation of congres
sional reconstruction while on the state and local level a plethora of
studies have examined every facet of reconstruction in the South*

But

the Southern congressional delegations, the link between the states
and the federal government, have received little scholarly attention,
particularly in the period from readmission to the end of Reconstruction.
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^ I n work on related subjects, a few historians have touched
on the response of the South to economic Issues. Unfortunately,
Sharkey's analysis concludes in 1869— on the eve of full readmlsslon
of the South to Congress. Unger carries his study to specie
resumption in 1879, but his focus is on financial questions and the
impact of moral and ideological factors on the formation of financial
opinion in the North. Allen Weinstein*s Prelude to Populism; Origins
of the Silver Issue* 1867-1878 (New Haven; Yale University Press,
1970}" briefly comments on the Southern reaction to the silver
demonetization-remonetlzation controversy, but his discussion of the
silver question is concentrated on the years from 1876 to 1878 .
The current interest in roll-call analysis has prompted several
studies centering in part on congressional response to economic
issues. Glenn M. Linden's "Congressmen, 'Radicalism,' and Economic
Issues, li^l-l^S" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Washington, 1963 ), and his two articles, "'Radicals' and Economic
Policies; The Senate, 1861-1873." Journal of Southern History. XXXII
(May, 1966), 189-99; and "Radicals and Economic Policies: The House
of Representatives, 1861-1873," Civil War History. XIII (March, 1967 ),

The Southern congressional delegations are deserving of atten
tion, not only to test the validity of the Beard-Beale thesis, but
also to examine their, composition and the manner in which they repre
seated their region on the national level.

Because of chaotic

political conditions in their home states resulting in a relatively
high turnover rate and endless contested elections, it is readily
admitted that Southern congressmen had little opportunity to attain
the seniority necessary for congressional leadership.

Still,

Southerners from the tex ex-Confederate states alone composed over
20 percent of the House of Representatives during the 1870*s.

If,

on any given economic question, they were able to achieve sectional
unity and combine with like-minded colleagues from other sections,
they constituted a powerful voting bloc in Congress.
In the present study the techniques of collective biography
5I-65 , are all concerned with defining a group of Northern Radicals
on political issues and then testing their cohesiveness as a unit on
economic issues. Consequently, little attention is given to the
Southern Representatives although in his most recent article,
"'Radical' Political and Economic Politics: The Senate, 1873-1877,"
Civil War History, XIV (September, 1968 ), 21(0-49, Linden suggests
that Senatorial voting behavior is better explained by geographical
region than it is by party and that in the Senate, at least, the
South and the West controlled economic votes; ibid., 246-47. More
provocative and sophisticated in methodology are John L. McCarthy,
"Reconstruction Legislation and Voting Alignments in the House of
Representatives, 1863-1869" (unpublished Eh.D.,dissertation, Yale
University, 1970); and John K. Fobmr, "The Repletion of Republican
Congressional Support for Enforcement of Reconstruction Measures: A
Roll Call Analysis, 1871-1877" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Alabama, 1968 ). McCarthy's focus is on political
reconstruction but his study is quite imaginative in the quantitative
techniques employed. As his title indicates, Folmar is also concerned
with the political questions during the later Reconstruction period,
but he does construct general economic scalograms for comparison
with scalograms on political questions.
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and roll-call analysis have been used to determine and analyze the
response of 18? congressmen from ten ex-Coafederate states to a
broad range of economic measures selected from the Fortieth through
the Forty-Fourth Congresses (1868-1877)•22 The obvious first step
in the process is the simple detennination of how each Southern member
of the House of Representatives (regardless of political affiliation)
voted on economic measures and to compare his response with that of
Representatives from other sections.

Secondly, it is important to

attempt to ascertain and explain the motivation and rationale for
the voting behavior of Southern congressmen.

In this area, an

effort is made to investigate the associations that may have existed
between voting behavior on economic issues and the personal and
constituent characteristics of each subject.

Finally, the Southern

response to economic measures is set in context to determine the
implications and importance of that response to Reconstruction history
and historiography.
A broad range of quantifiable and non-quantifiable data have
been collected for the purposes of this study.

Consideration is

22Initially, information was gathered for Southern Senators but
this study is limited to Southern members of the House of Repre
sentatives for several reasons. The House members were subject to
frequent popular elections, their constituency, which was definable
in specific terms, could be subjected to social and economic analysis,
and, in theory at least, the congressmen were responsible to that
constituency. The ten states considered are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas,
and Virginia. The eleventh ex-Confederate state, Tennessee, approved
the Fourteenth Amendment in 1866, and was readmitted to representation
by a joint resolution of Congress in July 1866. The state was thereby
spared the special rigors of congressional, reconstruction and is for
tnat reason excluded from consideration.

given to a comprehensive list of economic measures including issues
of taxation, the tariff, and federal aid to internal improvements
with particular attention to questions of finance such as contraction
and expansion of the currency, the demonetization and remonetization
of silver, public credit, and the overriding issue of specie resump
tion.

In addition to biographical information on the congressmen,

other bodies of quantifiable data collected include social and
economic profiles of each Southern congressional district and com
plete county-level election returns for the House of Representatives.23
ETon-quantifiable sources such as newspapers, manuscript collections,
and government documents have been surveyed to help determine Southern
attitudes on economic questions.
The nature of the topic and the volume of data necessitates
extensive use of the computer.

All quantifiable biographical infor

mation, election return data, and census statistics on each congres
sional district have been coded in machine-readable form for corre
lation with House roll-call records.

The OSIRIS II package of

computer programs designed for analysis of social science data has
been used to manipulate and analyze the quantifiable data.

In

addition to the usual data management programs, the OSIRIS II package
includes programs for calculating bivariate and multivariate
23jhe county-level election returns (the ten states, I868 -IB76 )
and a complete set of House roll-call records (all states, tOth to
Iflfth Congresses), were obtained in machine-readable form from the
Historical Archive of the Iirter-University Consortium for Political
Research at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Social and eco
nomic statistics on each congressional district were compiled from
Francis A. Walker (comp.), The Hinth Census of the United States (3
volumes, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1#72J.
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frequencies, ordinal and categorical correlations, partial and multiple
oh.
correlations, and Guttman scaling.
A special effort has been made to collect surviving biographical
data on each congressman under consideration for the purpose of con
structing biographical profiles of the delegations and for analytical
use.

The quantifiable data collected for each congressman includes

birth state, age (at the beginning of each term served), ethnicity,
level of education, Civil War military service, occupation (at the
time of service in Congress), former slaveholding status, value of
real and personal estate (1870 ), length of residency (in the state
served), state served, congressional district, party affiliation
prior to 1B60, secession stand, vote for president in i860, Southern
party faction (at the time of service), congressional party, prior
political experience, margin of victory (each election), contested
election status, and number of terms served.

The statistics com

piled for each congressional district included racial composition
2l*The OSIRIS II package, available for use at the Louisiana
State University Computer Center, was designed by the InterUniversity Consortium for Political Research (ICFR). Among the
better introductory guides to the computer and quantitative methods
are Edward Shorter, The Historian and the Computer: A Practical
Guide (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1971); Kenneth Janda,
Data Processing: Applications to Political Research (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1965); V. 0. Key, Jr., A Primer of
Statistics for Political Scientists (New York: Thomas~Y. Crowell,
195*05 Lee F, Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox,
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966)j Richard Jensen and Charles A. Dollar, The Historian1s
Guide to Statistics; Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research
(New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971)'; and Roderick Houd,
An Introduction to Quantitative Methods for Historians (Princeton;
Princeton University Press, 19737* For an excellent survey of quanti
tative work and the application of quantitative methods see: Robert P.
Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The Impact of the 'New'
Generation," Journal of American History. IX (March, 197*0, 1045-70.
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(expressed as percent white), per capita wealth, percent agricultural,
and land value per acre.**'*
The raw data have been coded in accordance with schemes utiliz
ing either dichotomous (two-valued) or geometric-progression codes.^
After punching the data on IBM cards (one card for each congressman
in each congress), the accumulated files of data for each congress and
for all congresses were subjected to programs to calculate univariate
frequencies (frequency distribution for each code and case and related
statistics), bivariate analysis (to create cross-tabulations which
classify selected variables in terms of every other variable), and in
certain select cases, multivariate analysis (to. test the association
between a selected dependent variable and two or more independent
variables)

She advantages of using the computer to cross-tabulate

^Other elements of data collected for each congressman included,
for example, religious affiliation and father's occupation* In both
cases, however, the data was deemed too incomplete for use in analysis.
26
For example, 1 = Democrat, 2 = Republican was the dichotomous
code employed for congressional party. For variables having more than
two values, geometric codes were devised to categorize or rank the
values; for example, the code devised for margin of victory was
0 = Unknown, 1 = 1-2$, 2 = 3-5S&, 3 - 6-10$, t = 11-20=6, 5 = over 20J&,
6 - unopposed or token opposition. Wherever possible, the standardized
codes (e.g., for ethnicity) created by the ICFR were utilized. The
codebook for biographical and congressional district data is repro
duced in Appendix I,

27
TO help preserve the original range and richness of the data,
multidigit codes were used for certain statistical procedures. For
example, multidigit codes for age, birth state, occupation, length of
residency, and congressional parly were used to calculate univariate
frequencies and percentages and descriptive statistics for each vari
able. To facilitate the use of programs for bivariate and multi
variate analysis the multidigit codes were collapsed to single digit
codes. Thus, for example, the two digit code for age (giving the exact
age in years at beginning of each tera) used in calculating univariate
frequencies was reduced to a single digit age group code with nine
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variables in a collective biography are evident.

The program designed

to calculate and display bivariate frequencies, for example, generated
hundreds of cross-tabulations, calculated various statistics to measure
the strength of each relationship, and created ancillary percentage
tables for each cross-tabulation.2® The results of the collective
biography are presented in Chapter II and as introductions to the
roll-caul analysis of each congress.
Initially several different methods of analyzing and displaying
the roll-call data were examined and tested.

Given the problem under

investigation, the most useful appeared to be a simple tabular pre
sentation showing the regional and party divisions occurring on
selected roll c a l l s . T h e relationships between a Representative's
performance on roll-call votes and his personal or constituent
characteristics have been examined by simple correlation techniques
devised to measure the strength of association between two or more
variables.

Provided the proper correlation coefficients and correct

tests for significance are applied (the selection of both depends
on the type of variables being compared), correlations may yield
useful information on the relationship between individual charactervalues. For bivariate and multivariate analysis the code values were
limited to the range of 0 through 9 *
2®For a model of the application of quantitative techniques to
collective biography, see Richard Jensen, "Quantitative Collective
Biography: An Application to Metropolitan Elites," in Quanti
fication in American History: Theory and .Research, ed. Robert P.
SwierengaTNew York: Atheneum, 1970), 3&9 -U05 .
2^See the note to Table 3-1: A and B.

istics and voting

"behavior. 30

The results of the correlation analysis

were at best disappointing— primarily because the Southerners tended
to vote either as a sectional bloc or as a party unit.

In either case,

member or constituent characteristics offer little insight into voting
behavior.

The results of the correlation analysis are presented only

when they are deemed significant.
Another statistical test employed whenever possible in this
study is Guttman scaling.

Scale analysis hinges on the assumption

that "each legislator has a more or less fixed attitude on each
issue and that he votes yea for measures which he approves and nay on
measures that are too strong for him to accept."

The use of

scaling necessitates the existence of a closely-related group of
issues which can be ranked on an ordinal scale from easiest-to-accept
(the lowest scale position) to hardest-to-accept (the highest scale
position).

If the assumption is acceptable and a scale of roll calls

can be properly defined, then each legislator may be assigned a scale
position, based on his voting record on a particular set of issues.
That scale position indicates how far the legislator was willing to
go in support of the issue defined by the scale set.32 The resulting
3°Por methods and limitations of correlation, correlation
coefficients, and tests of significance for correlations, see Key,
A Primer of Statistics. ch. IV; and Jensen and Dollar, Historian* s
Guide to Statistics, ch. III.
31
Jensen and Dollar, Historian*s Guide to Statistics, 116.
methods employed in scale construction are explained in
Chapter IV, Table 4-3: B. For the purposes of this study, scales
constructed on specific issues were found to be more useful than

scale positions have been cross-tabulated with biographical and con
stituent characteristics to offer a final, measure of the effect of
such variables on voting behavior. 33
In the following chapters the results of the application of
these quantitative techniques to the data are displayed and supple
mented with non-quantifiable data to determine the response of
Southern congressmen to economic measures.

The initial concern,

however, is to examine the Representatives as individuals. Chapter II
is devoted to a biographical and statistical profile of the men and
their constituencies.

general content scales containing a variety of economic issues. For
the latter type, constructed by session for the Forty-Second through
the Forty-Fourth Congresses, see Folmar, "Congressional Support for
Enforcement of Reconstruction Measures."
33fhe pioneer study in the refinement and application of
Guttman scaling is Duncan McRae, Jr., Dimensions of Congressional
Voting: A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in
the Eighty-First Congress''^Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 195$). See also: Anderson, Watts, and Wilcox,
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, ch. VI; Jensen and Dollar Historian1s
Guide to Statistics, llS-21; and Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E.
Beringer, The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress: A Study of the
Influences of Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting Behavior,
1&61-186~(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972)7 5-7.
The latter study is an excellent example of the application of
quantitative methods to a practicular historical problem.

CHAPTER II
THE CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES:
A PROFILE
Traditionally, legislative voting behavior has been studied
along party lines with the implication that political affiliation
is the chief determinant of voting behavior.

The advent of such

quantitative methods as legislative roll-call, analysis has done
little to alter the emphasis on political party,- in fact, the new
methods have tended to justify the traditional focus.

A recent

survey of the quantitative literature on legislative voting behavior
bluntly concludes that '^political party affiliation is the decisive
factor in legislative voting."-1- On certain well-defined issues, par
ticularly those on which a party has a declared position, it has been
demonstrated that political affiliation is the determining factor.
Several studies, for example, have found a high degree of correlation
between political affiliation and the emotionally-charged issues of
reconstruction policy and the "Southern Question.
^Robert P. Swierenga, "Computers and American History: The
Impact of the ’New' Generation," Journal of American History. EX
(March, 197*0, 1053.
^See, for example: John L. McCarthy, "Reconstruction
Legislation and Voting Alignments in the House of Representatives,
1863-1j869 " (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, 1970);
and John K. Folmar, "The Depletion of Republican Congressional Support
for the Enforcement of Reconstruction Measures: A Roll-Call Analysis,
1871-1877" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968 ).
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Explaining legislative voting patterns solely In terms of polit
ical party, however, has obvious limitations.

Most Importantly, it

assumes the existence of a party discipline and an ideological stance
seldom characteristic of the American party system.

Exclusive focus

on party also neglects the individual legislator and ignores a host
of other potential influences, including factors in the legislator*s
personal background, the social and economic characteristics of his
constituency, and his regional identification.
It is not to be denied that political affiliation and member
ship in some political faction were meaningful, particularly to
Southerners, during the era of Reconstruction.

The period has

spawned a host of troublesome political stereotypes.

Such political

epithets such as "carpetbagger," "scalawag," "bourbon," and "klansman"
immediately conjure up decided images of the individuals so designated.
t
Even the less opprobrious political party labels assume sectional
overtones and suggest a definite stance oh reconstruction issues.

As

a perceptive Georgia Republican explained,
In the Southern states, few men, if any, have taken their
side in the present politics from any opinions concerning
currency, taxation, expenditures, civil service, foreign
policy or Indian policy. Such matters are secondary here.
Men are Republican or Democrat accordingly as they are or
are not attached to the last three amendments of the con
stitution. 3
3Amos T. Akerman to George W. Friedley, August 22, 1876, in
Amos T. Akerman Letterbooks, University of Virginia library} quoted
from Keith Ian Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of
1876 and the End of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1973), 177-78. 'Akerman, a native Georgia Republican,
served as Attorney General for a short time in the first Grant Admin
istration; see Robert Sobel (ed.), Biographical Directory of the United
States Executive Branch. 177^-1921 (Westport, CT; Greenwood Publishing
Company, 1971),7.
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If issues of political reconstruction determined the political
affiliations of Southerners, one might question the relationship
between party and opinion on such "secondary" matters as economic
issues.

If opinion on economic issues did transcend party lines,

other factors must be sought to explain voting behavior on such
measures.

The party label submerges a wide range of individual and

constituent characteristics which may have been associated with a
legislator's response to economic issues.

The present chapter is

devoted to a collective appraisal of the Southern congressmen and
their constituencies.

On the one hand, an investigation of the

background of the Representatives facilitates reconsideration of the
familiar stereotypes; on the other, it suggests potential determinants
of voting behavior other than party for use in voting analysis in
subsequent chapters.
Most of the 185 congressmen under consideration left little
substantial evidence regarding their personal, economic, and political
backgrounds.

By virtue of their positions of leadership, the major

figures, such as Alexander K. Stephens of Georgia and I>. Q. C. Lamar
of Mississippi, have merited full-scale biographies.

The surviving

details of background and record of public service for the vast
majority, however, are all too briefly summed up in the Biographical
Directory of the American Congress.** For Democratic congressmen native
**The edition used for this study is Lawrence F. Kennedy (comp.),
Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 177^-1971 (Washington:
United States Printing Office, 1971J hereinafter cited as Biographical
Directory. Only 26 of the IB5 Southern congressmen merited inclusion
in Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone (eds.), Dictionary of American Bio
graphy (22 voIs. and Index, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons,

to the South, particularly those who participated in antebellum
politics or were in the Confederate service, the range of surviving
biographical data is much greater than it is for Republicans.

Within

the Republican party, background information is more abundant for the
natives (scalawags) than it is for the outsiders (carpetbaggers) and
for the fourteen blacks who served in Congress during the period. 5
The attitude of contemporary biographers toward Republicans in
general and blacks in particular was clearly expressed by the compiler
of a biographical directory of Georgia public officials:
The reader will preceive that no biographical sketches of
the Colored Members [of the state legislature] appear.
Aside from the manifest absurdity it would have been to
have written the lives of men who were but yesterday our
slaves, and whose past careers, probably, embraced such
menial occupations as boot-blacking, shaving, table-waiting
1928-1958), hereinafter cited as D.A.B. A greater number are in
cluded in such contemporary compilations as James Grant Wilson
and John Fiske (eds.), Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography
(7 vols., New York: D. Appleton and Company, I5&8-1900), and the
multi-volume National Cyclopaedia of American Biography (New York:
James T. White and Company, 1892— 77 tut rarely does the coverage
of relevant background information exceed that in the Biographical
Directory. Much the same can be said of Who Was Who in America:
The Historical Volume, 1607-1896 (Chicago: Marquis--Who's Who, 19**0).
More useful are the contemporary editions of Benjamin P. Poore (comp.),
Congressional Directory . . . . (Washington: Government Printing
Office, I868-IB76 ), for each session of each Congress; and the volumes
in William Horatio Barnes, History of Congress. . . . (New York:
W. H. Barnes and Company, issued every two years, 1870-1876 ), which
contains biographical sketches of each Senator and Representative in
each Congress.
^There is a tendency in recent revisionist studies dealing with
Reconstruction to avoid the use of the terms carpetbagger and scalawag
because of their often inaccurate connotations. The terms most often
substituted are outside white Republican and native white Republican.
For the sake of brevity and convenience, "carpetbagger" and "scalawag"
are used in this study to designate the white factions in the Repub
lican party* The terms are used with no implied assumption about the
character of those so designated.
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and the like, there was, perhaps another motive prompting
the Editor to exclude than from "biographical notice. It may
have "been that he felt a secret exaltation over the fact
that, though Congress could compel him to associate with
negroes in a deliberative [body], sit beside them in rail
road cars, etc., neither Congress, Military Government, a
triple Reconstruction, nor even anorher [sic] Amendment to
that national patch-work, the United States Constitution, ,
could compel him to publish their biographies in this book.
Despite such attitudes, several important sources do offer bio
graphical data on Southern congressmen.

In addition to the national

biographical directories and scattered autobiographies and memoirs,
useful sources include state and regional directories, state and
local histories, specialized monographs, and contemporary newspaper..
For Representatives formerly prominent in Confederate leadership or
worth more than $20,000, the Amnesty Papers, which contain their
personal applications for pardon to President Andrew Johnson, proved
to be especially revealing.? The manuscript population and agri
cultural schedules of the Ninth Census (1870) are a more valuable
^A. St. Clair-Abrams (ed.), Manual and Biographical Register
of the State of Georgia for 1871-2 (Atlanta: Plantation Publishing
Company’s Press,' 1 8 7 2 vi.
“
^Amnesty Papers, Office of the Adjutant General, Record Group 9k}
National Archives, hereinafter cited as Amnesty Papers. The petitions
for amnesty were filed by ex-Confederates who were excepted from
President Andrew Johnson's General Proclamation of Amnesty on May 29,
186?. Of the fourteen excepted classes, most were disqualified by
reason of service in the Confederate army at above the rank of
Colonel or by the famous thirteenth clause excepting voluntary
participants whose taxable property was worth over $20,000. For the
proclamation, see James D. Richardson (ccmp.), A Compilation of the
Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 178*1-1857 (lO vols., Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1897), VI, 310-12. For a general dis
cussion of the proclamation and its implementation, see Jonathan T.
Dorris, Pardon and Amnesty Under Lincoln and Johnson: The Restora
tion of the Confederates to Their Rights and Privileges. 1861-1895*.
(Chapel Kill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953)» 35, 211-13,
135-52, 221-27.
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source.

For most congressmen the voluminous schedules contain vital

data as to members and. size of family and. household, age, occupation,
state of birth, and the valuation of real and personal estate.®

De

spite the range of the source material, certain background details
(such as former political affiliations) remain unknown for several
individuals.

In particular, many Southern Republicans remain obscure,

transient figures who left little evidence of their presence other
than a residue of hatred among Southern whites— an animosity which
created the Republican stereotypes that historians are still trying
to dismantle.
The ten Southern states under consideration sent a total of
185 men to the House of Representatives from June 1868, when the first
states were readmitted to the Fortieth Congress, to the conclusion of
the Forty-Fourth Congress in March 1877.

The political composition of

the Southern delegations by Congress and state is outlined in
Table 2-1.

The delegations reflect the progress of reconstruction and

the viability of the Republican party at the state level over the time
period.

Proportionally, Texas, Virginia, and Georgia, all among the

last to be readmitted and the first to be redeemed, sent the fewest
Republicans to Congress.

In each of the three states, Republican

strength depended on the support of native unionists; eight of the
eleven Georgia Republicans, two of the three Texas Republicans, and
^Microfilm copies of the manuscript papulation and agriculture
schedules of the Ninth Census (1S70) for the ten states were used at
the following libraries: for Alabama, on deposit at the University of
Alabama; for Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Texas, and Virginia, on deposit at the University of North Carolina;
and for Louisiana and Mississippi, on deposit at Louisiana State
University.

TABLE 2 -1
POLITICAL PARTY BY CONGRESS AND STATE*

State

4Cth
Dem Rep

41st
Dem Rep

Congress and Party
42nd
43rd
44th
Dem
Rep
Dem Rep
Dem Rep

Alabama

■ •

6

2

4

3

3

3

5

6

Arkansas

• •

it

1

2

1

3

1

4

4

Florida

a •

1

1

1

1

2

1

3

5

3

7

3

9

Georgia

2

4

Louisiana

1

4

Mississippi

• •

• *

North Carolina

• •

r

South Carolina

• •

k

Texas

• •

• a

Virginia

• 4

Total

3

• •

4

• •

2
• 9

2
• •

Total
Dem Rep
11

15

5

9

2

3

19

11

• •

5

* 4

6

1

6

4

3

6

12

• •

5

• •

5

1

5

4

2

4

9

2

5

3

7

1

12

12

6

• 4

15

2
« •

7
5

5
• 4

4

• •

6

1

3

4

1

6

♦ m

J.

_4

JL

Jl

Jl

-2.

30

15

39

24

31

29

39

* •

• •

6

« •

11

J3

JL

IB

_ 8

49

17

86

97

3

totals include all individuals seated by the Bouse of Representatives including partial-term,
replacements for members who died during their term and those who were expelled, or lost their seat
by contest. The Biographical Directory is the source of political affiliation unless other sources
clearly indicate that the Directory is incorrect.

four of the eight Virginia Republicans were natives.

At the other

extreme, South Carolina, with, a large and active black constituency,
sent solidly Republican delegations to Congress throughout the period.
The political balance in the North Carolina delegations is a reflection
of what was, for a time, the best-balanced party system in the South
during Reconstruction.

As in Georgia, North Carolina Republicanism

drew its strength from an established contingent of native unionists.
Eight of North Carolina's twelve Republican congressmen were natives
of the state.
The Republican party remained relatively strong in the other
Southern states until after the elections to the Forty-Third Congress
in 1872.

In some Southern states, the Republican success in the 1672

elections was attributable to the fact that Horace Greeley, the
Liberal Republican candidate, sought and won the endorsement of the
Democratic national convention.

As a result, no viable Regular

Democratic candidate entered the presidential race, and Southern
Democrats and Conservatives faced the alternatives of either supporting
and campaigning on the liberal Republican ticket or staying home on
election day.9 The Republican gains in 1872 were, however, temporaxy.
In the long run, the national Republican schism in 1672 hurt the
Republican party in the South by widening the already existing split
between the carpetbagger and scalawag factions.
licans (primarily native)

who

The Southern Repub

joined Democrats to support the liberal

Republican ticket found that the experience eased their way back into
9&arle Dudley Ross, The liberal Republican Movement (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1919), passim.
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the Democratic party.
With the exception of South Carolina) where the Republican party
remained well entrenched, the most dramatic change in the fortunes of
the Republican party occurred between the congressional elections in
1872 and those in 187^.

The Democratic gains in 187^ were in part a

reflection of renewed Democratic organization and the redemption
process as Alabama and Arkansas joined the ranks of the redeemed
states.

But the Republicans) faced with the scandals of the Grant

administration and economic depression touched off by the Panic
of 1873) fared badly nation-wide in the congressional elections of
187^.

The overwhelming Republican majority in the Forty-Third

Congress became an almost equally decisive Democratic majority in
the Forty-Fourth Congress.

For the period as a whole, the Republi

cans slowly lost ground in the South, but for the five:Congresses
under consideration the ratio between Republicans (97) and Democrats
(88) facilitates comparison of the parties in terms of personal,
economic, and political background.10
To their Southern contemporaries, one of the first-noticed and
most important variations between Republican and Democratic congress
man lay in their regional origins and their length of residency in
the South.

A breakdown by party according to region of birth reveals

10The determination of total base numbers for each party to be
used in analysis is complicated by the instance of William Wilshire of
Arkansas who was elected as a Republican to the Forty-Third Congress
as a Conservative to the Forty-Fourth Congress. To avoid confusion,
Wilshire is considered a Republican in all calculations involving the
total membership in each party. He is considered a Democrat in the
analysis of the Forty-Fourth Congress.
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anticipated patterns (see Table 2-2).

While 88 percent of the Demo

crats were horn in the slave states, almost 50 percent of the Repub
licans were natives of the free states.

One-third of the Republicans

were b o m in New England or the Middle Atlantic states.

Sixteen

Republicans listed their birth place as either New York or Massacnusetts while Pennsylvania and Maine each contributed five Republicans.
Of the 113 congressmen b o m in the South, eighty came from the older
Atlantic seaboard states of Georgia (31), North Carolina (25), and
Virginia (24).

The individual Representative's length of residency

in the state he

served in Congress clarifies the relationship be

tween nativity and party (see Table 2-3).

By i860, eighty-four of

the eighty-eight Democrats resided in the states they eventually
represented during Reconstruction.

By contrast nearly half the

Republicans arrived in their adopted Southern states after the Civil
War began.

Well over one-third of the Republicans were either

mustered out of the army in the South or arrived there after April 1865 .
The individual's place of residency as of April l86l is used
as the basis for delineating the carpetbagger and scalawag factions
within the Republican party.

White Republican congressmen are

accordingly split into factions of forty carpetbaggers and forty-three
scalawags.13' The distinction between outsiders and natives in the
^Richard N. Current has estimated that at least 45 carpetbaggers
represented the South in Congress during Reconstm e t ion. Current's
figures included two carpetbaggers from Tennessee and three carpet
baggers, Horatio Bisbee, Jr. (EL), John E. Leonard (LA), and Joseph
Jorgenson (VA), who served in the Forty-Fifth Congress and are not con
sidered in this study. Current also counted three individuals who were
not carpetbaggers; Thomas Haughey (AL) was a scalawag, James Mann (LA)
was a Democrat, and Alexander M. McDonald (AR), while a carpetbagger,

TABLE 2-2
REGION OF BIRTH BY PARTY

DEMOCRAT
(n=88)

REGION

REPUBLICAN
(n*=97)

TOTAL
(n^l85)

New England

2

20

22

Middle Atlantic

6

13

19

Midwest

1

7

8

South

67 (76$)

1<6 ( W )

Border

10

If

llf

2

7

9

Foreign

113 (61#)

TABLE 2-3
LENGTH OF RESIDENCY (IN STATE SERVED) BY PARTY
2RI0D RESIDENCY
ESTABLISHED

DEMOCRAT
(n=88)

REPUBLICAN
(»=97)

TOTAL
(n=l85)

Native

5b

32

86

Prior to 1850

18

14

32

1850-1860

12

5

17

I86l-l861f

1

10

u

1865 or After

3

36

39

31

party is important as the two factions varied in background and in
their response to the issues of Reconstruction.

More often than not,

they also represented antagonistic factions at the state level.
The distribution of outsiders and natives by party and state
is outlined in Table 2-4.

Nearly 75 percent of the congressmen were

antebellum residents of the states they represented during Recon
served in the Senate rather than in the House. Current's figures do
not include three Representatives, Charles Fierce (AL), William J.
Hynes (AR), and John T. Deweese (NC), who definitely were carpetbag
gers. Fart of the problem in this instance stems from the fact that
Fierce and Deweese are erroneously referred to as Democrats in the
Biographical Directory. See Current, "Carpetbaggers Reconsidered,"
in A Festschrift for Frederick B. Artz, ed. David H. Pinkney and
Theodore Ropp (Durham: Duke University Press, 196k), 146, l47n; and
Current, Three Carpetbag Governors (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1967)7 4.
^%*lace of residency in l£6l is now commonly recognized as a
reference point for defining the carpetbag and scalawag factions.
Richard Current, for example, defines carpetbaggers as "white North
erners who went south after the bwrfntving of the Civil War and, sooner
or later, became active in politics as Republicans,11 but he notes that
in some cases it is impossible to be absolutely precise in classifying
a congressman as either a carpetbagger or a scalawag; see Current,
"Carpetbaggers Reconsidered," 144. Some scalawags, for example, were
being educated in the North when the war broke out and either joined
the Union a m y or declined to return to their native states until the
hostilities were concluded. In such cases the individuals are consid
ered to be natives, only temporarily away from their Southern residences.
The origins and character of the scalawags are considered in Allen W.
Trelease, "Who Were the Scalawags?" Journal of Southern History, XXIX
(November, 1963), 445-68; Otto H. Olsen, '^Reconsidering the Scalawags,"
Civil War History, XII (December, 1968), 304-20; and Sarah Woolfolk
Wiggins, "Whafe is a Scalawag?" Alabama Review, XXV (January, 1972),
56 -6 1 . The men considered scalawags in this study were antebellum
residents of states they served during Reconstruction with two
exceptions. Christopher C. Bowen moved from Georgia to South Carolina
in 1862 and John L. Morphis moved from Tennessee to Mississippi in
IB63 . As both men were residents of the slave states prior to the
war and both served the Confederacy, they are classified as scalawags.
For Bowen's varied career, see Biographical Directory, 617-18; and
Francis Butler Simkins and Robert H. Woody, South Carolina During
Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1932), llET; f*or Moiphis, see Biographical Directory, 1438-39*

TABLE 2-4
SOUTHEM PARTY FACTION BY STATE
DEMOCRATS

State

Natives

Outsiders

(n^8U)

«»*}

'REEUBItCCANS
Whites
Blacks
Natives
Outsiders
Natives
Outsiders
(Scalawags) (Carpetbaggers )
(n=10)
(n^O)
(n=4)
(n=43)

AX.

11

• •

6

6

3

AR

5

• *

it

5

••

m•

FL

2

••

2

•*

l

GA

19

•»

8

2

1

«•

LA

5

1

3

8

1

•

MS

4

• *

3

5

*•

NC

12

• •

8

3

1

SC

* +

• *

5

4

4

TX

10

1

%

1

• «

• *

VA

16

2

4

4

• *

♦ •

• •

•

«

•
1

• •

2
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struction.

Natives dominated the delegations of Georgia, North

Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and. Alabama.

Each state sent at least

one non-native to Congress, hut "outsiders" were proportionally most
numerous in the delegations of Florida and Louisiana.

Blacks were

even more unevenly distributed; South Carolina and Alabama contri
buted nine of the fourteen black

congressmen.^

Age was one of the most evident differences between Southern
Democratic and Republican congressmen.

The median age for all members

of the House of Representatives at the beginning of their first texm
was slightly over forty-four years.^ As Table 2-5 indicates, the
median age of Southern Democrats upon entering Congress in most
^3por the purpose of analysis, the blacks and the Democrats
are each considered as a group without regard to whether they were
natives or outsiders. For the blacks, race is far more important than
length of residency and contemporaries classified blacks in a category
of their own. Similarly, the four Democratic outsiders do not merit
treatment separate from native Democrats. Their acceptance of the
Democratic party overshadows their length of residency in the South.
See Current, "Carpetbaggers Reconsidered," 143-44. Southern conser
vatives preferred to refer to Democrats who arrived in the South after
the war as "settlers"— rather than carpetbaggers. The conservative
Richmond Whig, for example, emphasized that Gilbert C. Walker, a yankee who moved to Norfolk in 1B64, was a "settler— not a carpetbagger.11
When Walker successfully ran for Governor in 1869 as the candidate of
the "true Republicans" (a conservative coalition Which opposed the
regular Republicans), the Whig declared that "we will beat them with a
Northern man who is not a carpetbagger." See Richmond Whig. January 22,
1J869, May 4, IB69 . Walker had been a Douglas Democrat before the war
and was later elected to Forty-Fourth Congress as a conservative
Democrat. See Biographical Directory. 1869; and Jack P. Maddex, Jr.,
The Virginia Conservatives. 1867-1^79: A Study in Reconstruction
Politics (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970),
74-75 .
ll+Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297 . Rice's time series on median age by
Congress indicates that the percent of first termers in the House
ranged from 46 percent in the Fortieth Congress to 58 percent in the
Forty-Fourth Congress. The median age for all Representatives (in
cluding first termers) for the five Congresses is slightly under 46.

TABLE 2-5
MEDIAN AND AVERAGE AGE BY FARCY AND STATE*

State

DEMOCRATS
Median
Average

REPUBLICANS
Median Average

COMBINED
Average
Median

AL

44.0

42.7

40.0

41.7

41.5

42.2

AH

44.0

43.2

37.0

40.0

42.0

41.3

EL

55.0

55.0

28 .0

29.0

32.0

39^

GA

45.0

45.0

34.0

38.2

42.5

42.5

LA

44.0

44.2

32.5

34.2

3^.5

37-5

MS

48.5

48.3

33.0

36.1

36.0

39-8

NC

45.0

45.9

44.5

44.0

45.0

45.0

SC

• •

• •

38.0

38.8

38.0

38.8

TX

44.0

42.7

45.0

47.6

44.0

43.3

VA

47.0

47.7

35.5

39.0

!j6.5

45.0

Total

45.0

45.3

37.0

39.1

42.0

42.0

aAge figures are based on the age of each Representative at the
beginning of his first term in the House. The Biographical Directory
is the source of birthdate in all but a few cases in which other
sources clearly indicate that the Directory is incorrect.

states was very close to the national figure*
Democrats the median age was forty-five.

For all Southern

By contrast, the Republi

cans were much younger with a median age of thirty-seven.

Sixty per

cent of the Republicans were under the age of forty at the beginning
of their service while only 21 percent of the Democrats were in the
same age group.

The bulk of the Danocrats (73 percent) were in their

forties or fifties as compared to only 37 percent of the Republicans.
The carpetbaggers and blacks provided the youth in the Republican
party.

Almost 75 percent of the carpetbaggers and 86 percent of the

blacks were under forty years of age, and over 50 percent of each
faction were under the age of thirty-five. The age distribution for
the scalawags is remarkably similar to that of the Democrats; over
half the scalawags were forty-five or older.
Beyond the general disparity in age between Democrats and
Republicans it is difficult to enumerate significant age patterns.
Florida, the youngest and least populated state, represents the
extremes.

Florida's three Republican congressmen (all carpetbaggers)

were among the youngest (median age 28), but the two Florida Democrats,
both long time residents, were much older (median age 55),

Republi

can Representatives from Louisiana (median age 32.5), Mississippi
(median age 33 ), and Georgia (median age 3*0 were also remarkably
young.

The combined party figures indicate that the older and more

settled states like Virginia and North Carolina tended to send older
men to Congress,

This was partially due to the fact that they came

under Democratic control early in the period— as did Texas and
Georgia.

Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, m i
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redeemed later, sent younger delegations.

The lower median age

figures also reflect the preponderance of carpetbaggers and blacks In
these delegations.

In terns of age, as In other respects, the North

Carolina delegations were the most balanced with twelve Republicans
(median age 44.5) and twelve Democrats (median age 4-5). The older
median age of North Carolina Republicans Indicates the influence of
native unionists in the party. ^
On an individual level, the Republicans represent the extremes
in age.

The South sent two twenty-five year old Republicans to the

House during the period.

The youngest, John Auber Snith, a Virginian,

was six months over the minimum age of twenty-five when seated by the
Forty-Third Congress.

The same House admitted twenty-five year old

John Roy lynch, an ex-slave from Mississippi.

The only Southern

congressman b o m in the eighteenth century, Nathaniel Boyden of
^ I n terms of age, the Republican Representatives were much
younger on the average than Southern leaders in the antebellum state
legislatures, the secession conventions, and the Confederate Congress.
Median age values for Democratic congressmen are quite similar to
those of earlier Southern politicians. See the summary statistics on
age in Ralph A. Wooster, The People in Power: Courthouse and Statehouse in the Lower South»~i550-1p60 "(Khoxville: University of Tennessee
Press, 1969)> 29; Wooster, The Secession Conventions of the South
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), 16, 30 -31 , 53, 69 , 85 ,
105, 125, 142, 158 , 195-96, and Richard E. Beringer, "A Profile of the
Members of the Confederate Congress," Journal of Southern History,
XXXIII (November, 1967), 518-41. With some variation, Beringer’s
findings were published in Thomas B. Alexander and Richard E. Beringer,
The Anatomy of the Confederate Congress; A Study of the Influences of
Member Characteristics on Legislative Voting Behavior, I86l-l665
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1972), ch. 1. The members
of these earlier Southern representative bodies are obviously not
strictly comparable to the Southern congressmen. These studies are,
however, similar collective biographies and their findings regarding
membership characteristics are used to note variations between
previous Southern political leadership and Reconstruction leadership
as presented by Southern congressmen.
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north Carolina, m s also a Republican.

Boyden, a long time Unionist

Whig iriio had served in the Thirtieth Congress (18*47-18*4-9), was
seventy-one when elected to the Fortieth Congress in 1 8 6 8 . The
first of the congressmen to die was James Mann, a "carpetbag" Demo
crat from Louisiana, who succumbed to "acute brain fever" on August
26, 1868, thirty-nine days after the Louisiana delegation was
admitted to the Fortieth Congress.

The only other two Southerners

not to live into the 1870* s fell to assassins.

A disgruntled Demo

crat shot and killed carpetbagger James Hinds in October 1868 in a
prelude to the Brooks-Baxter War in Arkansas.

The second victim,

scalawag Thomas Haughey, was assassinated by a supporter of his
carpetbagger opponent while making a political speech in Courtland,
Alabama, in August 1869*

The last surviving Southern congressmen

were Frederick G. Bromberg of Alabama, who died in 1930 at the age of
ninety-three, and John Roy lynch of Mississippi who died at the age of
ninety-two.^
^^Biographical Directory. 1716 (Smith), 1318 (lynch), 623
(Boyden); John R, lynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, ed. William C.
Harris (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrili Company,' 1970), xiv-xxvi;
lynch, Reminiscences of an Active Life:
The Airbobiogranhy of JohnRoy
Lynch, ed. John Hope Franklin (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press,
1970), Introduction; Nathaniel Boyden to
Andrew Johnson, August 9>
1865, Amnesty Papers, North Carolina.
^Biographical Directory. 1333 (Mann), 1122 (Hinds), 1087
(Haughey), o*4l (Bromberg), 1318 (lynch); Speech of W. Jasper Blackburn
(memorial to James Mann), Cone* Globe. *40 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 5,
Appendix, 2*40; The Daily Picayune (New Orleans), August 27, August 28,
1868 (Mann); Martha Ann Ellehburg, "Reconstruction in Arkansas" (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Missouri, 1967)* 39-1*Oj 53-5^;
Daily Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), October 2*4, October 31, 1868;
Thomas Haughey to Benjamin P. Poore, December 28, 1868, in Haughey MSS,
1868 , University of Alabama Library, Tuscaloosa; Sarah Van Vorhis Woolfolk, "The Role of the Scalawag in Alabama Reconstruction" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1965 )> H 9 > 287 .

The Democratic congressmen outranked Republicans in terms of
Tfl
level of formal education.
The available evidence indicates that
nine Republicans and two Democrats had no formal schooling, hut five
of the Republicans were blacks who had little educational opportunity
until after the war,

A sharper contrast between members of the two

parties exists at the college or university level of education.
Over two-thirds of the Democrats had attended a college or university
and 55 percent had taken at least one degree.

By comparison, only

k6 percent of the Republicans gave evidence of having attended college

and only 28 percent had received a college degree.
college training were also sharply sectional.

The sources of

Of those who took

degrees, only nine of the forty-eight Democrats attended college out
side the slave states, and only nine (all scalawags) of the twentyseven Republicans attended Southern institutions.

The most popular

institution was the University of North Carolina with ten graduates
among the congressmen, followed by the University of Virginia with
eight, and the University of Georgia (Franklin College), Bnory College,
and Harvard College with five each.

Only two of the Southerners took

degrees abroad.
^Education is one of the most difficult background character
istics to measure. Obviously, some congressmen who were self-educated
or who received only an elementary education were as “well-educated"
as others who had one or more college degrees. The problem of meas
uring educational levels is further complicated by the fact that
a majority of the congressmen were trained as lawyers (see below).
Many read law and were admitted to the bar after only rudimentary
formal education. Others turned to law after college or law school
training. In the absence of a more satisfactory means of measurement
the congressmen have been ranked according to the highest level of
formal (institutional) education.
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On an individual level, Randall Gibson of Louisiana was among
the better educated Democrats.

The son of a wealthy Terrebonne Parish

sugar planter, Gibson received his initial education from private
tutors in Louisiana and at his mother's home in Kentucky.

He attended

a Yale preparatory school, was graduated ac the head of the Yale
class of 1853, took a law degree from the University of Louisiana
(now Tulane) in 1855, and spent the next three years traveling in
Europe before settling down to sugar planting.-*-9 The Republicans
had no one comparable to Gibson in educational experience, and only
three Republicans had more than one degree.

Of the three, the

experience of Charles Buckley of Alabama best reveals the restless
movement characteristic of many carpetbaggers.

Buckley began his

public schooling in his birthplace at UnadlUa, New York, and com
pleted it in Freeport, Illinois, where his parents have moved to buy
a farm.

In i860 he was graduated from Beloit College'in Wisconsin,

returned to his native state, and took another degree from Union
Theological Seminary (New York City) in 1863*

He entered the army as

a chaplain in the U. S. Colored Volunteer Infantry and served with
the Louisiana Colored Infantry before Joining the Freedman's Bureau
in Alabama.20

For sheer variety though, few could match the educational

experience of Beverly Brown Douglas of Virginia.

After being graduated

from a private academy in King William County, Douglas attended William
^-^Donald Eugene Dixon, "Randall Lee Gibson of Louisiana,
1832-1892" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University,
1971), 6-22.
20Joel Campbell Dubose (ed.), Notable Men of Alabama. Personal
and Geneological with Portraits (2 vols., Atlanta: Southern Historical
Association! 190*0. I. 25-2B7l3iographical Directory, 662.

40

and Mary, Yale, and the University of Edinburgh in Scotland before
returning home to study law under the renowned Beverly Tucker.

He

took a law degree from William and Mary in 1843.21
The educational experience of Gibson, Bucitley, and Douglas was
exceptional, but as a group, the educational level of the Southerners
was far above that of their constituents and probably compared
favorably with Representatives from other sections.

Even the men

who possessed only an elementary or secondary education often had
read law privately and had been admitted to the bar before the wax.
In terms of education, admission to the bar served as the great
equalizer; an individual's ability at the practice of law over
shadowed his formal educational attainments.
A survey of the vocations pursued by the 185 Southerners in
dicates that the majority were engaged in the practice of law or
agriculture or both.

A full 58 percent listed their occupation as

lawyers while 20 percent were primarily fanners or planters.

The

latter figure is surprisingly low given the overwhelmingly rural nature
of the South.

22

It is almost certain that more congressmen were
4

^Lynn Gardiner Tyler (ed.), Encyclopedia of Virginia Biography
(5 vols., New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, 1915)7 III)
114-15; Biographical Directory, 875.
22The studies of Southerners in other representative bodies
indicate a much higher concentration in agricultural pursuits. Beringer found that 58 percent of the membership of the Confederate Congress
were engaged in agriculture; see Beringer, "Members of the Confederate
Congress," 526-27 . Wooster's study of seven Southern legislatures
in I&50 and i860 indicates that in most states the percentage of
membership engaged in agriculture ranged from 50 to 65 percent. In
most states, the planters and faxmers outnumbered lawyers in the
secession conventions. See Wooster, People in Power, 35i and Wooster,
Secession Conventions. 17-18, 31, 53, 70, 85 , 106, 126, 143, 158 , 196 .
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engaged in agriculture than is indicated in Table 2-6.

The problem of

classification is illustrated by Archibald T. MacIntyre of Georgia.
MacIntyre is listed in the census of i860 and 3870 and other sources
as a lawyer.

In i860, however, he owned eighty-four slaves and in

I870 he lived in a rural area and owned 6,400 acres of land valued
at $50,000.

MacIntyre was therefore classified as a planter.

Similarly, all- sources list Dudley M. Du Bose of Georgia as a lawyer
and the 1870 census found him living in the town of Washington, but
the census also lists his real estate holdings at $50j000.

Du Bose* s

primary occupation is listed as a lawyer with agricultural interests,
even though his real estate holdings indicate he could have been a
q Il
farmer with a secondary interest in the practice of law.
Over half of the congressmen had two or more occupations. Same
like Gilbert C. Walker of Virginia were involved in so many pursuits
that they defy classification.

Walker, a Democratic "settler,"

practiced law and was the organizer and president of a Norfolk bank.
He had interests in the iron industry and railroads and owned real
estate valued at $18,000 which suggests agricultural inte r e s t s . T h e
23joseph Karl Menn, "The Large Slaveholders of the Deep South,
i860" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1964),
857-58; Manuscript Census, 1870, Population and Agricultural
Schedules, Georgia, Thomas County; MacIntyre to Andrew Johnson,
July 25, 3865* Amnesty Papers, Georgia.
2Vanuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Georgia, Wilkes
County; Biographical Directory. 883.
25d.A.B. , XIX, 344-45; Biographical Directory. 1869; Manuscript
Census, I870, Population Schedules, Virginia, Norfolk County; Maddex,
The Virginia Conservatives, 74-75> 91; Catherine Silverman, "'Of Wealth,
Virtue, and Intelligence': The Redeemers and Their Triumph in Virginia
and North Carolina," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, City University
of New York, 1971), 30-31.

4

42

TABLE 2-6
OCCUPATION BY PARTY6,
DEMOCRATS
(n^88)
LEGAL
Lawyer
Lawyer/Judge
Lawyer/Farmer
Lawyer/Merchant
Lawyer/Editor
Lawyer/Railroads
Lawyer/Banker
Lawyer/Mining
Lawyer/Educator

37
1
15

(42?0

<
1 ( If
4
2
2
1

(17#)
'

.

m

REHJBUCANS
(n=97)
27
3
4
2
4
3

(28#)
336)

(35#)
( 2#)
(10#)
3#

1
2

iw

2 ( 830
(7456)

43

(44#)

16

(18#)

21

(21#)

PROFESSIONAL
(e.g., Doctor, Educator,
Engineer)

4

( 5#)

14

(14#)

BUSINESS
(e.g., Merchant, Grocer,
Lumber Business)

3

( 3#)

AGRICULTURAL

64
4
19

3 ( 2#)

65

Total Legal

TOTAL
(n=l85)

9(9#)

MANUAL TRADES
(e.g., Carpenter, Brick
layer, Pilot)

8(8#)

OFFICEHOLDER15

2

( 2#)

108

( 1#

( 1#
(58#)

37 (20#)

IB

(10#)

12

( 7#)

8(4#)

2

(1#)

Occupations were cross-checked through a variety of sources
including the Biographical Directory, the population schedules of the
manuscript census, and the Congressional Globe. Individuals were
classified according to their primary vocation (outside politics) at
the time of their service in the House of Representatives.
^No occupation other than politician or public official was found
for the two congressmen classified as officeholders. Both held federal
positions (appointive) at the time of their election to the House.

tendency toward dual occupations necessitated a classification system
to account for the various occupational combinations. In Table 2-6
the Southerners are classified in six primacy occupational classes.
The full range of occupational combinations -within the primary legal
category are reproduced to indicate the variety of combinations.^6
Occupational breakdown according to political affiliation
indicates several variations between the parties.

Less than 10 percent

of the Democrats pursued vocations outside law and agriculture.

The

Republicans displayed more diversity with a full third of the party
involved in pursuits other than law and agriculture.

No significant

variation in occupation exists within the Republican party with the
exception than seven of the eight individuals in the manual trades
class were blacks.

The occupational profile for the scalawags might

have been expected to be very similar to native Democrats, but a
breakdown by party faction indicates that the profiles for scalawags
and carpetbaggers are almost identical.

The same variations in

occupation that existed between Republicans and Democrats also pre
vailed between scalawags and Democrats.
Lawyers, rather than planters, farmers, and businessmen,
dominated the congressional delegations from the South.

Including

those who had prepared for law but were not actively practicing,
68 percent of the congressmen (8 h percent of the Democrats, 5^ percent

of the Republicans) were qualified to practice law.

By contrast, only

26For the complete occupational classification system.
Appendix I.

See

Uh

31 percent (35 percent of the Democrats, 25 percent of the Republicans)
were engaged primarily or tangentially in agriculture.

While these

percentages must be considered minimal figures, it is notable that
less than ten percent of all the Southerners had economic interests
exclusively in agriculture.

Professional and business interests

rivaled those of agriculture.

Thirty-five percent of the congress

men (23 percent of the Democrats, k2 percent of the Republicans)
had some interest in professional or mercantile pursuits or such
economic concerns as railroads, banking, shipping, manufacturing,
and extractive industries.

Quite clearly, agricultural interests

no longer dominated the congressional delegations of the still rural
South. 27
Efforts to determine the level of personal wealth for each of
the 135 Southerners from the population schedules of the 1370 census
aQ
were only moderately successful.
Of the 136 individuals found in
the Confederate Congress, Beringer found that 78 percent of
the membership were engaged in law and 58 percent had agricultural
interests with all other vocations totalling 20 percent (the percent
ages do not tally to 100 percent because many had more than one
occupation); see Beringer, "Confederate Congress," 526-27* The ratio
between those involved in agricultural pursuits and lawyers in most
of the Southern state legislatures in 1350 and i860 was over two to
one; see Wooster, People in Power, 35*

28The census schedules were the only source systematically
searched for figures on wealth. In several cases, the wealth figures
from the 1870 census were cross-checked with figures from the 1360
census schedules for agriculture and free and slave population and
with the agricultural schedules of the 1880 census. The petitions
for pardon in the .Amnesty Papers (particularly those coming under
the Thirteenth Exception) are also a useful source for cross-checking
wealth. These alternate sources have not been used, however, to
project a congressman's wealth in 1370. A more accurate determination
of individual wealth would have to take into account such sources as
the county and state tax assessment rolls in scattered depositories
in the South.

voluminous population schedules, twenty-two did not admit to having
any real or personal property.

Three of the rattaining individuals

were dead by the time the census takers began their enumerations In
June 1870 and the others were either unlisted or raaained undis
covered.2^ The amount of real and personal estate reported by the
individual congressmen is subject to dispute on several accounts.
Some individuals may have exaggerated the value of their estates
to make themselves appear more prosperous than they actually were.
Other individuals may have underestimated the value of their property
out of personal modesty or because of a simple hesitancy to make
known the true value of their property for tax purposes.

In cases

in which the real estate holdings are agricultural, the figures
given in the population schedules may be cross-checked with figures
for the improved and unimproved acreage and the estimated cash value
of land, implements, livestock, and productions given in the agricul2^The problems associated with locating the congressmen in
the population schedules are considerable. Before searching the
schedules, it is necessary to determine as accurately as possible
the residence of each individual as of Jhne 1870 when the census
takers began their enumeration. In several cases, the exact
residence could not be determined and the search had to be abandoned
after examining the returns for all probable locations. Occasionally
the returns are totally illegible or in such poor condition as to be
of no value. In still other cases, the individuals may have been
listed, but simply overlooked. The problems associated with finding
the four individuals who susposedly resided in New Orleans, for
example, are self-evident— given the fact that almost 200,000 people
lived in Orleans Parish in IB7 0 . Furthermore, there is no guarantee
that those undiscovered congressmen were even listed in the census.
The census takers were overwhelming Republican and not a few were
Negroes. Those individuals who were "unreconstructed" may have been
unwilling to submit to cross-examination by a Radical census taker.
The reverse is also true. Some census takers were simply irresponsible.
Under-enumeration Is a special problem in the 1870 census, particularly
in South Carolina.

tural schedules.

Still others simply declined to give the census

takers any estimation of their real and personal wealth although
other sources indicate they were property

ow n er s. 3°

Overall, the

wealth figures are probably biased in favor of well-established
individuals (primarily Democrats) with medium to large estates.
Despite the incomplete figures and misgivings about the reliability
of census figures, the infoxmation in Table 2-7 gives a general
indication of variations in wealth in relation to political affil
iation.
Judged by the standards of the time, the Representatives were
generally well-to-do men of property with only two admitting to an
estate of le3s than $1,000.

At the other end of the spectrum, four

Democrats claimed a valuation exceeding $100,000.

The richest of the

four, William Smith Herndon of Texas, had accumulated real estate
valued at $122,000 and a personal estate of $55*000 by the time he
was thirty-two.

The census taker listed Herndon simply as a lawyer,

but his large landholdings in 1&70 indicate additional interests.

He

was a prominent railroad attorney end general solicitor and he was
later involved in railroad construction and served as vice president
of the Kansas and Gulf Shortline Company. ^

More is known about

3°rhe census figures are defective in other ways. As Beringer
has noted, the census figures on wealth give no indication of the
extent to which the estates were mortgaged. But he adds that "the
fact of a mortgage would not necessarily detract from the status the
owner held in his community . . . . Debt, after all, may indicate
wealth as well as poverty"; see Beringer, "Confederate Congress," 530n.
^Biographical Directory. 1110; Walter Prescott Webb and H.
Bailey Carroll (e'cLs.), The Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin: Texas
State Historical Association, 1952), I, 802; Sid S. Johnson, Texans

SABLE! 2-7
PERSONAL AND REAL ESTATE
VALUATION (1870) BY PARTY*
Estate
Valuation

DEMOCRAT
(n=88 )

REPUBLICAN
(**=97)

17

32

Undeclared

6

16

Under $1,000

1

l

$1,000 - 9,000

21

28

10,000 - 19,000

16

10

20,000 - 1+9,000

19

7

50,000 - 99,000

k

3

100,000 and Over

h

Unknown

• •

aSource: Federal Manuscript Census, 1870, Population
Schedules for the ten states.
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Effingham Lawrence of Louisiana who was probably worth considerably
more than the $15^,000 he claimed in 1870.

The agricultural schedules

list his Plaquemines Parish holdings at 2,680 acres; the value of the
average acre of land in the swampy sugar-producing parish has been
estimated at $28 in 1370*

Lawrence may have had seme useless swamp

land, hut he also had same of the best sugar land as is evidenced by
his production of 20,000 gallons of molassas, as well as orchard land
yielding $6,000 of oranges for I869-IB70 . In addition he had live
stock valued at $20,000 and equipment (probably a sugar mill) worth
$23,000.

His total productions for the year were valued at $120 ,000.32

Georgians ranked third and fourth in wealth*

Archibald MacIntyre's

sugar lands along the Ochlockonee River in Southern Georgia were
worth only $50,000 but he claimed an additional $60,000 in personal
property.

Nelson Tift, who styled himself a "merchant and farmer"

had $107*500 wrapped up in a number of ventures including land,
lumber, flour, and c o m meal mills and a packing plant, as well as
Who Wore the Grayfn.n*. 1907), 68 -69 ; John Pressley Carrier, "A
Political History of Texas Luring the Reconstruction" (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971)* ^91.
3%anuscript Census, 1370, Population and Agricultural Schedules,
Louisiana, Plaquemines Parish; Thomas J. Fressly and William H. Sco
field, Farm Real Estate Values in the United States by Counties. 13501359 (Seattle: University of Washington Press', 19657* 57* Joseph Karl
Menn, The large Slaveholders of Louisiana— 1360 (New Orleans: Pelican
Publishing Company, 196*0, 3C®7 310-11. For a description of Lawrence's
operation in an earlier period, see J. Carlyle Sitterson, 'Magnolia
Plantation, 1852-1362: A Decade of a Louisiana Sugar Estate," Missis
sippi Valley Historical Review.. XXV (September, 1938), 197-210.
Lawrence served less than a day in the House of Representatives. He
was seated on the last day of the Forty-Third Congress after success
fully contesting Republican incumbent Jacob H. Sypher. He had the
opportunity to vote on five roll calls; he was absent for two and voted
for three— none of which were economic measures.

railroads,33

For those whose wealth is known, almost 70 percent of

the Democrats were worth more than $10,000 with a healthy 1*4 percent
worth more than $20,000,

The median property valuation for Democrats

was $17,000 (average $26,815),

By contrast, the property of almost

60 percent of the Republicans was valued at less than $10,000 with
only 20 percent worth more than $20,000.

Within the Republican

party, the average property valuation was $7,500 (average $14,032)
for scalawags, $10,450 (average $14,166 ) for carpetbaggers, and
$6 ,8 0 0 (average $5 ,270) for blacks.
Information on the political antecedents of most congressmen
is incomplete. Thirty-one of the thirty-seven identified as members
of the Democratic party during the 1850* s remained in the party
through Reconstruction.

Of the remaining six, four became scalawags,

and two became carpetbaggers.

Of the thirty-four identifiable former

Whigs, twenty-two served as Democrats and twelve as scalawags during
Reconstruction.

Only eight (all carpetbaggers) were positively

identified as belonging to the Republican party before the war.

While

the data is far too fragmentary to engender conclusions, it is clear
that former Whigs did not naturally gravitate into the Republican
party.

Of the fifty Representatives whose vote in the presidential

election of i860 is known, twenty-two supported John C. Breckinridge,
thirteen favored Stephen A. Douglas, nine voted for John Bell, and
3%anuscript Census, 1870, Population and Agricultural Schedules
Georgia, Thomas County; MacIntyre to Andrew Johnson, July 25 , 1865 ,
Amnesty Papers, Georgia; Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules
Georgia, Dougherty County; Tift to Andrew Johnson, June 27, 1865 ,
Amnesty Papers, Georgia.
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tea (all carpetbaggers) are known to have supported Abraham Lincoln.
All the Breckinridge votes came from Democrats, while the votes for
Douglas and Bell were proportionally split between Democrats and
scalawags. 3^
Information is more complete on the congressmen's attitudes
toward secession and their subsequent service in the Civil War (see
Table 2-8).

If the blacks are excluded, only twenty (all Democrats)

were identified as secessionists while 103 were unionists (43 unknown).
It is interesting that nearly half of the Democrats took a unionist
or cooperationist stance during the secession crisis.

The Democratic

unionists, however, tended to join the Confederacy once the war
began.

While 80 percent of the Democrats supported the Southern effort

in civil and military capacities, over half the scalawags declined
to serve the Confederacy.
Given the political instability of the Reconstruction period,
the level of prior political experience remained high for both
Democrats and Republicans.

As anticipated, the native Democrats had

the edge over their Republican counterparts in terms of total political
3^While some association exists between an individual's party
during the 1850 s, vote for president in i860 , position on secession,
and civil war service, in no case has one position been used to
predict another. If an individual voted for Breckinridge in i860,
for example, it does not necessarily follow that he was also a
secessionist. In fact, for individuals whose position in both cases
is known, three Breckinridge supporters were declared unionists in the
subsequent crisis over secession (contingency coefficient C = .6 6 for
cross-tabulation of vote for president and position on secession).
Likewise, the association between position on secession and civil war
service is relatively strong (contingency coefficient C = .51; mean
square contingency coefficient phi = .46 for a reduced 2x2 table),
but it is far from being perfect.

TABLE 2-8
POSITION ON SECESSION AND CIVIL WAR
SERVICE BY PARTY
DEMOCRATS
(n=88 )

REPUBLICANS
Scalawag
Carpetbagger
(n=^3 )
(n=lfO)

Position on Secession
Secessionist
Unionist
Unknown

20
Ifl
27

27
lf>

40
..

Civil War Service
Confederate
Union
Nonparticipant

70® (80$)
2C ( 2$)
16 (18$)

15^ (3:
3 (7$)
21
(^9$)

35 (88$)
*f(10$)

Unknown

. . I f

1

aTotal includes four individuals who had no identifiable
military service but served the Confederacy in civil capacities.
^Total includes two individuals who had no identifiable
military service but served the Confederacy in civil capacities.
°Mann (LA) and Connor (TX).

experience, "but the Republicans' general level of experience belies
the commonly accepted notion that they were political novices.

Only

ten Democrats and seven Republicans had no discoverable political
experience at the beginning of their first term in Congress.^

At

the highest level, eight Democrats and four Republicans had served
in the House of Representatives prior to the war, nine Democrats had
experience in the Confederate Congress, and one, Alexander Stephens
of Georgia, had been Vice President of the Confederate States of
America.

Fifty-six percent of the Democrats and 38 percent of the

Republicans had served one or more terns in state legislatures— the
principal stepping stone to congressional service.

The so-called

"Black and Tan" constitutional conventions held in each of the ten
states in I867 and 1868 provided experience and a forum for fortyfour of the ninety-seven Republicans.

In several cases, their role

as delegates to those conventions constituted their only substantial
political

e x p e r i e n c e . 36

Many Representatives from both parties had

served in the state and local judiciary systems (see Table 2-9).
The extent and variety of political experience varied widely
35phe figures for those with no political experience are undoubt
edly too high; it may be assumed that information for some of these
individuals was not discovered. Most had been active in state and
local party politics and several had been unsuccessful candidates for
political office prior to their election to Congress.
3^The forty-four Republican delegates to the Black and Tan
Conventions included sixteen carpetbaggers, nineteen scalawags, and
nine blacks. According to Richard Hume's voting analysis, thirtyeight of the forty-four were radicals, four were conservatives, and
three were non-aligned; see Hume, "The 'Black and Tan* Constitutional
Conventions in Ten Former Confederate States: A Study of Their
Membership" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington,
1969 ), passim.

TABLE 2-9
PRIOR POLITICAL EXPERIENCE BY PARTY
DEMOCRAT
(n=88 )
federal

House of Representatives
Appointive®
Total
CONFEDERATE
Vice President
Congress
Appointive*5
Total
STATE
Governor, It. Governor
Legislature
Judiciary
Secession Convention
Constitutional Convention
IB65-66

s

if ( It#)

LOCAL0
County or Parish
City
Other
Total

TOTAL
(ns=385)

12

(13$)

26
25

(27#)
(26#)

( 2#)

(lS#)

2
2

(2#)

16

Ik

(16 %

1
38
17
3

(39#)
(18#)
( 3#)

3
ok
ifit (2$
17 ( 9#)

10

(11#)

10

(10#)

8
75

c m
(88 #)

Uk
16
80

{k%)
(16 #)
(82 #)

20
Ifif
2if
155

(11#)
(2lf#j
(13#)
(8if#5

13

(15#)

k
2

J
( 2Si
#)

28
9

19

(22#)

31

(29#
| 9#,
2#
(32#)

ifl
13
if
50

(22#)
( 7#
( 2#)
(27#)

13
7

(13#)
( 7#)

2lf (13#

7

( 7#)

17

11
1
9
5
Ik

1667-68
Other
Total

REPUBLICAN
(n^97)

POLITICAL PARTY
National Party Conventions
Presidential Electors

1

NO POLITICAL EXPERIENCE

10

? Si
(31#)

29
36 (19#)

.

5#
( 9#)

( 9#)

aE.g., positions of U. S. District Attorney and Internal Revenue
agent, service in the Freedmert's Bureau.
u

E.g., positions of tax assessor., judge, service in the C.S.A.
diplomatic corps.
cThe figures for local political experience are undoubtedly too
low due to lack of information. The sources and the men themselves
often neglected to detail the range of their experience at the local
level.

from individual to individual and from party to party.

In terms of

total experience, no one could match Alexander H. Stephens of
Georgia.

In a political career that hegan with election to the

Georgia House in 1836, Stephens served a term in the state Senate,
and seven terms as a prominent Whig in the U. S. House from 18^3 to
1859*

He was a presidential elector for Stephen A. Douglas In i860,

a unionist in the Georgia secession convention, and was elected to
the Provisional Congress prior to his selection as Vice President of
the Confederacy.

At the conclusion of the war, the Georgia legis

lature promptly selected him as one of the state's U. S. Senators,
hut he was not seated.

When he finally returned to the House in

1873 to begin the first of

four terms, he was,in the words of

Republican leader James G.

Blaine, "physicallya shattered man . . .

merely a relic of the past

in a representativeassembly in whichhis

voice was said to have been once potential. "37

But to his younger

Southern Democratic colleagues who helped him to the Speaker's chair
to take the oath he was a symbol of the greatness of Southern leadership.
Other more obscure Democrats were big men in their own baili37
James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to
Garfield (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1886), II, 5^7.
3®See, for example, Alfred Moore Waddell, Some Memories of My
life (Raleigh: Edwards and Broughton Printing Company, 190$), 109;
Atlanta Constitution, November 30, 1873; and The Brooklyn Argus as
quoted in Atlanta Constitution, December 11, 1873. Far Stephen's
career, see Richard M. Johnston and William H. Browne, life of
Alexander H. Stephens (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott and Company,
1876 ); Rudolph Von Abele, Alexander H. Stephens: A Biography (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*t6); and dTa.B. XVII, 569-75*

wicks.

Otho R. Singleton, for example, a wealthy Mississippi planter-

lawyer, served in the Mississippi House in 3J8lt6 and I8 U7 , in the state
Senate freon 18U8 to 185^, and as a Democratic Representative for three
terms before withdrawing when Mississippi seceded in early 1861.

His

constituents promptly sent him to the Confederate House of Repre
sentatives for the duration of the war. ^9

The political background

of Charles E. Hooker, Singleton* s fellow Mississippian, is more
representative of the general level of political experience among
Democrats.

Hooker, a lawyer of modest means, served as a district

attorney from 1850 to 185^ and spent one term in the Mississippi House
prior to the Civil War.

After serving in the Confederate army, he

was elected Attorney General of Mississippi and served until removed
by military authorities in 1868.**° Most of the Democrats acquired
their political experience in their native states, but a few, like
Jesse J. Finley of Florida, had served in several states.

A native

of Tennessee, Finley was succesively a member of the Arkansas Senate
in 18^5> mayor of Memphis, Tennessee, a member of the Florida Senate
in 1850, and a U. S. judge and a Confederate judge for the Florida
District from 1852-1865.^
In terras of major officeholding, no Republican had compiled a
3^Biographical Directory, 1702; Singleton to Andrew Johnson,
n.d., Amnesty Papers, Georgia.
^^Biographical Directory. U37; Dunbar Rowland (ed.), Missis
sippi: Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutions,
and Persons . . . .
vols., Atlanta: Southern Historical Publishing
Company, 1907), IV, 150-5^.
^^Biographical Directory, 9^2.
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record comparable to Stephens or even Singleton.

She native Repub

licans were more experienced than the carpetbaggers and blacks.

Some

scalawags, like Robert S. Heflin of Alabama, had made a career of
public service.

A native Georgian, Heflin had served as clerk of the

Georgia Supreme Court and in the Georgia Senate and House before
moving to Alabama in 1849-

In Alabama, he was elected as a Democrat

to the state House and state Senate, before changing his allegiance
to the Republican party during the war. 1*2

While as a rule the

caxpetbaggers had less experience than the scalawags, many had held
office in several different states— a reflection of the adventurous,
restless character often associated with the carpetbagger type.**3
David Heaton, for example, had served in the Ohio and Minnesota state
Senates prior to accepting an appointment as agent of the Treasury
Department at New Bern, North Carolina, in 1863.

But Heaton could not

match the travels of John Edwards, a lawyer, editor, and professional
politician who eventually represented the third district of Arkansas
in the Forty-Second Congress.

Although Edwards was b o m in Kentucky,

his political career apparently began with his election to the
Indiana House in 184-5. Four years later he was serving as an Alcalde
(a major with judicial powers) in California.

He returned to Indiana

in 1852 and was selected to the state Senate in 1853-

Another move

Ibid., 1099* Benjamin P. Poore (camp.), Congressional Directory
for the Second Session of the Forty-First Congress of the United States
of America (2d ed., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870), 6 .
^See, for example, David H. Oveiy, Jr., "The Wisconsin Carpet
baggers: A Group Portrait," Wisconsin Magazine of History. XLIV
(Autumn, i960 ), 15-49.
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in 1855 took Edwards to Iowa where his new constituents promptly elected
him to the state's constitutional convention of that year and to the
Iowa House for the next four years.
him Speaker in 1859 and i860.

His House colleagues selected

During the war, Edwards attained the

rank of Brigadier General of Volunteers in the Union army.

After being

mustered out in January 1866, he settled in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and
President Johnson rewarded him with an appointment as U. S. Assessor
of Internal Revenue.1^
As a factor in voting analysis, prior political experience, in
and of itself, appears to be of little consequence, but It merits
consideration for reasons other than illuminating the political back
ground of the individual.

An individual with extensive political

experience was likely to have compiled a record on public issues.
He was known to other political figures and to his constituents
either by virtue of his public record or by the mere fact of contact
established by perennial campaigning.

Thus an individual., by virtue

of his political experience and record, might wield more influence
among his colleagues than other individuals who were political novices.
Men with extensive political experience, like John H. Reagan and James
W. Throckmorton of Texas, received better committee assignments, their
voices merited consideration, and they wielded much more influence
during their first tern in the Forty-Fourth Congress than did, for
example, another first termer, Charles Hash of Louisiana, whose only
known experience even closely related to politics was his appointment
^^Biographical Directory, IO98 (Heaton), 901-902 (Edwards).
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as a night inspector of customs in New Orleans.
A final measurable attribute possessed by each congressman was
the margin of victory by which he achieved election to the House.
David Donald has demonstrated that a Representative ’s margin of
victory, which can be interpreted as a measure of security in office,
had an Impact on his response to the formation of reconstruction
policy.

Professor Donald's study suggests a direct association between

radicalism and security in office— the more secure his position (as
measured by margin of victory) the more radical he was likely to be. ^5
Conversely then, one might expect that the more insecure a congress
man felt, the more responsive he might be to what he perceived to be
his constituents' interests and the less likely he might be to chart
an independent course.
Information on the margin of victory in each of the 276 congres
sional elections is presented in Table 2-10.

Any compilation of

election statistics gathered over a period of time must be qualified
by an awareness that the margin of victory depends on the time and
particular circumstances of each election.

Since the margin of

victory depends on the relative strength of each political party at
the time of election, the decisive Republican victories usually came
during the earlier part of Reconstruction and in the heavily black
districts.

The reverse is true for Democrats.

The closely contested

elections most often occurred just prior to or during the redemption
^5pavid Donald, The Politics of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, lofe), especially""33-52 .
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TABLE 2-10
MARGIN OP VICTORY BY PARTY
MARGIN OP
VICTORY8,

DEMOCRAT

Unknown

2

Scalawag

REPUBLICAN
Carpetbagger

Black

1

3

1

8 (11$)

5 (2lf$)

1-2$

12 (10$)

3-5$

12

9

7

2

6- 10$

19

10

6

2

11-20$

20

12

lb

2

Over 20$

h9 (hi$)

15 (2lf$)

29 (to$

7 (33$)

Unopposed

_6

MP*

120

63

Total
Elections

16 (25$)

.

2

J2

72

21

-

aMargin of victory is defined as the difference between the
percentages of total vote won by the top two candidates In each
contest.
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process at the state level.^
For the period as a whole, only minor variations existed be
tween the parties in terms of margin of victory.

Within the Repub

lican party, however, there are several Important variations,

As

Table 2-10 indicates, the distribution of cases for Democrats and
carpetbaggers is about equal, particularly in the 1 -2 percent and the
over 20 percent categories.

On the other hand, the scalawags and, to

a less degree, the blacks were much more likely to be involved in
close contests.

This variation is another shred of evidence that

suggests the peculiar position and dilemna of the scalawag.

Earlier

variations in background between the scalawag and carpetbag elements
of the Republican party have been noted.

Quite often, and not

^ I n most cases, the margin of victory was calculated from
county-level election returns on machine-readable tape from the
Inter-University Consortium for Political Research (ICFR) at the
University of Michigan. The ICFR election returns for the Recon
struction period were, for the most part, compiled from the annual
issues of The Tribune Almanac and Political Register (New York:
The Tribune Association, 1868-1 B76"J*I The election returns in Almanac,
however, are incomplete particularly for interim elections to vacancies
created by contests, deaths, and resignations. In addition, the
Almanac does not include revised returns for elections won by contest.
In these cases the ICFR returns must be supplemented with returns
in newspapers and other sources. On occasion, the Congressional
Globe and Congressional Record include election returns for indi
viduals seated during the term. The revised returns for elections
won by contest are often contained in two compilations of contested
elections: D. W. Bartlett (comp.), Digest of Election Cases. Cases
of Contested Elections in the House of Representatives From 1865 to
T O ! Inclusive, House Miscellaneous Documents','¥l CongT, 2 Sess.,
No. 152; and J. M. Smith (comp.). Digest of Election Cases. Cases
of Contested Elections in the House of Representatives, Forty-Second,
Forty-Third, and Forty-Fourth Congress, Frcm 1871-187^. Inclusive,
House Miscellaneous Documents, ^5 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 52. The
various editions of Boore (comp.), Congressional Directory, are an
additional source for cross-checking election returns.
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surprisingly, the scalawags were closer to the Democrats in terms of
personal background.

The scalawags were often caught in an uneasy

position between the carpetbaggers on the one hand and the Democrats
on the other.

As will be discussed later, scalawags tended to be

elected from closely-contested districts that were either marginally
black or white in terns of racial composition.

Districts with heavier

black majorities favored carpetbaggers and blacks while Democrats
tended to come from districts with white majorities.
Any study of the membership of a legislative body over a period
of time is complicated by the various factors contributing to a high
turnover rate and the Reconstruction period is clearly no exception.
The turnover rate is obviously related to party strength at any
given time and other factors contributing to contested elections.
Of the 276 elections to the House during the period, twenty-nine
were contested--seventeen successfully.

No congressmen from Alabama

and Mississippi lost their seats by contest.

Not surprisingly,

Louisiana and South Carolina led in the number of successful contests.
One congressman, Josiah Walls of Florida, had the distinction of
losing his seat twice by contests, while Jacob H. Sypher of Louisiana
won one contest and lost one during his four terms in the House.
Sypher lost his second contest to Effingham Lawrence who was seated
on the last day of the Forty-Third Congress.

The only other Repre

sentative to serve one day was also from Louisiana and served the same
day as Lawrence.

Former Union General George A. Sheridan won his

celebrated contest with P. B. S. Pinchbeck and was granted, as one
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editor put it, "15 hours honor and several thousand dollars backpay. *'^7
Others speculated that the prospects of financial gain figured in
many contests.

In his commentary on one such election, the editor of

The Atlanta Constitution denounced the Republican contestant, charging
that the "Radical congress will pay him for his trouble, and that is
all he is working for." The Constitution and other newspapers agitated
continually for a law, eventually passed, that stopped pay for
unsuccessful contestants.
Another factor contributing to the turnover rate was the
creation of vacancies by death or resignation.

Six congressmen died

during their terms in office, the Bouse forced two to resign, and
a third resigned to re-enter state politics.

The staggered readmi3sion

of the states added greatly to the number of partial-tenners in the
Southern delegations.

Seven states, including Georgia, were readmitted

toward the end of the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress and the
swearing in of members stretched over a two month period in mld-1868.
Georgia, denied admission to the First Session of the Forty-First
Congress, was not readmitted until the Third Session.

Virginia, was

readmitted in January 1870, Mississippi in February 1870, and Texas
in March 1870— all midway in the Second Session of the Forty-First
Congress.
^N e w Orleans Republican. March 5, 1875.
^Ehe Atlanta Constitution. January 7, January 12, 1873. See
also Richmond Whig. November l5, 1870, December 21, 1871* For the
act curtailing payments to either party for expenses incurred in
contested elections, sec Cong. Globe, kZ Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3,
Appendix, 260.

+
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The political distribution of the large number of congressmen
who served partial terms Is worthy of note.

Nearly hai.-p of the terms

served by Republicans were partial terns while only 19 percent of the
Democratic terms were incomplete.

Thirty-five

of the forty carpet

baggers served at least one partial term and 35 percent of the seventytwo terms served by carpetbaggers were partial terms with an average
length of eleven months.

The large number of partial terms for

Republicans suggests that perhaps the Republicans actually served
fewer total months (in proportion to their numbers) in the House
than did the Democrats.

Such, however, was not the case.

The ratio

between total number of months served by Republicans and Democrats
and the ratio between Republicans and Democrats in the membership
are equal.

This is due to a difference in the average number of

terms served by Democrats (l.tf) and Republicans (1.6).

A variation

does exist between the parties in average length of term.

Democratic

terms averaged 20.8 months; Republicans averaged 17.3 months.
To some degree, the Representatives were responsible to con
stituencies definable in social and economic, as well as geographical
terms.

Ideally, a congressman* s response to economic measures, for

example, should reflect the varied economic interests of his constit
uency.

Thus if a given constituency is heavily agricultural, one

would expect its elected representative to respond positively to
measures favored by agricultural interests of his district.

On the
0M'

other hand, the representative of an urban constituency with a heavier
concentration of manufacturing and labor interests might be expected
to respond to economic issues in a manner quite different from his
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counterpart who represents an agrarian district.

Granting the assump

tion that seme relationship exists between a congressman's vote and.
his constituents' interests, it is important to try to define the
social and. economic interests of that constituency.
It is practically impossible to measure accurately the extent
and. influence of each of the varied, economic interests within each
congressional district.

She Reconstruction South is justifiably

viewed as primarily a staple-producing region, but when it is broken
down into congressional districts, greater variations occur in economic
interests.

Furthermore, the economic values usually associated with

an agrarian region (e.g., soft money, free trade, free banking, an
inflationist philosophy, federally-subsidized transportation systems)
are functions of time and circumstance.

It has been shown, for

example, that agrarian concern with economic issues is inversely
proportional to farm prosperity.

The attendant difficulties in

determining the Southern position on economic issues at any given
time are numerous.

Contemporary newspapers and special interest

publications give a general indication of the economic attitudes of a
particular area or interest group within the South.

But editors and

other spokesmen for Southern interests were naturally subjective, and
may or may not have accurately reflected the economic interests of a
given area.
^$Ehere is no study of the economic interest groups of the South
comparable, for example, to those of Sharkey and linger for the ftorth.
Some indication of the economic interests is given in E. Merton Coulter,
The South During Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 19^7), particularly chs. 3X-XII, but Coulter is
more interested in recounting and assessing blame for the South's

I
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To supplement other contemporary and secondary sources, three
statistical Indexes have been constructed to assist in measuring the
economic interests of each congressional district*

Two of the

indexes, per capita wealth and land value per acre, serve as incondite
indicators of the general level of the economy and economic develop
ment within each district.

A more important index measures the

importance of agricultural interests to the economy of the district,
and a fourth index is the ratio between white and black population
in each district.

The index of racial composition is particularly

well correlated with political affiliation but it also relates to
economics.
tural.

Heavily black areas were most often rural and agricul

The scattered white rural districts were usually centered

in the upland wooded country or in poorer agricultural areas outside
the black belt, seacoast, and delta areas of the South.

A few

urban centers contained sizable black populations, but whites formed
the majority in most urban areas.5°
economic ills on the war and radical political domination. Other
historians have dealt with the South* s reaction to specific economic
issues; see, for example, Arm!stead C. Gordon, "The Effects of Currency
Legislation," in The South in the Bu1.ld3.nK of the Ration. (12 vols.,
Richmond: The Southern Historical Society, 1909)* VI, Economic History.
1865-1910. 1*15-18; Davis R. Dewey, "Banking in the South," ibid..' 1*26>33; William E. Dodd, "The Economic Effects Upon the South of the United
States Tariff Policy," ibid., 1*76-81; Paul Wallace Gates, "Federal Land
Policy in the South, 1866-1888," Journal of Southern History, VI (August^
19l*0), 303-30; George L. Anderson^TheSouth and the Problems of PostCivil War Finance," Journal of Southern History. IX (Hay, 19**3)» 183216; and Anderson, "The National Banking system, 1865-1875; A Sectional
Institution" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois,
1933)9 ch. V, passim; and Walter T. K. Nugent, Money and American
Society, 1865-1880 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 57-59*
50 /0 1 four indexes are explained in fuller detail below. The
indexes of per capita wealth, percent agricultural, and percent white
for each congressional district were compiled from county-level statis
tics in Francis A. Walker (ccorp.), Ninth Census of the United States

The compilation of the four indexes necessitates reconstruction
of the Southern congressional districts at each apportionment.

Under

the apportionment of 1360, which was valid through the Forty-Second
Congress, the South was allotted fifty Representatives in a House
which numbered 2k3 members.

The apportionment based on the I87O

census, valid for the Forty-Third and Forty-Fourth Congresses, in
creased Southern membership to sixty-three and total House membership
(3 vols., Washington: Government Printing Office, I872), Vol I. The
Statistics of the Population of the United States . . . , hereinafter
cited as Walker (comp.). Statistics of the Population. 1670; and Vol.
Ill, The Statistics of the Wealth and Industry of the United States
. . . , 1670. The index of land value per acre was compiled from
Pressly and Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values.
The 1870 census is used in this study with an awareness that the
returns have been found to be inaccurate— the central problem being
one of under-enumeration. After studying population trends, census
officials in 1890 estimated that the total population in IB70 was
approximately 39,818,M # instead of 38,558,371 as reported. Underenumeration was a special problem in the South. Authorities estimate
that the 1870 figures for the total population in the thirteen South
ern states should be increased by about U . 2 percent. Under-enumer
ation was "marked" in South Carolina, Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and Texas, and "considerable" in Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina.
For a discussion of the reliability of the 1870 census, see Robert P.
Porter (ccmp.), Compendium of the Eleventh Census: 1890. Part I:
Papulation (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1592), 35-43;
Simon Kuznets and Dorthy S. Thomas, Population and Economic Growth.
1870-1950, Vol. I, Everett S. Lee, et al.. Methodological Consid
erations and Reference Tables (Philadelphia: The American Philo
sophical Society, 1957), tOl-402; and Carroll D. Wright and William C.
Hart, History and Growth of the United States Census, 1790-1890
(Washington: GovernmenF Printing Office, 1900 ), 52-57. For more
general discussions regarding census use, see Barnes F. Latfarop,
"History from the Census Returns," Southwestern Historical Quarterly,
II (April, 191*8 ), 293-312; Merle Curti, et al., The Making of an Amer
ican Community: A Case Study of Democracy in a Frontier County
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 195977 Appendix I, 1&9-58; Sam
B. Warner, Jr., Streetcar Suburbs: The Process of Growth in Boston,
3870-1900 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and the M.I.T. Press,
1962), Appendix A. 169-178; and Robert G. Barrows, "The Manuscript
Federal Census: A Source for a 'New* Local History," Indiana
Magazine of History, LXIX (September, 1973), 181-192.

to 293.5** The state legislatures or constitutional conventions that
assumed responsibility for implementing apportionment could revise
congressional district lines at any time.

In Louisiana, for example,

the conservative legislature of 1865 divided the state into five
congressional districts in accordance with the apportionment of i860.
Three years later, the convention charged with revising the stated
constitution according to the guidelines set down by Congress redrew
the lines of the five congressional districts to its liking.

Because

of the timing of the redistxicting, Louisiana Representatives to the
Fortieth Congress were elected from districts established by the 1865
legislature, and those to the Forty-First Congress served from the
districts established by the constitutional convention of 1868.

With

the exception of a minor adjustment in Arkansas' district lines in
1868, Louisiana was the only state to redistrict twice within the
same apportionment in the period under review.
The Southern congressional districts for the apportionments of
i860 and 1870 are presented in Maps 2-1 and 2-2 respectively.

The

apportionment of 1870 increased the number of Representatives allotted
to each Southern state but only four states decided to redistrict for
?lpor the number of Representatives allotted to each state
at each apportionment, see Biographical Birectory. ^7.
5%or the counties included in the congressional districts
established by the legislature of 1865» see "An Act to Divide the
State of Louisiana into Five Congressional Districts," Acts Passed
by the First General Assembly of the State of Louisiana . . . . (New
Orleans: W. R. Fish, State Printer, 1865 )
For the act
reapportioning the state in 1868, see Louisiana Contested Flections.
Testimony Taken by the Sub-Committee of Elections in Louisiana.
House Miscellaneous Documents. 41 Cong.. 2 Sess., Pt. 1,
Appendix, i.
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elections to the Forty-Third Congress.

The other states, with the

exception of Alabama, elected at-large Representatives equal to their
increase to the Fprty-Thlrd Congress and completed redlstricting in
time for elections to the Forty-Fourth Congress.

Alabama retained

the congressional districts established under the apportionment of
i860 and elected two at-large Representatives to both the Forty-Third
and Forty-Fourth Congresses.

Alabama did not redistrict until after

the elections to the Forty-Fourth Congress.

By then the Democrats had

full control of the state legislature and were able to divide the
state in a manner most beneficial to party interests.53
53ihe only congressional district maps available for the Recon
struction Congresses were compiled by the WPA Historical Records
Survey under the direction of Clifford Lord and are now in the Columbia
University library, see McCarthy, "Reconstruction Legislation and
Voting Alignments," 382. As the author was unable to consult these
maps, the maps in this study were constructed from a number of sources.
The sources for counties in each district at each apportionment were
the various editions of Poore (comp.), Congressional Directory. supple
mented and cross-checked by the notices of elections in newspapers
which often enumerated the counties in each district. Map 2-1 and all
subsequent maps are based on the U. S. maps showing present-day county
lines in United States, Department of the Interior, Geological Survey,
The National Atlas of the United States of America (Washington; Govern
ment Printing Office, 1S7O), e.g., 164. For state maps outlining the
counties at the time, Rand McNally and Campaigns Business Atlas (Chicago
Rand McNally, 1878 ) was particularly useful as were the i860 state maps
showing county divisions in Ralph A. Wooster, "The Secession Conventions
of the Lower South: A Study of Their Membership" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Texas, 195*0i and the Outline Maps of the
United States by Counties, for June 1, i860 and. JUne 1, 1870 (U. S.
Department of Agriculture, Division of Publications). These were
supplemented by state maps in other sources; see, for example, the map
of North Carolina counties as of 1870 in David L. Corbitt, The Formation
of North Carolina Counties. 1663-19^3 (Raleigh: State Department of
Archives and History, 1950), 291; and those for Mississippi in James £.
Baxter, "Congressional Redlstricting in Mississippi From 1817-1939,"
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Duke University, 1939)» 53, 91* For the
period under review, New Orleans was the only city split by congres
sional district lines. Tracing the division of New Orleans at art
apportionments was facilitated by the ward maps in E. Robinson and
R. H. Pidgeon (comps.), Atlas of the City of New Orleans. Louisiana
(New York: E. Robinson, 1883 ).

The key consideration for those charged with redrawing congres
sional district lines was the racial composition of each district.
The shape the districts took depended upon the party in power in the
state legislature at the time of redistricting.

Each party showed

an adeptness at gerxymanaering districts in such a way as to ensure
the racial balance in each district desired by the party.
sippi serves as a good example of the process.

Missis

John Boy lynch, who

eventually represented the state in the Forty-Third Congress, was
Speaker of the Mississippi House of Representatives when it came time
to reapportion the state from five to six districts in accordance with
the apportionment of 1870.

The Republican House decided that lynch,

as Speaker, should draft a bill to redistrict the state.

According

to lynch, there were two possible plans of redistricting to be con
sidered:
One plan was so to apportion the State as to make all the
districts Republican; but in doing so the majority in
at least two of the districts would be quite small. The
other was so to apportion the State as to make five dis
tricts safely and reliably Republican and the remaining one
Democratic. . . . After going over the matter carefully I
came to the conclusion that the better and safer plan would
be to make five safe and sure Republican districts and con
cede one to the Democrats. Another reason for this decision
was that in so doing, the State could be more fairly
apportioned. 5^
An examination of the ratio between the races in each congres
sional district before and after the lynch reapportionment indicates
that lynch did his job well.^

In creating one solidly Democratic

5^Iynch, The Facts of Reconstruction, 67-68.
lynch took the five districts which were 5*+$, 53$» **6$, h5$,
and 37$ white and created six districts which were 71$, hk$, 43$, ^3$,
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district, lynch knowingly provided for the election of L. Q. C. Lamar
(whan he admired) to the Forty-Third Congress.

In 1875 > the state

legislature, now in Democratic hands by virtue of the so-called
’Mississippi Plan,” reapportioned the state into five safely white
districts and one black district.

lynch represented that black

district, the famous "shoestring district” along the Mississippi River,
in the Forty-Seventh Congress.

*56

The index of racial composition is expressed as the percent of
the total population of a district which was white at each appor
tionment (see Maps 2-3 and 2-k).

According to the 1870 census, whites

constituted 56 percent of the population of the ten states.

Blacks

outnumbered whites only in South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana,
but in those states and others they tended to be concentrated in
certain areas.

The congressional districts were often designed to

emphasize those concentrations.

Consequently, the values for percent

white range from a low of 30.U in the coastal second district of
South Carolina (i860

apportionment) to a high of 97*2 in the north

western fourth district of Arkansas (1870 apportionment).

The median

position at both apportionments was 53*7 percent white, but surprisingly
few districts had a nearly equal balance between the races.

As shown

U l a n d 39f> white. For the reaction of the conservative press to
the lynch reapportionment, see Baxter, "Congressional Redistricting
in Mississippi,” 81-8H.
5^Iynch, The Facts of Reconstruction. 67 -6 8 , 195. For a
revealing insight into the workings of the "Mississippi Plan" by one
of the victims, see the Jason Miles Diary, Vol. 21 (microfilm copy
in Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill), entries for June-Novesnber, 1875 •
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in the lynch reapportionment in Mississippi, congressional district
lines were often constructed in such a way as to heighten the prepon
derance of one race for political purposes.

The Mississippi example

was repeated in other states. Maps 2-3 and 2-U indicate the some
times drastic changes in racial composition resulting from appor
tionment.

A close comparison of the maps indicates which party was

responsible for reapportionment in each state.^7
As might be anticipated, districts with a large white population
tended to elect Democrats and those with heavier concentrations of
blacks favored Republicans.

The breakdown by party and faction

in Table 2-11 clearly indicates the relationship that existed
between party and racial composition of each district. Most blacks,
as expected, were elected from predominantly black districts.

The

same type of district favored carpetbaggers, only a very few of whom
were elected by constituencies that were more than marginally white.
Seventy-seven percent of the Democrats came from districts that were
more than 50 percent white.

As mentioned earlier, the scalawags

were caught in the districts which were from bo to 60 percent white
but particularly those that were only marginally white.

Districts

that were either heavily black or white were not likely to select
scalawags as their Representatives.
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-^The percent white index for each congressional district was
compiled from county-level population figures in Kennedy (comp.),
Statistics of the Population, 1870, Table II, H-7*f.
5®Again, the significance of the relationship between the racial
composition of a district and the political affiliation of its Repre
sentative must be qualified by an awareness of the circumstances
of each election. To cite but one example, the lynch reapportionment,

IABLE 2 -U

DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL PARTIES BY THE RACIAL
COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT
Cong. Dist.
Percent White

DMOCRAT
Scalawag

REPUBLICAN
Carpetbagger

1* ( 3#)

5 ( 8#)

15 (21#)

3 (ll*#)

1*4#

7 ( 6#)

9 (ll*#)

12 (17#)

13 (62#)

1*5 - 1*9#

17 (ll*#)

7 (11#)

18 (25#)

3 (ll*#)

50 - 54#

13 (11#)

18 (29#)

11 (15#)

2 (10#)

55 - 59#

12 (10#)

U

60-69#

Under 1*0#
1*0

-

Black

(17#)

3 ( 4#)

9 *

20 (17#)

2 ( 3#)

7 (10#)

9 9

70 - 79#

29 (21*#)

6 (10#)

4 ( 6#)

9 9

Over 80#

18 (15#)

5 ( 8#)

2 ( 3#

9 9

Total
Elections

120

63

72

21

77

She index of per capita wealth for each congressional district
was calculated by dividing real and personal property valuation totals
by the aggregate population.

The values of per capita wealth range

from $117 for the first district of Texas (1870 apportionment) to a
high of $893 for the first district of Louisiana (1870 apportionment).
The highest wealth levels occurred in districts containing urban
areas.

The first district of Louisiana, for example, Included a

substantial portion of Orleans Parish and most of the city of New
Orleans.

Other districts with high per capita wealth levels were

those encompassing Richmond, Norfolk, and the Shenandoah Valley in
Virginia, and Charleston and Mobile.

Arkansas, an overwhelmingly rural

and agricultural state, also had surprisingly high per capita wealth
levels.

If the census statistics are reasonably accurate, the high

per capita wealth levels for Arkansas districts are probably due
to the fact that at each apportionment the Arkansas districts
included either a share of the prosperous delta country or a portion
of Pulaski County (Little Sock).
Arkansas was 75 percent white.

In addition, the population of
The lower levels of per capita wealth

occurred in the hill country of East Texas, the piney woods area of
which was designed to make five of the six Mississippi districts
"safely and reliably Republican," worked as lynch planned in the
elections to the Forty-Third Congress. In elections to the FortyFourth Congress, however, the same districts selected four Democrats
and two Republicans. The new element in the electoral process was the
introduction of the so-called ’Mississippi Flan"--an all-out effort to
intimidate Republican voters by a variety of means. Thus three of the
five districts so carefully designed to be safely Republican (black)
elected Democrats. During the earlier part of Reconstruction, some
heavily white districts elected Republicans, This was due in part
to either white apathy, evidenced by a failure to register, or a
white boycott of elections.

central Louisiana, and. the upland areas in Northern Alabama, Georgia,
and Western North Carolina.

The median levels of per capita wealth

were $252 for the districts created under the i860 apportionment and
$2Uh for the 1870 apportionment.-^
The index of land value per acre is a less satisfactory index
but it does indicate the general level of the economy and. the
productivity of land in the district.

The land value figure for each

congressional district is the average value of land and improvements
per acre in the district’s median county.

Land values range from one

dollar per acre in the first district in Southeastern Georgia (at
both apportionments) to a high of twenty-eight dollars per acre in
the Louisiana districts encompassing part of Orleans Parish.

The

extremes do not represent the average; the median land value per acre
for all districts ranged from $h.00 (i860 apportionment) to $^.50
(1870 apportionment).

An overwhelming number of the districts had

land values ranging from three to six dollars per acre— a fact which
detracts from the usefulness of the index for analysis.
A final and more satisfactory index, referred to as percent
59phe per capita wealth index is calculated from county-level
statistics on real and personal estate valuation in Kennedy (comp.),
Statistics of the Wealth and Industry, 1B70, Table II, 15-68; and
aggregate population figures in Kennedy (comp.), Statistics of the
Papulation, 1870. Table II, U-7h.
^°Land values are taken from county-level statistics for 1870
in Pressly and Scofield, Farm Real Estate Values, *f2-57, 59-62.
Alexander and Beringer use a similar land value index to measure the
general level of the economy for the constituencies of members of
the Confederate Congresses; see Alexander and Beringer, Anatomy of
the Confederate Congress, 252.

agricultural, is the percent of total productions value which were
agricultural.

The percent agricultural for each district was calcu

lated by dividing the total value of agricultural products by the
total value of agricultural and manufacturing products.

The re

sulting percentage is a rough measurement of the degree to which the
district's economy was agricultural as opposed to manufacturing. The
distribution of values varies from a low of 18 percent agricultural
for the districts including the Richmond manufacturing complex to a
high of 96 percent in the fifth district of Louisiana (the delta land
in the northeastern part of the state) at both apportionments.

The

index indicates that in terms of products value, the South was
heavily agricultural.

Less than 10 percent of the districts created

at each apportionment were under 50 percent agricultural.

The median

values for percent agricultural ranged frcm 79 (i860 apportionment)
to 81 (I87O apportionment).

It is evident that most Southern

congressmen represented districts which were primarily if not predom
inantly agricultural in terms of value of productions.^1
^Percent agricultural is calculated from county-level data in
Kennedy (comp.), Statistics of Wealth and Industry. 1870. Table IV
(Productions of Agriculture), 9^-285> and Table XI: A (General
Statistics of Manufactures), ^93-58U. The productions of manufactur
ing cover almost all productions of the Southern economy that were not
exclusively agricultural. The manufacturing statistics include those
for all phases of the important lumbering industry as well as the
products value for industries ranging frcm one-man operations to the
large associated iron industries In Virginia. The only two elements
of the economy not included in the productions totals for figuring
percent agricultural are those for mining and fishing. Both are
so small in all states that they amount to less than one percent of
total valuation of products. The mining of Southern iron, copper,
coal, and stone deposits did not become important elements of the
economy of certain areas until later. See ibid.. Tables XII-XV
(Statistics of Mining), 759-90; and Table XVlT (Statistics of
Fisheries), 792-93.

The range of values for the four indexes for each state at
large indicate the relationships between the indexes (see Table 2-12).
States "which had a high level of per capita wealth also had higher
land values.

Both indexes are inversely related to the percent

agricultural index.^

Overall, very little relationship exists

between the percent white index and the three econctnic indexes.

Any

relationship between political affiliation and the economic indexes
hinges on the racial composition of the district rather than on the
levels of per capita wealth, land values, or percent agricultural.
Thus, for example, predominantly black agricultural districts tended
to select Republicans while heavily white agricultural districts
selected Democrats.

A cross-tabulation of party and the economic

indexes does indicate a positive correlation between the carpetbaggers
and urban areas.

Districts with a low percent of agricultural

interest and a high level of per capita wealth were urban and
manufacturing centers.
held in these districts.

Carpetbaggers won 70 percent of the elections
They obviously found the urban setting

receptive even though over two-thirds of these districts were at
least marginally white.

The individuals who represented the South in Congress during
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The relationships between the four indexes can be tested by
Goodman and Kruskal's gamma, a measurement of association between two
ordered categorical variables, with values from -1 to +1. For land
value and per capita wealth, gamma = .hi indicating a positive associ
ation (as one increases the other does also). For land value and per
cent agricultural, gamma = -.3 8 indicating an inverse relationship.
For per capita wealth and percent agricultural, gamma - -.29*

TABIE 2-12

RANK OP STATES BY CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT INDEXES
Per Capita
Wealth

Percent
Agricultural

State

Percent
White

State

SC

4l.l$

TX

$194

VA

57$

IX

$3

MS

46.2

AL

202

PL

66

GA

3

IA

49.8

GA

226

LA

68

PL

3

PL

51.2

FL

235

GA

72

NC

3

AL

52.3

NC

243

NC

75

SC

3

GA

54.0

. MS

253

TX

81

AL

4

VA

58.1

SC

295

SC

81

AR

4

NC

63.3

AR

323

AL

84

MS

5

TX

69.0

VA

334

AR

90

LA

8

AR

74.7

LA

445

MS

90

VA

9

State

1 State

Land Value
per Acre

H

82

Reconstruction resist stereotyping in terns of background and the type
of constituency they represented. IP attempt to describe the "typical"
Democrat or Republican in terms of background characteristics -would
do injustice to the congressmen as individuals. The principal differ
ence between the carpetbaggers and other Representatives was obviously
a matter of nativity, length of residency in the South, and Civil War
service. The blacks, of course, were set off by the simple fact of
race and all that race symbolized to Southerners. Otherwise, differ
ences between the parties in terms of background and constituent
characteristics are not especially evident. Republican Amos T. Akexmaa
may have struck close to the truth when he observed that in the South
"men are Republican or Democrat accordingly as they are or are not
attached to the last three amendments to the constitution.
The exact relationship between political affiliation and economic
issues remains unclear. Contemporary newspapers leave a definite im
pression that political control of the South was more important than eco
nomic considerations of the moment. Regardless of how well a Republican
responded to the economic Interests of his constituency, he was still
a degree undesirable because he was a symbol of alien leadership.
Ackezman*s suggestion that economic considerations were secondary to
the issues of political reconstruction implies that the two were not
associated in any meaningful way. In short, economic opinion may
have transcended party lines. On the other hand, the Beard-Beale
thesis suggests that political affiliation was highly correlated with
^Quoted frcm Polakoff, Politics of Inertia, 177-78.

economic issues; Southern Republicans reinforced a specific set of
economic values held dear not by the South, but by the Northeast.
Both views can be tested by measuring the association between a
congressman's vote on economic issues and his party and region. The
foregoing investigation into the background of the congressmen has
suggested several factors other than political party and party
faction that may have been related to the congressmen's voting
behavior on econcanic issues. In particular, such background
characteristics as occupation, wealth, prior political affiliation,
margin of victory, and the four congressional district indexes— all
of which cut across party lines— are potential influences on voting
behavior.
The following chapters attempt to determine and analyze the
response of Southern Representatives to specific economic issues
selected from the Reconstruction Congresses. The key consideration
is a matter of ascertaining how well the congressmen, particularly
the Republicans, represented Southern economic interests in the
House of Representatives.

CHAPTER III

THE FORTIETH HOUSE
When the House of Representatives overrode President Andrew
Johnson's veto of a bill readmitting Arkansas to representation in
Congress on June 22, 1868, it opened the way for readmission of the
other nine ex-Confederate states.

But the process of restoring the

Southern states to their proper relationship to the Union took over
two years.

Georgia, the final state to be readmitted, was not allowed

to rejoin the Union until July 15, 1370, the last day of the Second
Session of the Forty-First Congress.

The last Representative to be

admitted frcm Georgia took his seat on February 9, 1371*

Thus the

South did not attain full representation in the House until just
before the end of the final session of the Forty-First Congress.^
iThe states and dates of their readmlssion are as follows:
Arkansas, June 22, 1368; Florida, June 25, 1368; North Carolina, July 4,
1868; Louisiana, July 9, 1368; South Carolina, July 9, 1368; Alabama,
July 13, 1368; Virginia, January 26, 1370, Mississippi, February 23,
1870; Texas, March 30,. 1870. Georgia's Representatives qualified and
took their seats July 25, 1368 in the Fortieth Congress, but the state's
Senators, who presented their credentials during the Third Session,
were not seated. In the interim Congress deemed that Georgia had not
properly complied with the conditions for readmission. Georgia's
Representatives were not admitted to the First Session of the FortyFirst Congress. Congress passed the act readmitting Georgia on July 15,
1870; Biographical Directory. 138-92 (Fortieth Congress), 193-97
(Forty-First Congress), For the controversy over the representation
of Georgia, see C. Mildred Thompson, Reconstruction in Georgia:
Economic, Social, and Political, 1365-1^72 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 19157, 255-70.
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A month remained in the Second Session of the Fortieth Congress
when the three Representatives from Arkansas took their seats on June
2k, 1868.

Two days later, the House overturned another Johnson veto

of an omnibus hill relating to the readmission of six other Southern
states.

During the final month of the session, the House seated the

duly elected delegations from Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Louisiana, Alabama, and Georgia.

As most of the Southern Repre

sentatives were not sworn in until the last few days of the Second
Session, the seven states were not effectively represented until the
beginning of the Third Session on December 7, 1868.^
The thirty-three Representatives from the seven states to the
Fortieth Congress were the least "Southern1' of any of the recon
struction delegations and, in terms of background information, they
are the most obscure.

Thirty of the thirty-three were Republicans.

They represented states which had been reconstructed quickly— states
in which the conservative forces had not had time to organize.

In a

few cases, the conservative whites had boycotted the congressional
elections— the first such canvasses in which the newly-enfranchised
blacks participated.

Several Republicans had little or only token

opposition from Democratic or Conservative candidates.3
^Between the last day of the Second Session (July 27, 1868) and
the beginning of the Third Session (December 7, 1868), the House con
vened in three unusual, one-day sessions on September 21, October 16, and
November 10. The sessions were not concerned with economic issues and
are not subject to analysis herein. For the acts readmitting the seven
states, see Congressional Globe, U0 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, Appendix,
509-10.
^The margin of victory for three of the Representatives is unknown.
Twenty-two of the remaining thirty Representatives were elected by a
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The three Democrats represented, the extremes to he found, among
Southern conservatives at the time.

Of the three, Fierce Manning

Butler Young of Georgia probably best represented, the type of leader
ship to which the South had been accustomed in the antebellum period.
He was the son of a slaveholding planter, a secessionist Democrat,
and a West Point cadet.

He resigned from the academy two months before

graduation to join the Confederate army and. he held the rank of major
general at the end of the war.

After having secured a pardon from

President Johnson, Young was elected to the Fortieth Congress from the
heavily white seventh district in northwestern Georgia.1*- Nelson Tift,
the second Democrat, represented the moderate ground in the party.
Tift, the wealthiest of the delegation, was b o m in Connecticut but
moved to Georgia in 1835 > where he quickly acquired interests in land,
railroads, and various manufacturing endeavors.

He was a unionist in

i860 and, although he later wrote President Johnson that he had never
borne arms, he was a major supplier for the Confederacy.

Tift was

elected by a district that was only forty percent white.5 The third
margin of over 10 percent. Eight of those won by more than 20 percent
of the total vote and four were unopposed. When margin of victory is
cross-tabulated with party, a familiar pattern emerges in that the
scalawags represented the most closely contested districts, and they
tended to represent those districts that were either marginally black
or white.
^.A.B., XX, 633-3^5 Iynwood M. Holland, Pierce M. B. Young; The
Warwick"’of the South (Athens: University of Georgia Pres:;, 196^),
passlun; Young to Andrew Johnson, September 22, 1865* Amnesty Papers,
Georgia.
^Biographical Directory. 1818-19; Tift to Andrew Johnson, June
1865 , Amnesty Papers, Georgia; William Warren Rogers, "Nelson Tift
Applies for Pardon, 1865," Georgia Historical Quarterly, LI (June
1967), 230-32. That Tift could be elected as a Democrat from a district
that was sixty percent black was probably due to the disorganization of

27,
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Democrat served only briefly in the Fortieth Congress.
resident of Maine until 1865, was a rarity in the party.

James Mann, a
He was a

Union army veteran and had served as a U. S. Treasury Agent for
Louisiana prior to his election by a largely white New Orleans con
stituency.

When Mann died in August 1868, a three-way contest for his

seat ensued, and the seat stood vacant for the remainder of the
f.

congress. 0

The thirty Republicans consisted of fourteen scalawags and six
teen carpetbaggers.

With one exception, a n served in the Third Session

of the Fortieth Congress.

That exception, James Hinds, an Arkansas

carpetbagger, was assassinated in October 2368.

James Elliott, his

scalawag replacement, was seated in January 1869 for the duration of
the Third Session.

Thus for most of the session, the Republicans

numbered fifteen carpetbaggers and fifteen scalawags.?
the Republican forces in that district. Tift was
in the next two elections and his second district
stronghold of Republicanism in Georgia; see Olive
Republican Party in Georgia: From Reconstruction
University of Georgia Press, 1964), 53.

beaten by a scalawag
became the last
Hall Shadgett, The
through 1900 (Athens:

6Biographical Directory. 13335 The D a i l y Picayune (Hew Orleans),
August 27, 1868; Speech of W. Jasper Blackburn (memorial to James Mann),
Cong. Globe. 40 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 5> Appendix, 240. Had Mann been a
Republican, Southerners would have considered him to be the worst kind
of carpetbagger. A thorough search of the sources did not reveal any
type of economic vocation for Mann other than his job as a Treasury
Agent. Furthermore, he could not have been considered a "settler" as
he never moved his family to the South. In fact, the evidence suggests
that he left Louisiana in 1867 to move his family from Maine to Andover,
Massachusetts. It was his choice of party that dictated his acceptance
by Southerners. See "Papers in the Case of Simon Jones v. James Mann,"
House Misc. Doc. No. 13» 40 Cong., 3 Sess., 29-30.
^According to E. Merton Coulter, "twenty of the thirty-five
Representatives" elected to the Fortieth Congress were carpetbaggers.
Coulter does not indicate how he defined the carpetbaggers other than

The congressmen came from a variety of backgrounds.

They ranged

in age from twenty-seven year old Logan Boots of Arkansas to seventyone year old Nathaniel Boyden of North Carolina.

The median age was

forty-three, but over half the carpetbaggers were under the age of
thirty-five and more than half the scalawags were forty-five years of
age or older.

Sixteen were born in the slave states, fourteen in free

states, and three were foreign-born.

Seventeen had no more than an

elementary education, but ten held college degrees*

Only two were

known slaveholders (ten unknown), and only one had a record as an
active secessionist (seven unknown).

Eighteen had served in the Union

army, seven had served the Confederacy, six were non-participants, and
the wartime service of two remains unknown.

They held a greater

variety of occupations than did subsequent delegations.
lawyers and seven were Involved in agricultural pursuits.

Twelve were
The balance

included four editors, three bankers, and two physicians.
In addition to having only a brief time to serve, the Southerners
were handicapped by a relative lack of political experience.

Although

only three had no discoverable political experience, several had not
held an elective office.

Only six had served in state legislatures,

and six had held local elective offices.

Seventeen Republicans had

gained experience in the conventions held in 1867 end 1868 to revise

that "they had come out of a shady or obscure life in the North,
bringing all their earthly belongings in a carpetbag . . . ," nor
does he delineate those so designated. His figures are clearly in
error on both counts. The South elected thirty-three men to the
Fortieth House, and only sixteen were carpetbaggers. See Coulter, The
South During Reconstruction. 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press', 19^7)» 1**0> 126.
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the constitution of each state according to the congressional guide
lines for readmission.

Another eight had served either in the Freedmen's

Bureau or as Southern agents of the Treasury Department.

Two, Nathaniel

Boyden (R-NC) and William Kellogg (R-AL), had served in the U. S. House
of Representatives in the anteheUum period and their records in the
Third Session indicates that they adapted quickly to the House.

Most

of the Southern Representatives simply had not had the opportunity to
serve in elective political office unless they were old enough to have
done so in the antebellum period.
In a House that totaled 2h3 members, the Southerners, who never
numbered more than thirty-two at any given time, could not have expected
to have much influence.

As freshmen they were assigned to the lowest

ranking position on minor committees.

Most would never be any more

than freshmen as only fourteen were re-elected to the Forty-First
Congress.

Four more would continue into the Forty-Second Congress,

and two, Jacob Sypher (R-LA) and Pierce M. B. Young (D-GA) survived to
serve in the Forty-Third Congress.

The circumstances under which the

Southerners labored must be considered when evaluating their
performance in the Third Session of the Forbietn Congress.
When the Third Session convened on December 7s 1868, the problems
of political reconstruction still dominated the Washington scene.
Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia had not yet been restored to the Union,
and while Georgia's Representatives had been admitted, the state's
Senators had not been seated and Georgia's delegation would not be
admitted to the Forty-First House.

The intense feelings regarding the

impeachment and trial of President Andrew Johnson had cooled somewhat

with the knowledge that Johnson was now a lame duck.

But Johnson con

tinued to antagonize Congress with his statements on economic issues
and his vetoes of congressional legislation, and Congress responded
accordingly.

Fresh in the background was the hard-fought, hut hardly

closely-contested presidential election of 1868.

To congressional

Republicans, the selection of Ulysses S. Grant signaled the beginning
of an era of better executive-legislative relations.

In the country

at large, Grant's campaign slogan, "Let us have peace," had struck a
responsive chord, but the shibboleth proved to have little application
to Grant's administrations.®
The consideration and passage of the proposed Fifteenth Amend
ment to the Constitution overshadowed all other legislation during the
Third Session, but Congress did consider a few important economic
measures.

Of the 197 recorded roll-call votes in the House of

Representatives, approximately one-fourth related to economic issues
of general concern.
consideration.

Of those issues, only one tariff bill merited

More significant were a series of roll calls related

to the granting of lands and other federal subsidies to aid in railroad
construction.

The most important economic issue of the session was

probably the consideration and passage of the Public Credit Act which
Johnson pocket vetoed at the end of the session.

Finally, late in the

session, Congress gave considerable attention to a bill providing for
a more equitable distribution of the national bank notes.
degrees, all these issues were important to the South.

In varying

The response of

^Martin E. Mantell, Johnson, Grant, and the Politics of Recon
struction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), chs. 8 and 9.
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the section's Representatives to these specific measures offers an
indication of how well they served Southern economic Interests.
The solitary tariff measure (H. S. 1^460) to he considered pro
posed higher duties on a variety of imported copper products and
copper ores. As a measure of attitudes toward tariff rates in general
it is of little value. At the time very little copper was mined in
the South3 and the hill was not an issue in the region. The measure
had heen under consideration since the beginning of the Fortieth
Congress, and it was brought to a vote and passed on the second day
of the Third Session. On the initial passage of the hill, Southerners
split along party lines with the Republicans favoring the bill. The
South, in fact, was the only region in which party cohesion was perfect,
although voting on the issue generally followed party lines in other
regions (see Table 3-1: A).
The measure reappeared in the House on February 8, 1869; with
several proposed Senate amendments which made the bill more protec
tionist by adding several copper products to the list of items on which
duties were to be raised.^ The House, by a vote of 120-50, indicated
its willingness to suspend the rules and consider the Senate amendments
but the House was initially less inclined to favor the more protec
tionist bill. On a Democratic motion to table the amendments, party
lines wavered and a few more Republicans indicated their opposition to
^Opponents of the bill were quick to point out that the Senate
had added copper sulphate or blue vitriol, a product widely used for
dyeing cloth, to the protected list. As Brooks (D-NY) put it, blue
vitriol entered "into every old lady's dye-pot in the country,11 see
Cong. Globe, UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 960.

TABLE 3-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY* ON H. R. Ilt60:
"AN ACT REGULATING THE DUTIES ON IMPORTED
COPPER AND COPPER ORES"
A.

Initial passage of H. R.
Yea

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Rep.

Dem.

*•
1
«•
•*
a•
JL

13
25
38

««
13
9
2

9
_2

•«

3
9
••
3
•«

2

105

30

21

Grand Total
B.

Nay

Dem.

lfl

Rep.
6

6

107

51

To table Senate amendments to H. R. l460c
Yea
Rep.

Nay
Don.
Rep.

Region

Dem.

NE

••
15
10
2
5

7
1
17
k
h
»m

*•
3
••
*•
•*
2

11
31
38
13
9

32

33

5

105

MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

65

110

TABLE 3-1- -Continued
Regional codes In this table and all subsequent tables are a
modified version of the ICFR code. HE (New England) includes Connect
icut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
MA (Middle Atlantic) includes Delaware, New Jersey, New York, and
Pennsylvania. MW (Middle West) includes Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin.
SS (Solid South) includes the ten ex-Confederate states considered
in this study. BS (Border States) includes Kentucky, Maryland,
Tennessee, and West Virginia. FS (Pacific States) includes California,
Nevada, and Oregon. Political affiliations in this table and all
subsequent tables have been derived from the ICFR roll-call data sets
for each House (the original source for party affiliation is the
Biographical Directory). In a few cases, the party affiliation for
several Southern Representatives has been corrected. Those House
members who served under political labels other than simply Democrat
or Republican have been recoded as members of the party with which
they identified with the exception of three Independents serving in
the Forty-Fourth House. The vote totals in each table include paired
and announced votes.
^Cong. Globe, 1*0 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 15 (December 8, 1868).
cIbid., Pt. 2, 960 (February 8 , I869 ).
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the amendments (see Table 3-li B),

The move to table failed 65-110,

and concurrence in the Senate amendments by a vote of 112-56 followed
almost immediately.1® President Johnson vetoed the bill on the grounds
that it was special interest legislation for a few copper mines along
Lake Superior*

He declared that it would decrease revenue and raise

taxes while burdening consumers of copper products with higher prices.
The House thereupon overrode the veto by what was nearly a strict party
vote. 11
The two Southern Democrats opposed the measure at every oppor
tunity while Southern Republicans favored the measure, although a
few broke party ranks in the attempt to table the more protectionist
Senate amendments.1^ On the surface at least, it would appear that as
consumers of copper products, it would have been in the interest of
the Southerners to vote against the bill.

In addition, the South, as a

staple-producing region, had traditionally upheld the doctrine of free
trade.

A Southern vote for the bill could have been justified to

10See ibid., 960-61, for the votes to consider, to table the
Senate amendments, and to concur in the Senate amendments.
^Ibid., 1460-66, for Johnson's veto message, subsequent discus
sion, and the vote overriding the veto* The text of the bill as
finally approved by the House and Senate is given in ibid., Ft. 3,
Appendix, 304. According to F. W. Taussig, Johnson's veto message was
written by revenue reformer David A. Wells who considered the act
blatantly protectionist. See Taussig, The Tariff History of the United
States (8th ed., New York: a. P. Putman's Sons, 1931), 219-21.
^The Southern Republicans voting to table the Senate amendments
were Clift (AL), Dockery (NC), Goss (SC), and Norris (AL). There
appears to be no common denominator among their personal or constituent
characteristics which would indicate why they voted as they did. Of
the four, only Goss and Dockery (both scalawags) voted against accepting
the Senate amendments, but on the final vote to pass the measure over
Johnson's veto, Whittemore (SC) and Hamilton (FL) joined Goss in
opposing the bill.
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protect fledgling copper mines in the South, hut according to statistics
compiled in 1870 , copper was mined, only in scattered pockets in the
region, most notably in North Carolina. ^
Johnson* s widely-publicized veto message attracted little notice
in the South, but a few old-line Democratic newspapers blasted the
Republican, Congress for having passed the copper bill.

The New Orleans

Times, for example, rebuked Republican Senator Zaeharlah Chandler of
Michigan for "crowding the infamous copper bill through Congress":
The copper bill is probably the highest job, next to the
Pacific Railroad, ever passed in this country. Every consumer
of copper in the United States is taxed three cents per pound
extra in order to render profitable a few mines on the shore
of Lake Superior, in which Chandler has become an immense
stockholder.1^
The Times exaggerated the importance of the issue.

But if the

South still favored a tariff for revenue only and if a positive vote
on the copper bill can be taken as solid evidence of a protectionist
^North Carolina copper mines were centered in Chatham County in
the fourth congressional district. The Representative of that district,
Republican John Deweese supported the measure on all the roll-call
votes. North Carolina ranked fourth among the states in the production
of copper, but in terms of value, North Carolina*s copper production in
1870 ($96,000) was small compared to that of Michigan, the leading
copper-mining state ($lf,312,!67). See the census statistics on mining
productions in Francis A. Walker (camp.), The Statistics of the Wealth
and Industry of the United States . . . . (Washington: Government
Printing Office /IF 72 ), Tables XIII-XV, 760-90.
^The New Orleans Times, March 2, 1869. Unlike some other South
ern newspapers and generally unmindful of Louisiana sugar interests and
New Orleans manufacturing interests, the Times remained adamant in
defense of free trade: "The pet idea of all Southern statesmen, the
main political principle upon which the Southern people of all political
shades have ever been a unit, is that of unrestricted trade," ibid.,
March If, I869 .

stance 5 then party was more important to most Southern Republicans
than were sectional interests.

The copper hill was the only tariff

measure of any significance to he considered in the Third Session.
Its significance as an indicator of tariff attitudes is correspondingly
limited.
More important to the South than the tariff were federal subsi
dies for internal improvements.

Measures promoting internal improve

ments were, one of the few issues to elicit bipartisan support in the
postbellum South.

The South especially desired federally-aided pro

jects to upgrade the region's transportation system.

Proposals

abounded for building railroads and canals as well as for levee
construction and river and harbor clearance to rehabilitate wartorn areas.

That element of the antebellum states-rights philosophy

which forbade federal aid for internal, improvements was one of the most
notable casualties of the war.
Southern newspapers preached the necessity of improving the
South's internal transportation system and of establishing external
connections with the Midwest and the Pacific states as the Northeast
already bad done.

Southern attitudes toward internal improvements

were best summarized by a North Carolina editor who concluded that the
whole people, "regardless of race, color, or condition,” concurred
in the importance of internal improvements:
What then may we not say in behalf of the man who adds a mile
of Railroad to the number already in existence in a State like
North Carolina, which is remote from the markets of the world,
and without the ordinary facilities of reaching them? We say
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this: that he Is the true statesman and patriot whose
achievement Is worth more than a career in Congress, or
volumes of speeches upon party politics.3^
The sense of urgency underlying such editorials was prompted
by an uneasy feeling that perhaps the practice of handing out huge
federal subsidies was ending, leaving the South without its rightful
share.

In response to an editorial in the New York Journal of

Commerce calling for the curtailment of federal subsidies to railroads,
the editor of the Richmond Whig acknowledged that wartime subsidies
had generated a certain amount of corruption.

But the editor insisted

that the South had "certain works of vast national importance," and
that
we are too poor to complete them, and having never received
any assistance from the General Government, while other works
in other States have been built by government liberality,
we are anxiously looking forward to that source for needed
assistance. . . . Is the door to be slammed in our ..faces
after having for years been kept open for others?"*
^The Raleigh (NC) Register. November 3, I867 . For a sampling of
similar Southern attitudes on internal Improvements see: North Carolina
Standard, November IB, 1867; Daily Arkansas Gazette (Little Rock), Dec
ember 24, 1869; New Orleans Times, March 3, 1&69; New Orleans Daily
picayune, March 29, 186#; New Orleans Republican. November 26,1^70;
Atlanta Constitution, January 20, 1869; Augusta (GA) Constitutional, as
quoted in Atlanta Constitution, January 6,1374; The Daily Mississippi
Pilot (Jackson), December 30 , 1874; and The Vicksburg (MS) Herald, March
3, 1875- Almost every issue of Debow's Review (After the War Series),
from 1368 to cessation of publication in October 1370, contained
articles in support of internal improvements, especially those projects
in the Mississippi Valley. See, for example: Vol. VII (August, 1369),
588-696 ; (October, 1869 ), 837-38, 845-60, and Vol. VIII (March-April,
1870), 209-26, 294-99. Of all the newspapers surveyed only the Atlanta
Constitution and the New Orleans Daily Picayune hesitated to endorse
federal subsidies for internal improvements.
•^Richmond Whig and Advertiser, January 1, 1369, hereinafter cited
as Richmond Whig. Virginians were particularly interested in federal
subsidies for the Cheaspeake and Ohio Railroad and the James River and
Kanawha Canal. The Whig viewed the latter project as one which would
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The Southern crusade for internal improvements was often
frustrating.

The editor of the New Orleans Republican later wondered

if any hope remained "that continued appropriations can be extorted
from an unwilling Congress?"1? The frustration often turned to out
right anger.

In reference to an unfavorable Northern commentary on

Georgia's canal scheme, an Atlanta editor bitterly concluded that such
remarks were simply more evidence of "the customary disregard, If not
hostility to the interests and just claims of the South.
The voting record of Southern Representatives reflected the
region's concern with federal subsidies for internal improvements.

The

cohesion level of Southern Republicans in favor of federal subsidies
in the Third Session was consistently higher than that for Republicans
from other regions.

This was one of the main areas in which Southern

Republicans voted in opposition to the Northeastern wing of the party.
But the Republicans were the self-proclaimed heirs to the Whig philos
ophy of governmental participation in the economy, and that sentiment
remained strong even in the Northern wing of the party.

Northern

Republicans were much more receptive to the granting of federal subsidies
during Reconstruction than were Northern Democrats.

Throughout the

period, Northern Democrats in the House, invariably led by retrenchmentminded William S. Holman of Indiana, consistently voted against federal
open a vital water route from the Atlantic seaboard to the West. See
ibid., February l£, 1869; "Report of the Committee of the National
Board of Trade on a Continuous Water line of Transportation through
Virginia," Debow's Review. VII (December, 1869 ), 1030-1*8.
l^Kew Orleans Republican, April 1, I87I+.
^Atlanta Constitution, January 25, 187!*.
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subsidies for internal improvements.

This put Southern Democrats In

the frustrating position of having to side with Republicans In any
attempt to secure federal aid for Southern projects.-^
Of the numerous measures requesting federal grants for internal
improvement projects in the Third Session, few were considered on the
po
floor of the House and fewer still were subjected to roll-call votes.
Southern Representatives, regardless of party, were usually unanimous
in their support of internal improvement projects— same of which were
only remotely related to most Southern states.

The Southern and

Pacific states, for example, were the only regions to vote solidly in
favor of a resolution (H. J. Res. 465) granting a right of way across
public lands to the Memphis, £1 Faso, and Pacific Railroad from El Faso
to the Pacific.2’** The resolution did nothing more than award the
^See Albert V. House, Jr., "Northern Congressional Democrats as
Defenders of the South During Reconstruction," Journal of Southern
History, VI (February, 1940), 46-71. House concluded that Northern
Democrats did nothing to aid the South in its quest for favorable
economic legislation during the period. The uneasy alliance between
Southern Democrats and. Northern Republicans on economic legislation is
the subject of much pertinent comment in C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and
Reaction; The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Reconstruction (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1951) > especially 51-63*
2°A New York journal opposed to further subsidies counted seventyone railroad bills in Congress in late December 1868, see Journal of
Commerce, as quoted in the Ricimond Whig, January 1, 1869.
^ I t is understandable why a state like Arkansas might favor the
Memphis, El Faso, and Pacific line (see Dally Arkansas Gazette, October
28 , 1868), but support for the venture was evident even in regions of
the South remote from the line. The Richmond Whig, for example, viewed
the route very favorably and envisioned the establishment of new
connecting lines running back to Norfolk, Virginia, see Richmond Whig,
March 26 , 1869.

*
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right of way lands and It specifically stipulated that no other subsidy
or lands were to be granted to the company. 22

still, the resolution

raised same opposition in the Northeast and Midwest, as both sections
already had or were building their own railroads to the Pacific
(see Table 3-2).
Southern attitudes toward federal subsidies were more clearly
indicated by the -votes on two cleverly-worded resolutions introduced
by William S. Holman (D-IN) on January 18, 1869:
Resolved. That in the present condition of the national
finances no further subsidies ought to be granted by Congress,
either in bonds or money, to railroads or other corporations,
or to promote local enterprises, but the whole resources of
the country ought to be applied to the pressing necessities
of the public service in such manner as will relieve the people
from the burdens of taxation.
Resolved, That grants of the public lands to corporations
ought to be discontinued, and the whole of such lands ought
to be held as a sacred trust, to secure homesteads to actual
settlers, and for no other purpose whatever. 3
Holman's resolutions put those favoring federal subsidies in an
untenable position.

While the resolutions had no practical effect

other than to sample congressional attitudes, a vote for either
resolution indicated a disposition to curtail the granting of federal
subsidies— something not desired by Southern constituencies.

On the

other hand, a vote against the resolutions implied a willingness to
increase the "burdens of taxation" and to give the national domain to
pp

For the text of the resolution ana the votes to order the
previous question, to table, and to order engrossment and third read
ing, see Cong. Globe, IfO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lMlt-lf?. The resolution
was referred to the Committee on the Pacific Railroad in the Senate
and remained there until the end of the session; ibid., Pt. 3, 1589.
23cong. Globe, hO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, k2h.
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TABLE 3-2
VOTE BY REGION AND PASTY TO ORDER ENGROSSMENT
AND THIRD READING OP H. J. RES. k6$
(Memphis, El Paso, and Pacific Railroad Bill)*

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

1
8
k
1
5

10
2 l*
33
2k
8

• •

102

19
1P3

Dem.

Nay
Rep,
6
7
18

• •

6
2
•

m

•

0

2

0

•

#*

e •

10

31
In

aCong. Globe, 1*0 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lM+5 (February 22, 1869)
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corporations rather than homesteaders.
On the first resolution to curtail further subsidies in bonds
or money, the Southerners stuck by their determination to support
subsidies and voted 6 -19 against the resolution.^ With the exception
of the three Pacific states, the South was the only region to vote
against the resolution.

Given the wording of the resolution, their

vote was decisively in favor of continued subsidies in bonds or
money.

Despite Southern opposition, however, the resolution passed by

a vote of 89-68 (see Table 3-3! A).

On the vote on the second

resolution to cut off land grants, Henry Washburn (B-1N) moved to
table rather than to order the previous question.

With this escape

route opened, Southerners joined the majority and voted 24-2 to
table (see Table 3-3: B).

Again the Southern margin in favor of

tabling the resolution was overwhelming in comparison to all other
regions except the Pacific states.

The vote on both resolutions,

however, must have had an unsettling effect on those who desired con
tinued federal subsidies.

For while the House had effectively avoided

the question of granting land as subsidies, a majority of the Repre^Ibid. The two Southern Democrats split on the first Holman
resolution, with Tift (GA) voting with the Republicans against the
resolution and Young (GA) voting for it. Of the five Republicans who
voted for the resolution, four were from North Carolina, and one,
Jacob Sypher was from Louisiana. Why the North Carolina Republicans
voted against the measure remains unknown. Sypher typically voted
against grants to railroads unless they were intimately connected
with his district which encompassed part of New Orleans and the parishes
below Orleans. Sypher was more interested in clearing the lower
Mississippi River and he offered three bills asking for federal
subsidies for ship canals— all of which were of greater interest to his
particular constituency than were railroads; see New Orleans Daily
Picayune. February 28, 1869; and Debow* s Review. VII (August, 1869)»
691; VIII (March-April, 1870), 2 0 9 ^
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IABIE 3-3: A and B
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON THE HOMAN RESOLUTIONS
a pass the first resolution8.
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

Nay
Dem.
Rep,

••
10
8
1
k
JL

7
15
33
5
5
-i

2
1
1
2
Js

7
8
18
IB
7
-1

2k

65

7

61

Grand Total

68

89

> table the second resolutiona
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Yea
Dem,
Rep.
1

13
17

1
k
_2

23
7
__2

8

102
110

Nay
Dem.
Rep,
8
9
1
3

7
9
1A
1
3

21

31*

55

aS 2S£* Globe, UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, U2U (January lfl, 1869).

sentatives had demonstrated a willingness to halt further subsidies in
the form of bonds and money. The Southern editors were generally
correct in their uneasy feeling that support for federal subsidies was
declining in Congress, but they could not blame their own Represen
tatives— who were overwhelmingly scalawags and carpetbaggers.
If the "Southern position*' can be defined as favorable to con
tinued federal subsidies for internal improvements, then the region was
well represented in the Third Session. On eight measures dealing with
such subsidies, seventeen Southern Republicans supported their con
tinuance on all eight votes; seven supported the southern position
seven times, and three supported it six times.^ One Republican,
Jacob Sypher of Louisiana, voted against the South five times and
was absent for the other three ballots. Another Louisiana Republican,
Michel Vidal, was present for only one vote which he cast against
further subsidies. Of the Democrats, Tift supported the Southern
position seven times and Young favored subsidies five of eight times,
but Young had voted for both Holman resolutions.
Southern Republicans worked diligently to secure federal subsidies
for specific internal improvements projects in the South. Despite their
inexperience and the short time they had to serve, Southern Republicans
2?The eight votes include three votes on the Memphis, El Faso, and
Pacific Railroad {+ = Southern position): to order previous question
(+ = yea), to table (+ = nay), to pass (+ = yea); the two votes on the
Holman resolutions: to pass the first resolution (+ = nay), to table
the second resolution (+ = yea); a vote to table S. 570, a bill granting
public lands to Denver Pacific Railway and Telegraph Company (+ “ nay),
Cong. Globet to Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 587; and two votes on H. J. Res.
O T 7 a resolution which proposed In part to regulate further grants of
lands for aid to railroads: to table (+ = yea), to refer (+ = yea);
ibid., Pfc. 2, 959, 1221.
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submitted ten bills calling for federal aid to local and state rail
road projects during the Third Session.

Nine Republicans submitted a

total of twelve bills for other projects ranging from ship canals to
river and harbor improvements, and ten bills for the establishment of
mail or post roads.

All of the bills were referred to committees and

none passed, but Southern Republicans did make the effort.
A third economic issue in the Third Session concerned alternate
methods of discharging the government's obligations to holders of its
securities.

The issue of public credit had been the focus of

considerable partisan controversy during the presidential campaign
of 1868.

The Democrats, particularly those from the Midwest, endorsed

the so-called "Ohio Idea" to pay government obligations (bonds) in
lawful money (greenbacks) unless payment in coin was specified by law.
To most Republicans, this amounted to nothing more than repudiation
of the national debt— a clear violation of the public trust.

The

Republican platform of 1868 accordingly upheld the sanctity of the
public debt, denounced repudiation, and pledged the "payment of public
indebtedness in the uttermost good faith . . . not only according to
the letter but the spirit of the laws under which it was contracted. ,,27
Grant's victory in the fall of 1868 seemed to indicate that the
"respudiators" had been repudiated.

The issue might have rested there

26
Figures on the number of bills introduced by Southern Represen
tatives were compiled fran Cong. Globe. *tO Cong., 3 Sess., Pts. 1-3. Of
the two Democrats, only Tift offered any bills for internal improvements.
^Quoted from Robert Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party; An Economic
Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959), 122. See also; Robert T. Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies, 1865-1879 (Durham: Duke University Press, 195577 72.
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had not President Johnson revitalized the controversy in his last
annual message in December 1868.

With the assumption that bondholders

had already received a just return on their investment, Johnson proposed
that the government confiscate the interest now being paid to bond
holders and apply it to the principal in order to retire the bonds.
Thus challenged, congressional Republicans moved quickly to guarantee
the sanctity of the public debt, first by resolution, then by the
passage of a public credit bill.
The public credit resolution, introduced on December l1*, 1868,
contained a preamble and resolved
That all forms and degrees of repudiation of national indebt
edness are odious to the American People. And that under no
circumstances will their Representatives consent to offer the
public creditor, as full compensation, a less amount of money
than that which the Government contracted to pay him.29
Southern Republicans voted as a unit in favor of the resolution on four
recorded roll calls.

The two Democrats voted against the resolution

with the exception that Nelson Tift voted in favor of passing the
preamble and the first sentence of the resolution on the fourth vote. 30
The House split almost perfectly along party lines on all four voues.^3*
The bill to strengthen the public credit (H. R. 1744) was reported
g9cong. Globe. 40 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, 71*

30The first vote was to suspend the rules and consider the
. resolution; the second was to table a motion to reconsider the first
vote; the third was to table the preamble to the resolution; and
the fourth was to pass the preamble and first sentence of the
resolution. The vote on the passage of the second sentence of the
resolution was not recorded. Ibid., 72-73.
3^The Senate passed a similar resolution on December 17, 1868
by a strict party vote, see Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party. 124.
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from the House Ways and. Means Committee on February 22, I869 . The
heart of the bill pledged the "faith of the United States . . . to the
payment in coin of all interest bearing obligations of the United
States, except in cases when the law was expressly directed other
wise. "32 Motions to table and to weaken the measure by amendment
were easily defeated by a partisan vote.

The House passed the bill

on February 2b by a margin of 121-60 and sent it to the

Senate. 33

a

House-Senate conference committee returned the bill to the House with
several changes on the last day of the session.

The most important

alteration was the addition of a clause promising an early return to
resumption of specie payments:
And the United States also solemnly pledges its faith to make
provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption
of the United States notes in coin. 3*+
Both Houses approved the conference report, but Andrew Johnson got in
the final blow in the controversy by pocket-vetoing the bill.
The vote on the bill, as on the resolution, was highly partisan.
The two Southern Democrats voted against it on every recorded vote.
Southern Republicans, with few exceptions, favored the measure.

By

region, the vote followed party lines with the exception that a handful
of Eastern Democrats supported the measure and a substantial number
3sCong. Globe, ^0 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1bb6.
33por debate on the bill and the votes to table, amend, and
pass, see ibid., Pt. 3j 153^-39*
3^Ibid., 1879.
35ibid., 1883 . A similar bill would pass during the First
Session of the Forty-First Congress.
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of Midwestern Republicans opposed it.

Robert Sharkey has concluded

that the vote on the public credit measure "separated the principled
greenbackers from the politicians."

The Republican greeribackers and

ultra-Radicala, such as Benjamin F. Butler, John Covode, William D.
Kelly, and Ignatius Donnelly, joined Democrats in opposing the
measure.36 Little is known about the financial views of the Southern
Republicans who opposed the bill.
Southern attitudes on the public credit issue are difficult to
determine.

The issue evoked little comment in the Southern press,

and the newspapers that did notice it were of a divided mind.

If any

specific group benefited from the promises of the act it was the
holders of government securities and there were few bondholders in
the South.

The New Orleans Daily Picayune, for example, disliked the

idea of "legislating bonds into a higher value for the benefit of
brokers," and doubted that Johnson was a "repudiator."38 But the
3^Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 279 .

37Five Southern Republicans expressed opposition to the Public
Credit Act. Four voted against passage on February 2b, 1869 , ana three
voted against the conference report on the bill on March 3* An inves
tigation of their background and constituent characteristics reveals no
real common denominator Which might indicate why they opposed their
party on the bill. Three were scalawags, two were carpetbaggers; three
were from North Carolina, two were from South Carolina. With one
exception, they represented marginally white agricultural districts.
In terms of occupation and personal wealth they had nothing in common.
Only two, James Goss (SC) and John Deweese (NC), opposed the public
credit bill on every vote* Goss, a country merchant, represented the
poor, rural, and marginally-white fourth district in western South
Carolina and he probably favored soft money. Deweese was on record as
being in favor of paper money and currency expansion and against specie
resumption. See his speech in support of a bill to expand the currency
in Cong. Globe, UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix, 215-17.
33nc w Orleans Daily Picayune, March

1869; December 19, 1868.

Picayune, like many other Southern Democratic newspapers, favored specie
resumption, and the conservative newspapers certainly did not want to
be connected in any way with the heretical schemes of Radicals like
Benjamin Butler (who had voted against the public credit bill) to
establish a paper currency with no specie base.39 The extant Repub
lican newspapers seemed to have favored the public credit measure.*4®
The ambiguous stance of Southern newspapers on the public credit
issue makes it difficult to determine whether or not the Southern
Republicans were properly representing their constituents'.interests
in voting for the measure.

One historian has expressed the opinion

that by their votes for the public credit bill the majority of the
Southern Republicans demonstrated "their subservience to whatever
Republican dogma might be fashionable at the time.
unsubstantiated explanation will not do.

.Jii

Such an

Even In the Midwest, where

the "Ohio Idea" was strongest, Republicans favored the measure by a
substantial majority (see Table 3-k); and the Southern Republicans
demonstrated that they were not merely party rob01 s by their vote on
other economic issues.

The public credit bill was a partisan issue,

buc support for the motions of safeguarding the public credit and
39ibid., January 21, 1869; Richmond Whig, January 1, I869 .
Several other Democratic and Conservative newspapers approved of
Grant’s premise to maintain the public credit in his inaugural address.
See, for example, the Arkansas Gazette, March 9, 1869; and New Orleans
Times, March 5 , 1869 . But other newspapers, like the Atlanta Con
stitution, doubted that Grant's policy would "meet with much popular
favor*4--"outside of New England and the bonded interest," see Atlanta
Constitution, March 3, 1869 .
^®See, for example, The Weekly Raleigh (NC) Register, September
Zh, 1867; March h, i860.
^Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, 128.
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TABLE 3-U
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO AGREE TO
THE CONFERENCE REPORT ON H. R. 17Mf
(Public Credit Bill)a
Yea

Region

Rep.

1

20
33
30
20
k

NE
MA
MW

* »

SS

• *

6

BS

• •

PS

JL

Total
Grand Total

Nay

Dem.

8

HO
118

Dan.

Rep.
1
2
19
3
3

• •

9
10
2
9
_1

••

28

31
59

aCong. Globe« UO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1883 (March 3, 1869).
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returning to specie payments did exist in the South.

At the very

least, there is no evidence of strong opposition among conservative
Southern newspapers.

There was a shortage of currency in the South,

and Southerners were tired of the unsecured state and local, scrip
and the lack of credit arrangements, hut they were not ready to endorse
and wildly inflationist proposal in 1869.

Southerners could swallow

paying the governments obligations in coin on the assumption that it
was a first step toward specie resumption.

Finally, it should he kept

in mind that the measure did nothing more than pledge the faith of
the government to the payment of its obligations in coin and to promise
an early return to specie payments.

As Robert Sharkey has noted, the
Up

bill "did not affect the redemption of a single bond or greenback."
Of the economic measures considered during the Third Session,

the issue most directly related to the South was the proposed redistri
bution of the national bank notes*

As the national banks and their

issue were a topic of continuing importance during Reconstruction, the
system bears explanation.

Congress had created the national banking

system as a war measure to provide for more stable banking facilities
and a sound and uniform currency.

In addition, the national banks

could serve as a market for government bonds, and their currency,
called national bank notes, would be receivable for most public debts
and government obligations.

The system, as established in 1863 and

revised in l£36U, provided that "associations" with a minimum capital of
$50,000 and a deposit of federal bonds with the newly-created office of
the Comptroller of the Currency, would be granted charters as national
4gIbid., 130.
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'banks.

They were then allowed to Issue national hank notes in specified

proportion to their hond deposits.

The number of national hanks grew

slowly until March 1865 , when Congress imposed a ten percent tax on
state hatik notes which accelerated the conversion of state hanks to
national hanks.

As a result, by the end of 1865 , most of the allotted

$300 million was taken up by new national banks. ^3

The national hanking system had a number of shortcomings.

The

law establishing the system had set a ceiling of $300 million on
national hank note circulation to help avoid further wartime inflation.
This amount proved to he insufficient for the needs of the country in
the postwar period.

In addition, the minimum capital requirement for

organization was often prohibitive for sparsely-settled areas in
the West and South— areas which most needed currency, loanable
funds, and a stable hanking system.

But the most evident sectional

inequity in the system was the maldistribution of the $300 million in
hank notes.
Originally, the $300 million was to he distributed to each state
on the basis of population, existing hank capital, resources, and
business interests.

The actual distribution did not, however, proceed

in accordance with the quota system.

Through misadministration and

^Sjprits Redlich, The Molding of American Banking; Men and Ideas
(2 vols•, New York: Hafher Publishing Co., 1951), II, 99-121; Sharkey,
Money, Class, and Party, 223-28; Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A
Social and Political History of American Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19^), 18-19.
^TPor a discussion of defects in the system, see Redlich,
Molding of American Banking, II, 117-20; and Sharkey, Money. Class,
and Party, 229-37.

ambiguities in the law, New England, New York, and Pennsylvania ended
up with 999 of the 16^7 national banks and $218 million of the $293
million in national bank notes that were issued.

Comparative

statistics on the actual distribution show an incredible sectional
imbalance.

Rhode Island's "share" of the national bank note

circulation exceeded that of the entire South.

The tiny burg of

Waterville, Maine, had as much as the state of Alabama, and Florida
had no national bank note circulation at all.

On a per capita level,

Rhode Island had $77.17 while Arkansas had thirteen cents.^5
The unequal distribution did not generally attract the attention
of Congress until the spring of 1866 when most of the authorized
circulation had been distributed.

It was evident that the South

and the West had not received their rightful quotas.

Northeastemers

argued that they needed more circulation for trade and manufacturing,
but, as several historians have pointed out, the South and West badlyneeded an adequate supply of sound currency and stable banking
institutions.

In addition, the West and the South did not have the

readily available credit facilities which the Northeast could use to
conduct business.

There is little doubt that the postwar recovery

of the South was hindered by a lack of an adequate circulating medium.
1

In its place, the South could either purchase bank notes from the
Northeast at a premium or rely on the unstable and unauthorized issues
maldistribution of the national bank currency is compre
hensively treated in George LaVeme Anderson, "The National Banking
System, 1865-1875: A Sectional Institution" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Illinois, 1933)? especially chs. Ill and
IV.

issues of state and local scrip for business.*^
The maldistribution of the national bank currency was the
subject of a great deal of debate but very little action until tne
Third Session of the Fortieth Congress.

In February 1669» the House

received for consideration Senate Bill No. 440, a four section bill
to supplement the 1864 act which had altered the original 1863 law
establishing the national banking system.

In the Senate version

of the bill, the first three sections provided needed correctives to
the 1864 Act.

It was the fourth section than aroused controversy

by providing for partial redistribution of the national bank note
circulation.

Section four proposed to withdraw up to $20 million

from those states whose bank note circulation exceeded their lawful
quota and distribute it to states with less than five dollars of such
circulation per capita.^
Representative Theodore Pomeroy (R-NY) of the Committee on
Banking and Currency reported S. 440 and several proposed amendments
to the House on February 13, 3869.

One of the amendments proposed

to replace section four of S. 440 with a section that provided for
greater redistribution by scaling existing national banks having more
than their quota of circulation and redistributing "twenty to twentyfive million dollars of currency, 12,000,000 to go to southern States
and the rest to western States which have not received their portion
^Anderson, "National Banking System," 105, In, 115-16, 136 ;
Redlich, Molding of American Banking, II, 118-19; Sharkey, Money,
Class, and Party, 236-37.
47cong. Globe, 4o Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1181.

under existing law.

On the floor of the House, however, "both the

Senate version of section four and the committee amendment lost out
to a more comprehensive redistribution plan. Under the lead of
John Coburn (D-IN), members from the South and West passed an amend
ment for complete redistribution of the $300 million in national bank
circulation. In its final form, the Cobum amendment proposed that
half of the $300 million be distributed by states according to their
representation in Congress and half according to the official
valuation of all real and personal property in each state.^9
The vote on the Coburn amendment and the subsequent votes on
S. ¥(0 with the amendment incorporated as section four were bipartisan
and sectional. The Hew England and Mid-Atlantic states, guarding
their bank nose circulation jealously, voted against the Cobum
amendment; the South and the West voted overwhelmingly in favor of the
amendment. The South, in fact, was the only section solidly in favor
of the amendment (see Table 3-5)- With minor exceptions the South
continued to vote as a unit on the bill incorporating the Cobum
amendment.50
In reference to the problem of redistribution, Professor George
^Ibid., 1183.

^Ibid., 1325. In earlier debate on the bill, Cobum pointed
out that section four of the Senate version of the bill, and the
committee's proposed substitution for section four would not correct
the inequity— primarily because both proposals limited the amount to
be redistributed to $20-25 million. See ibid., 1270-72.
5°For debate and recorded roll-calls on S. kkO, see ibid., Pt. 2,
1181-86, 1269-7^, 1319-3^.
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TABLE 3-5
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON THE
COBURN AMENDMENT TO S. hkO
(Redistribution Bill)8-

Region
NE
MA
MW

SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

Nay
Dem.
Rep

a•
2
8
2
5

1
•
kz
22
8
_2

1
11
2
• •
2
_1

1
JL

18

75

17

69

•

93

21
36
10
• »

86

^ o n g . Globe, 1*0 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1325 (February 17, 1869 )
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LaVeme Anderson has remarked that the readmlssion of the Southern
states "was not a decisive factor In influencing legislation as had
heen expected due largely to the fact that many of the men sent to
Congress during the early years of renewed statehood did not represent
the true Southern point of view."51 But Anderson*s own evidence belies
his observation; he later notes that House passage of S. ttO would have
failed without Southern votes.52 There is little doubt that the
South needed more currency and desired redistribution of the national
bank currency.53 One Southerner was not greatly exaggerating the
situation when he wrote President Johnson that "the present financial
system is a greater curse to the South than would be a standing army
of 200,000 men to be supported by the South.

As for the Beard-

Beale thesis, it is obvious that in supporting the Cobum plan of
redistribution the carpetbaggers and scalawags were voting against
Northeastern Republicans.
Efforts to achieve redistribution during the Third Session, how
ever, were of no avail as the Senate refused to agree to the House
amendments to S. ttO. A House-Senate conference committee appointed on
March 2, 1869, failed to resolve the differences between the two bodies.
53-Anderson,

"National Banking System," 151.

5gIbid., 283.
53gee, for example, Richmond Whig. February 2t, 1869; Weekly
North Carolina Standard. April It, 1869; "Apportionment of the National
Currency," Debow1s Review, VIII (April-May 1870), 3^9-51; Anderson,
"National Banking System," ch. V; and Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements
in the South, 1865-1933 (Los Angeles: University of California Press,
196o]7 9-13,
511Quoted from Anderson, "National Banking System," it6.
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The issue of redistribution would resurface early in the Forty-First
Congress which began two days later. ^

Early in 1869, the Washington correspondent of the Cincinnati
Commercial published an interview with a carpetbagger congressman
that was widely and favorably copied in conservative Southern news
papers.

The journalist concluded that

these gentlemen of the paper collar and extra dickey follow
New England, and vote all the time against the interests of
their own constituents.
I had a long talk with one of these Representatives
ad interim last night, and tried to convince him that it
would be well, just for the appearance of the thing, to cast
a vote now and then for the region he claimed to represent.
But no! I found my friend had intense contempt for one half
of his people, and a deadly hatred for the other half. It
was a Connecticut Congressman elected in the South.56
Such an "observation" reinforces the Beard-Beale thesis, but it is
clearly in conflict with reality as it does not apply to the voting behav
ior of Southern Republicans on economic issues in the Fortieth Congress.
55cong. Globe. IfO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1 ^ , 1816, 1897-1908.
In the Senate, the Southerners (all Republicans) voted solidly with
the West in favor of redistribution, but they could not overcome the
combined vote of the New England and Mid-Atlantic states against S. hto
as amended by the Hbuse. See Anderson, "National Banking System," 283.

56

Cincinnati Commercial as quoted in the Richmond Whig. January
5, IB69 . The correspondent did not identify the carpetbagger. Of the
Southern Representatives in the Fortieth Congress, only Nelson Tift, a
Democrat and long-time resident of Georgia, had been born in Connecticut.
While several of the Representatives were natives of other New England
states, as far as can be ascertained, none viewed Connecticut as their
home, nor had any served in the Union army from Connecticut. Although
he specified a carpetbagger Representative, he may have been talking
about carpetbag Senator Adonijah S. Welch of Florida who was born in
Connecticut— but Welch had been a resident of Michigan since 1839. The
correspondent may have erred, intentionally or unintentionally, in
identifying the native state of the carpetbagger. Whatever his
intentions, he added to the inaccurate portrayal of the carpetbagger
stereotype.
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The problem of determining the degree to which the twenty-nine
Republicans accurately represented "Southern interests" on economic
issues during the Third Session is compounded by the difficulty of
defining those interests on any given issue.

If a positive vote on

the copper b i U was detrimental to the South, and it probably was,
then Southern Republicans tended to vote with protectionists in the
House and against the interests of their own constituents.

As noted

above, however, the vote on the copper bill has limited value as an
indicator of attitudes on the tariff.

It is inpossible to determine

where the South stood on the issue of public credit.

Obviously, there

were few Southern bondholders to benefit from the bill.

On the other

hand, Southerners seemed inclined to accept the notion that the nation's
public credit should be upheld, and, at this time at least, Southerners
tended to agree that specie resumption was desirable.

But the measure,

as a declaration of intent, had no effect other than to put Congress
on record as favoring payment of the public debt in coin and promising
eventual resumption of specie payments.
Southern interests were well represented on the two economic
issues that were most important to the section.

Carpetbaggers,

scalawags, and Democrats alike compiled a solid record on measures
continuing federal subsidies for internal improvements and redistributing
the national bank currency.

Southern Republicans differed from New

England Republicans on the issue of federal subsidies, and the break
between the two wings of the party was complete on the issue of
redistribution.

While Beale correctly noted that the Northeasterners

should fear a reunion of the South and the West on economic issues, he
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maintained that if Republicans represented the South, the South and
West would not unite because the Southern Republicans would vote with
Northeastemers on economic questions.

Such was not the case on the

important questions considered in the Third Session.

On the forty

recorded roll calls on economic measures in the Third Session, the
most evident sectional combination is that between the South and
Midwest against the Northeast.
On the economic issues most vital to the South, the Southern
Representatives voted as a bloc.

Thus sectional interests, rather

than party interests appear to be the key to the voting behavior of
Southern congressmen, especially on the issues of federal subsidies
and redistribution.

The public credit proposal and, to a lesser

degree, the copper bill, were partisan issues, and political affiliation
best explains the voting behavior of most Southern Representatives.
On all the economic issues, the scalawag and carpetbag Representatives
tended to vote as a bloc whether for sectional or party interests.
Member ana constituent characteristics therefore offer little insight
into the voting behavior.
By examining the response of the thirty-one Southern Repre
sentatives on economic issues in the Third Session, it is possible to
rank them in terms of how well they represented Southern interests
(see Table 3-6).

The resulting ranking of the Representatives

actually reveals very little as most of the Representatives voted
similarly.

If the relatively insignificant vote on the tariff is

dropped, there was no appreciable difference in voting behavior between
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TABLE 3-6
RANK OF SOUTHERN CONGRESSMEN ACCORDING
TO THEIR VOTE ON ECONOMIC ISSUES0-

1. Deweese
2. Tift
3.

If.
5.
6.
7.

Dockery
Goss
Young
Whittemore
Hamilton

8. Norris
9. Newsham

10. Clift
11. Boyden
12. Corley
13.
14.
15*

.

(M

00

16.
17*
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Buckley
Haughey
Callis
Pierce
Roots
Prince
French
Bowen
Jones
Lash
Heaton
Boles
Elliott
Kellogg
Gove
Edwards

29. Sypher

30. Blackburn
31. Vidal

(R-NC)
(D-GA)
(R-NC)
(R-SC)
(D-GA)
(R-SC)
(R-FL)
(R-AL)
(R-IA)
(r -g a )
(R-NC)
(R-SC)
(R-AL)
(R-AL)
(R-AL)
(R-AL)
(R-AR)
(R-GA)
(R-NC)
(R-SC)
(R-NC)
(R-NC)
(R-NC
(R-AR)
(R-AR)
(R-AL)
(R-GA)
(R-GA)

C
S
S
C
C
C
C
C
S
S
C

s
C
C
C
c
c

+
4
4
4

+
+

Y

4
4
4
t

+

N
N

4
4

Y

+

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

4
4
4
4
4
4

-

•

-

#*
-

s
s

-

s
C
s

-

s

N
N

•

mm
-

c
s

*

s

-

(r-la)

C

_

(R-LA
(R-LA)

s
s

—

-

-

Y

N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

4
4

+
4
4
4
4
+
4
4
4
4
4
+
+

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

1
10

4
4
4
4

••
9
U
*«

4
4
4
4
4
4

2

4
4
4
4

6

if
2
9

21

5

5
7

8

8
10
11
17
»*

4
4
4

2
If
31
10

4

7

4

4

8

4

19

M

4

21

4

-

26

-

A

27
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TABLE 3-6— Continued
Congressmen are ranked according to how often they voted for
Southern Interests on economic issues (total of forty roll-call votes).
Southern interests are defined as being against the b l U raising duties
on copper and copper products (H. R. lk6o)t for continuation of
federal subsidies to internal improvements, and for the redistribution
of the national bank currency (S. UUo). The Representatives are ranked
within each category according to the number of times they supported
the Southern position. In case of identical voting patterns, they are
ranked according to the number of times absent* No rank is given for
their vote on the public credit bill (H. R. 17^) as a "Southern
position" on the issue could not be determined.
= carpetbagger; S = scalawag.
c+ c= a position against the copper bill (H. R. l46o). An
exception is made in the case of Deweese who represented the only
Southern district with extensive copper mining interests. Deweese
voted for the bill.
% = a position against the public credit bill; Y = a position
for the public credit bill (H. R. 17^)*
®+ « a position for continuation of federal subsidies for internal
improvements.
f+ =: a position for S. UUo incorporating the Cobum amendment;
A = absent on all votes.
^Figure given is the number of times absent out of a total of
forty roll-calls on economic issues.
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John Deweese (rank one) and William Edwards (rank twenty-eight). 57
As noted above, the Southern Representatives entered the Third
Session of the fortieth Congress under a number of handicaps.

With

two exceptions they had no experience in such an august body and most
had a mere three months to serve.

All were concerned with their

political future and, given the situation in the South, most were in
political trouble.

Seven had already failed to be re-elected to the

Forty-First Congress*

The six Georgia Representatives were in trouble

because Georgia had not complied with the Reconstruction Acts and none
of the six would be seated at the beginning of the Forty-First Congress.
Only Pierce M. B. Young, the Democrat, survived subsequent elections
to the Forty-First Congress.

The six Alabama Republicans were like

wise unsure of their future, as Alabama, for same inexplicable reason,
did not hold elections until after the First Session of the Forty-First
Congress.

In those elections, only Republican Charles Buckley

survived.

Of the remaining Representatives, only nine had been clearly

re-elected; the others faced pending contests for their seats.
Under such circumstances a lesser set of men might have totally
ignored their constituents* interests and sold their votes to the
highest bidder to secure their future.

Southern Republican Represen

tatives obviously antagonized conservative elements in their constit57of the three Louisiana Republicans given the lowest rank,
Jasper Blackburn and Michel Vidal, both lame ducks, were absent on
over 50 percent of the votes. Jacob Sypher is set off from the rest
of the Representatives by his failure to support continued federal
subsidies for internal improvements (see fh. 2b above).

uencies by actively supporting the proposed Fifteenth Amendment,58
hut on economic issues they faithfully represented Southern interests.
Given the issues, the time, and the circumstances, to say that a
solidly conservative delegation could have better represented the
economic interests of the South is speculation and nothing more.

58jhe Southern Republicans were vocal in their support of the
Fifteenth Amendment. Most of the speeches given by Southern Repub
licans related to the passage of the amendment. While it is not
to be denied that the political future of many of the Republicans
depended upon passage of the amendment, their speeches also reflect
a strong humanitarian concern for the welfare of blacks. For their
speeches, see Cong. Globe, bO Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix. Southern
Republican Representatives received no praise in the conservative press,
but the two Democrats, Tift and Young of Georgia, were cited, not for
their votes on economic issues, but for maintaining the proper attitudes
on reconstruction legislation. See Atlanta Constitution, February
March 3, lJb 1869*

CHAPTER IV
THE FORTY-FIRST HOUSE
The Forty-First Congress convened on March b, 1869, the day
following the conclusion of the Third Session of the Fortieth Congress.
The Forty-First House met in three sessions.

In terms of issues con- .

sidered and legislation, little was accomplished during the First
Session which lasted until April 12, 1869, hut the House was quite
productive during the Second Session (December 6, 1869 to July 15,
I870 ) and the Third Session (December 5, 1870 to March 3, 1871).

As

had been the case in the two previous Congresses, the continuing
problems of political reconstruction overshadowed economic issues but
a number of important economic measures were considered.

In particular,

the Forty-First House guaranteed the sanctity of the public credit,
refunded the national debt, and grappled, with varying degrees of
effectiveness, with redistribution, currency expansion, internal
taxes, the tariff, and federal subsidies for internal improvements.•
^According to a law passed during the Second Session of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress, the House and the Senate were obliged to
convene each new Congress on the day following the conclusion of the
old Congress. Thus the Fortieth, Forty-First, and Forty-Second Con
gresses each had three major sessions. The law was revoked during
the Forty-Second Congress, and the House and Senate returned to the
original two-session foimat beginning with the Forty-Third Congress.
For the acts establishing and revoking the law, see Cong. Globe,
39 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 3, Appendix, 180-81; Cong. Globe. b2 Cong.,
1 Sess., Pt. 2, Appendix, 335125

The South sent fifty-four men to the Forty-First House, hut due
to contested elections, resignations, deaths, failures to elect on
time, and the policy of staggered readmission, over 90 percent of the
Southerners served partial terras.

During the First Session, the

House seated only fifteen Southerners, including the full delegations
from Arkansas, Florida, and North Carolina.

p

In the following session,

from December 1869 to July 1870, another twenty-six Southerners took
their seats.

Those seated during the Second Session included the

delegations from the newly readmitted states of Virginia, Mississippi,
and Texas and the Representatives from Alabama.

The remaining thir

teen Southern seats, including seven from Georgia, were filled during
the Third Session beginning in December 1870 *^ When Richard H.
Whiteley (R-GA) took his seat on February 9, 1B71, the South finally
attained full representation in the House— twenty-two days before the
biographical Directory, 19^-96• Also seated during the First
Session were Republicans Benjamin F. Whittemore, C. C. Bowen, and
Solomon L. Hoge of South Carolina and Lionel A. Sheldon of Louisiana.
Because of disputed election returns, the two states' other seats
remained vacant for the duration of the First Session.
3ibid., 193-97- Alabama did not hold elections to the FortyFirst Congress until August 1869— between the First and Second Ses
sions. Virginia was readmitted on January 26, I87O; Mississippi on
February 23, 1870; and Texas on March 30, 1870- Two more Louisiana
Representatives, Joseph P. Newsham and Chester B. Darrall, and
Alexander S. Wallace of South Carolina won their contests and were
seated late in the Second Session. But the House forced the resig
nation of two Southerners, Benjamin F. Whittemore (R-SC) and John
Deweese (R-NC), during the session, and two other Southerners, David
Heaton (R-NC) and Robert Ridgeway (R-VA), died before the Third
Session convened in December 1870.
Slid., 19 I+-97 . In addition to the seven Georgians, the House
seated the final two Representatives from Louisiana and four replace
ments for those Representatives who had died or had been forced to
resign during or after the Second Session.
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end of the Forty-First Congress.

As the average term for Southerners

■was only 12.it- months, it is obvious that the South was not well
represented in the Forty-First House.

Fifteen of the fifty-four Representatives were Democrats.

The

Democrats included two outsiders (or "settlers" according to Southern
conservatives) who had arrived after 1865 in the states they repre
sented.

The wealthy iron and coal mine owner, William Milnes, Jr.,

had crossed the state line from Pennsylvania to Virginia in 1865 to
purchase and operate the Shenandoah Iron Works.

The heavily white

valley constituency selected him as their Representative when Virginia
was readmitted in January 1870.5

The other outside Democrat, John C.

Connor of Texas, was a Union army veteran who had waged an unsuccessful
campaign in 1866 as a national Union candidate for the Indiana House.
After his defeat, Connor rejoined the army in Texas and ran for the
U. S. House from the heavily white second district with the support
of such eminent Texas Democrats as former Provisional Governor James
W. Troclcmorton.

Most of the Democrats, like Milnes and Connor, were

^Biographical Directory, 1460; Benjamin P. Poore (comp.), Conressional Directory for the Third Session of the Forty-First Congress
2d ed., Washington: Government Printing Office, 1871), 51. There
is some dispute as to whether Milnes had served in the Union army.
Jack P. Maddex, Jr. refers to him as a Union veteran, hut Catherine
Silverman classifies him as a non-participant. See Maddex, The Virginia
Conservatives, 1867-1879: A Study in Reconstruction Politics (Chapel
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1970), 80; and Silverman,
"’Of Wealth, Virtue, and Intelligence*: The Redeemers and Their
Triumph in Virginia and North Carolina" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
City University of New York, 1971), 301.

f

^Biographical Directory, 775-76; Walter Prescott Webb and H.
Dailey Carroll (eds.), The Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin: Texas
State Historical Association, 1952), I, 393; John Pressley Carrier, "A

moderates and, although half had served the Confederacy, most had
"been unionists or cooperationists during the secession crisis.
The thirty-nine Republicans consisted of twenty carpetbaggers,
seventeen scalawags, and the first two blacks to be seated in the
House of Representatives.

Both blacks served for but a short time.

The first, Joseph H. Rainey of South Carolina, was chosen by a predom
inantly black constituency to fill the vacancy created by the forced
resignation of carpetbagger Benjamin P. Whittemore.

Rainey, a barber

by trade and a well-known state politician, was seated on December 12,
1870.

He served less than three months in the Forty-First House, but

he was re-elected to four more terras and served until 1879*

The

other black, Jefferson Bong of Georgia, had been b o m a slave and
was, at the time of his election, a relatively well-established
merchant-tailor in Macon.

Long was a lame duck when he began his

one and one-half month terra in January 1870.?
The Southerners ranged in age from twenty-six year old Clinton
Political History of Texas During The Reconstruction, 1865-187^"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971)? 283;
James Alex Baggett, "The Rise and Fall of the Texas Radicals, 18671883" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, North Texas State University,
1972), 110.
?For Rainey's career, see: D.A.B., XV? 327-28; Biographical
Directory. 1581; Emily Bellinger Reynolds and Joan Reynolds Paunt
(comps.), Biographical Directory of the Senate of the State of South
Carolina, 1776-196^ (Columbia: South Carolina Archives Department,
196^0, 2§5; and Joel Williamson, After Slavery: The Negro in South
Carolina During Reconstruction (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1965), 1^3,359? 369-70. For biographical information
on Long, see: Biographical Directory. 1305; Poore (ccanp.), Congres
sional Directory for the Third Session of the Forty-First Congress, 11;
and Maurine Christopher, America* s Black Congressmen (New York:
Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1971)*27-29.
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L. Cobb (R-NC) to sixty year old Edward Degener (R-TX).

The median

age was a youthful thirty-eight with well over half the carpetbaggers
under the age of thirty-five while half the Democrats and scalawags
were forty-five years of age or older.

Twenty-nine had been born in

slave states, twenty in free states, and five were foreign bom.
Five possessed no formal education and twenty-two had no more
than an eleaentary education.

Fourteen of the seventeen scalawags

had no formal training beyond the elementary level while fourteen of
the twenty carpetbaggers had attended college and eleven had taken one
or more degrees.

The educational experience of the Democrats paralleled

that of the carpetbaggers.
Thirty-two of the fifty-four Representatives resided in the
South prior to the war, but only nine (six Democrats and three scala
wags) were identified as former slaveholders.

Information on their

former political affiliations remains fragmentary.

Of the nine

identified as Democrats during the 1850s, six remained in the party
and three became scalawags.

Of ten former Whigs (all native Souther

ners), six joined the Republican party and three became Democrats.
Only five (all carpetbaggers) were clearly identified as having belonged
to the Republican party prior to i860.

At least five carpetbaggers

supported Lincoln in the election of i860 , three Democrats and two
scalawags voted for Douglas, and two scalawags favored Bell.

Only one

Democrat was identified as having supported Breckinridge and only two
(both Democrats) were active secessionists.

Sixty-six percent of the

Democrats and 75 percent of the scalawags were unionists or cooper
ationists during the secession crisis (seven unknown).

The figures

on Civil War service indicate that seven Democrats and six scalawags
served in the Confederate army, twenty-two (including two scalawags
and one Democrat) sided with the Union, and seventeen (including
eight scalawags and five Democrats) were non-participants.
Half of the Representatives were lawyers and 25 percent were
involved in agricultural pursuits.

Of the remainder, seven were

merchants and businessmen, three were bankers, one a minister, one a
pilot, and one a tailor.

For the thirty-five whose wealth was

discovered, seventeen claimed less than $10,000 in personal and real
estate and ten admitted to a personal worth of less than $5,000.
Another ten claimed an estate valued between $10,000 and $20,000 and
eight were worth more than $20,000.

William Milnes (D-VA) headed the

list with a property evaluation of $70 ,000— most of which was wrapped
up in the Shenandoah Iron Works.

Charles Hays, the Alabama scalawag,

valued his plantation holdings at $50,000 and admitted to another
$6,000 in personal estate.®
Six of the Representatives apparently had no previous elective
political experience, but fifteen had held local offices, forty-two
had served at the state level, and seven had held appointive federal
positions.

Another fourteen had served briefly in the Fortieth House.

^Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Virginia, Page
County; ibid., Alabama, Green County. Hays could have been worth more
than the $56,000 he admitted to in I87O. He had inherited a large
estate from his father and he was often referred to as one of the
largest planters in Alabama. In i860 he owned 92 slaves with real
estate valued at $112,500 and a personal estate of $98,750. See
Manuscript Census, i860, Schedule of Slave Population, Schedule of
Free Population, Alabama, Green County; Hays to Andrew Johnson,
August 1, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Alabama.
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In terns of prior political experience, the Southern delegation to
the Forty-First House compared favorably with those to other Recon
struction Congresses.
easy elections.

Most of the Representatives had relatively

Thirty won by margins of over 10 percent, and

twenty-one by more than 20 percent.

There were, however, some

extremely close contests since fifteen won their seats with margins
of less than five percent, and nine (including four scalawags) with
margins of less than two percent of the vote.

Opponents unsuccessfully

contested the elections of eight Southerners; three others won their
seats by contest.

All of the Louisiana seats were contested.

Three

Louisiana Republicans won their contests but the House refused to
seat the other two Republicans until they presented new credentials
won in special elections.
Cross-tabulations of the Representatives* political affiliation
with the congressional district data yields some interesting relation
ships.

As might be expected, the two blacks represented constituencies

that were Uo to U5 percent white, and sixteen of the twenty carpet
baggers were elected by constituencies that were under 55 percent
white.

Over half of the Democrats, on the other hand, came from

districts that were more than 70 percent white.

The scalawags again

represented marginally white or black districts with six elected by
constituencies that were from 50 to 5k percent white.

Carpetbaggers

represented n.n five of the districts that were less than 50 percent
agricultural (urban districts), and Republicans represented 88 percent
of the districts that were over 80 percent agricultural.

Nearly all

the Democrats came from districts that were 50 to 79 percent agricultural.
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The fifty-four Southerners entered a charged atmosphere in
Washington.

The political calm pledged by Ulysses S. Grant in the

campaign of 1668 was noticeably absent during the Forty-First Congress.
The volatile issues of political reconstruction remained in the fore
front as the last four Southern states were "reconstructed" and
readmitted.

In the interim, Congress generated volumes of rhetoric on

disputed Southern elections, debated the feasibility of a general
amnesty, and finally passed two controversial "force bills" to
facilitate enforcement of the newly-approved fifteenth amendment.

Less

than one-fourth of the 6^3 recorded roll-call votes in the Forty-First
House related to economic issues, but several pieces of important
economic legislation were considered and passed.

During the First

Session, the public credit bill was revived and made law, while the
central piece of legislation to emerge from the Third Session was the
act incorporating and subsidizing the Texas-Pacific Railroad Company.
In terms of economic legislation, the Second Session ranked among the
most important during Reconstruction.

During that session, the

national debt was refunded, a currency bill incorporating redistribution
was passed, and the House approved a bill reducing internal taxes and
tariff duties.9
^Full analysis of the response of Southerners to economic issues
during the Forty-First Congress is impossible because the South was
only partially represented during the First and much of the Second
Session. In particular, scaling techniques lose their value unless
a representative number of members responded to the issue being con
sidered. A scale encompassing all the important economic issues
considered in the Forty-First House, for example, is relatively
meaningless, because so many Southern seats were vacant when key votes
were taken. The value of the scalograms that have been constructed on
specific economic issues must be qualified by an awareness that the
South was incompletely represented. The one exception is the scalogram
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The first significant economic measure to be considered by the
Forty-First House was a bill to strengthen the public credit.

Presi

dent Johnson had pocket-vetoed a similar bill at the conclusion of
the Fortieth Congress, but President Grant had announced that he
favored paying in gold “every dollar of the Government indebtedness
. . . unless otherwise expressly stipulated in the contract."3-0 With
Grant's blessing, Congress revived and passed "An Act to Strengthen
the Public Credit of the United States," and on March 18, 1869, it
became the first act of the Forty-First Congress to receive Grant's
approval.

In its final form, the act pledged the faith of the United

States to pay in coin all non-interest bearing and interest-bearing
obligations except in cases where the law authorizing the issue
stipulated otherwise.

To this was added a clause pledging "to make

provision at the earliest practicable period for the redemption of the
United States notes in coin."33- The response to the bill was as
highly partisan as it had been in the Fbrtieth Congress.

House

Republicans favored a motion to order the engrossment and third reading
of the bill by a margin of 96-12 while Democrats voted 1-36 in opposition
(see Table 4-1: A).

The handful of Southern Republicans to be seated

favored the measure by a margin of 8-2.
on the Texas-Pacific railroad question— a measure considered when the
South was at full strength. All fifty Southern Representatives scale
on the Texas-Pacific question.
30James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents. 1784-1897 (10 vols.. Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1897), VII, 7 .
^^Cong. Globe, 4l Cong., 1 Sess., Appendix, 35 .
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TABLE 4-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
OR THE PUBLIC CREDIT ISSUE
A.

To order engrossment and third reading of H. Res. 7
(Public Credit Act)8,
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem,

1LJ
T_M_

12
27
37
8
6
2

1

92

aa
•*
* •
• a
a a

Dem.

Ray
Rep.

• •

a *

7
15

a a

8
2
2

a •

12
2

a»

■

12

36

93

Grand Total
B.

Yea
Rep.

48

0 table the McNeely Resolution1*

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.
23
29
44
14
7
2

10
16
3
9
2

119

4o

• a

2
a •
#•
a•

1
~1"n

3

Dem.

122

Nay
Rep.

a •

• a
a a

1
a a
a •
a a

1

4l

aCong. Globe, 41 Cong., 1 Sess., 60 (March 12, I869 )
?Ibid., 4-1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 913 (January 31, 1870),
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The passage of the Public Credit Act did not completely resolve
the question of how bondholders were to be paid.

The issue reappeared

during the Second Session when Representative Thompson W. McNeely
(D-IL) offered a resolution stating that
the national debt should be paid in strict compliance with the
contract, whether it is made payable in gold or greenbacks;
that the five-twenty bonds are payable in greenbacks or their
equivalent, and we condemn the policy of the Administration,
which is squandering millions of money by buying such bonds
at a high rate of premium when the Government had the clear
right to redeem them at par.^ 2
The reaction to a motion to table the resolution was even more partisan
than the earlier division on the Public Credit Act (see Table 4-1: B).
The anti-administration tone of the resolution undoubtedly stimulated
Republican party unity.

Only one Republican voted against tabling

the resolution; only three Democrats voted for tabling.

The vote on the

resolution, which offers a slightly larger sample of Southern opinion
on the issue, split the South along party lines.^
The public credit issue was closely associated with a successful
effort during the Second Session to refund the national debt with
lower-interest, longer-term bonds and to make the new bonds specif
ically payable in coin.

Refunding was a sound fiscal move, as the

government was then paying relatively high rates of interest on
•^Cong. Globe. 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 913*
bonds are explained below.

The five-twenty

^The three Southern Republicans, Bowen (SC), Deweese (NC), and
Dockery (NC), who had opposed the Public Credit Act, fell into line
and voted to table the resolution. All three had also opposed the
public credit bill in the Third Session of the fortieth Congress. For
a discussion of Southern reaction to the public credit issue, see
above, ch. III.
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several short-term issues.

Of particular consequence, were the series

of bonds issued between 1862 and 1868, known as "five-twenties," which
accounted for approximately 75 percent of the interest-bearing part of
the federal debt.

The five-twenties were tax-exempt securities,

initially purchasable with greenbacks, and bearing 6 percent interest.
The interest was specifically payable in gold, but the law had not
stipulated in what kind of money the principal was to be paid.

As

their name indicates, the five-twenties were optionally redeemable at
any time between five and twenty years after their purchase.

Most of

the five-twenties were optionally payable by 1870; and, as the last
issue was made in 1868, all would become redeemable by July 1, 1873.
The refunding legislation eventually passed in 1870 was almost solely
concerned with refunding the $1 .6 billion of five-twenties still
outstanding.
Both Houses of Congress generally agreed that the short-term,
high-interest five-twenties should be refunded, but the exact means of
doing so stimulated considerable debate.

Early in the session, the

Senate considered and passed a bill (S. 380) which proposed to refund
the bonded indebtedness with three new bond issues of $k00 million each,
at interest rates ranging from k to 5 percent, and at maturities of
ten to twenty years.

The House considered S. 380 but offered a sub

stitute bill (H. R. 2167) which proposed a single bond issue of $1
•****0 n the origin and nature of the five-twenties and the refunding
issue, see Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era: A Social and Political
History of American Finance, 1865-l879Ti?riricgbon: Princeton
University Press, 196k), lfj-17, 179-80; and Robert T. Patterson,
Federal Debt -Management Policies, 1865-1879 (Durham: Duke University
Press, l W , 78-10k.
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"billion, redeemable in thirty years and bearing t percent interest. 15
The first report of the conference committee between the two Houses
resulted in a compromise bill (S, 380) which authorized three issues:
$1 billion at k percent interest, redeemable after thirty years;
$300 million at k.5 precent, redeemable after fifteen years; and $200

million at 5 percent, redeemable after ten years.^
The House rejected the first conference report on S. 380 for
reasons other than the terms of the proposed refunding issues.
Opposition to the first conference report centered on three provisions.
Throughout the consideration of the refunding bills, one group (mostly
Democrats) opposed replacing the five-twenties with new bonds whose
interest and principal were both payable in coin as S. 380 stipulated.
This was essentially the same group that had opposed the Public Credit
Act with the argument that the national obligations should be paid
in greenbacks.

17

A second provision of the conference report

authorized a commission of 1 .5 percent payable to banking and business
syndicates to negotiate and sell the bonds.

Several Representatives

^ Cong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6 , 5070-71 .

.

•^Ibid., 51^ - 65 . Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies,

82

^Both the House and the Senate versions of the bill had stip
ulated payment of the new issues in coin. At the time of the bill's
passage, the term "coin” signified gold, but the choice of the term
later created considerable controversy during the Forfcy-Fifth Congress
when the silverites argued that the bonds might be paid in either gold
or silver coin. See Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies, 82;
Walter T. K. Nugent, The Money Question Piping Reconstruction (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), 99; and Allen Weinstein,
Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue, 1867-1878 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1970T, 307-16.
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argued that the commission rate was too high and proposed a reduction
lO

to one half of one percent.

A final provision of the refunding bill

clearly affected Southern interests.

As first reported back from the

conference committee, section seven of S. 380 stipulated that any new
banking associations would be compelled to organize by purchasing the
new, lower-interest government bonds at par in gold.

Established

banks, on the other hand, would be able to continue to base their
banking on bonds paying 6 percent interest— at least until those bonds
would be refunded with the new lower-interest bonds.

Thus established

banks would have a distinct advantage over banks to be organized after
the passage of the refunding proposal.

As has already been discussed,

the national banking system was highly sectional in character; most of
the established banks were in the Northeast.

S. 380 discriminated

against new banks in that the established banks, based on 6 percent
bonds, would have a 1 or 2 percent advantage over new banks which
would have to be based on bonds yielding either ^ or 5 percent interest.
On the surface, the distinction seemed minor, but if allowed to stand,
section seven would definitely hinder the organization of new banks—
most of which would be in the South and West.

Radical Republican John

F. Benjamin of Missouri found ready support among Southern and Western
members when he declared that section seven was "a gross injustice to
the South and to the West."1^
^Sentiment to lower the allowable commission rates for negoti
ation of the bonds was widespread among the Democrats, but many Repub
licans also supported the move. See, for example, the remarks of James
A. Garfield (R-OH) in Cong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5^5.
19rbid. For similar comments, see the remarks of Samuel S. Mar
shall (D-IL), James A. Garfield (R-OH), Norman B. Judd (R-IL), and the

I
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TABLE 4-2
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO ADOPT THE FIRST REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE CO&MITTHE ON S. 380a

Region

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

RE

21
32

MA
MW
SS
BS
PS

4b
6

Total
Grand Total

90
90

Nay
Dem.
Rep
1
21
l4
4
14

1
4
27
13
2

57

47
104

aCong. Globe, 41 Cong., 2 Sess., Pb. 6, 5k67 (July 12, 1870.
bAyer (VA), Boles (AR), Buck (Al), Roots (AR).
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The various groups opposing the first conference report on S. 380
successfully prevented its adoption and the bill was returned to the
same conference committee.

The vote on the first conference report

represents the height of opposition to the funding bill (see Table k-2).
Section seven undoubtedly prompted thirteen of seventeen Southern
Republicans to join the Democrats to defeat the bill, and the closeness
of the vote indicates that they played a crucial role in its defeat.
It is somewhat surprising that the Southern Republicans were not
joined by more of their party colleagues from the Midwestern and
Border states in opposition to the Northeastern wing of the party.
The conference committee reconsidered S. 38O and reported it
back to the House on July 13, 1870, with two major changes.

The

commission rate was reduced to one-half of one percent and section
seven was eliminated.

Those who favored payment of the new bond

issues in greenbacks now stood alone against the refunding measure
and it easily passed the House by a margin of 139-53.20
The partisan nature of the funding issue is clearly indicated
by a scalogram of six votes on the matter (see Tables U-3: A and
1+-3: B).

Seventy-five percent of the Democrats opposed refunding at

every opportunity (scale position 0) while sixty percent of the
Republicans supported it on every vote (scale position 5).

Democratic

countering argument of Robert C. Schenck (R-OH), the floor leader for
the measure; ibid., 5^2-67.
on
For the text of the funding bill as finally passed and the
debate on the second conference report, see ibid., 5522-23. Only two
Southerners, McKenzie (R-VA) and Sherrod (D-Ai), opposed the bill on
the final vote.

TABLE 4-3: A
HJNDING SGALOGBAM:

REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS

Scale
Position
0

NE

MA

D

R

D

2

3

« *

4

• •

* •

• •

1

•

* •

19

18
21

34

15

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .984
McKenzie (VA).
looker (VA).

• •

■*

47

3

16

• *

1
35
• •

• *

9

12

• 9

2

3
13

3

•*

■ •

• •

• 9

5

• •

5

4

7

• •

••

• *

2

• •

1

• •

6

38

••

m m

5
ih

0

27
16

« ■

6

5

18
Total

• •

la

Total
R

D

••

♦ •

1

■•

R

2

2
* •

1

1

1
5

* •

• •
• •

1

PS

D

1

• •

• «

1

« •

10

1

• •

2

1

REGION M Q 3 PARTY
SS
BS
D
R
D
R

1

• *

• •

R

15
#•

4

••

D

R

10

* *
*0

1

MW

3

2

75
51

127

I

■
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TABLE 4-3: B
ITEMS IN HJNDING SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position

Identification

To amend H. R. 2167 By striking out the words "coin in the
Treasury of the United States" and insert "United States
notes in the Treasury of the United States arising from
the sale of honds authorized to he issued by this act,
or other such notes in the Treasury." 42-127; + = NAY.
Cong. Globe, 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 6, 5059 (July 1,

ip ).

To pass H. R. 2167.

1870).

128-43; + = YEA.

Ibid., 5070 (July 1,

To adopt the second report of the committee of conference
on S. 380. 139-53; + = YEA. Ibid., 5523 (July 13,
1870).
To table the first report of the committee of conference
on S. 380. 55-123; + = NAY. Ibid.. 5467 (July 12,

1870).

To amend H. R. 2167 by providing that "nothing in this act
shall authorize the Secretuary of the Treasury to allow
or pay any commission or percentage for the sale of the
bonds so issued, or any part thereof." 57-103; + = NAY.
Ibid.. 5026 (June 30, 1870 ).
To adopt the first report of the committee of conference
on S. 380. 88-102; + = NAY. Ibid.. 5 ^ 7 (July 12,

1870).
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TABLE k-3: B— Continued
A NOTE OH SCALE CONSTRUCTION
The roll-call votes used for scale construction in this study
were taken from the roll-call data sets for each House compiled by the
ICPR. The computer programs used for scale construction were those
in the ICPR's Osiris II package. By examining the content description
of each roll call in the ICPR data set and the Congressional Globe,
all roll calls relating to economic issues in each House were listed
to form a "preliminary universe of content.” From this universe, a
series of subsets relating to specific economic issues (e.g., the
tariff, currency, taxation) were selected. The universe was then
reordered by subset and the roll-calls were recoded and subjected to a
program to compute Yule1s Q correlation coefficient for each pair of
roll-calls in the universe. Yule's Q (which ranges from -1 to +l),
is the generally accepted measure of the scalability of a pair of roll
calls. A high value of Q between a pair of roll calls indicates that
they scale— that is, few (if any) members will be found who reject an
easier-to-support item and then accept a harder-to-support item. Every
roll-call in a given subset was required to have a Q value of above
dfc.7 with every other measure in that subset to be considered scalable.
The Q limit was lowered to *.6 on several occasions in order to include
certain desired items within a scalable subset, but in «.n cases the
mean Q, for each subset exceeded .7 and in most cases it exceeded .85.
The computer-generated matrix of Q, coefficients for the universe was
then examined to determine which measures scaled within each subset and
within the whole universe. To double-check the manual "clustering" of
scalable roll-calls the matrix was subjected to a computer program to
produce clusters of scalable votes on a particular issue. Those rollcalls in each cluster with negative Q values were "reflected"— the yeas
and nays reversed to produce the correct response category indicating
the positive position.
Each cluster of roll-call votes was then subjected to a scaling
program which ordered the items in the cluster in a rank from largest
passing set to smallest passing set and assigned a scale position to
each member. In most cases, members who were absent for more than
30 percent of the votes in a scale were excluded from that scale.
Similarly, those with more than one inconsistent vote (e.g., voting
for a harder-to-accept proposition after rejecting an easier-toaccept proposition) were usually excluded from the scale except when
the scale size could legitimately accommodate more than one inconsistent
vote (referred to as an "error"). In cases in which a member had an
acceptable number of errors or absences, his scale position was deter
mined by choosing the median score out of his possible scores. Careful
use of the Q coefficient and proper controls on errors and absences
consistently yield valid scales. A further customary check on the
adequacy of each scale is its coefficient of reproducibility which
measures the percentage of responses on scale items that could be
correctly predicted from a member's position on the scale. Scales
with a coefficient of reproducibility above .9 are generally considered

11*

to be satisfactory.
For a discussion of scaling methods and examples of their
applications see Duncan MacRaes Jr., Dimensions of Congressional Voting:
A Statistical Study of the House of Representatives in the Eighty-First
Congress (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California PresSs
1956}s especially 218-23; Joel H. Silbey, The Shrine of Party:
Congressional Voting Behavior. I81fl-l852 (Pittsburg: University of
Pittsburg Press, 1967)9 14-17; Thomas B. Alexander, Sectional Stress
and Party Strength: A Study of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the United
States House of Representatives, l536-l86b tNashville: Vanderbilt
University Press, 1967)9 7-8; John Kent Folmar, "The Erosion of Repub
lican Support for Congressional Reconstruction in the House of Repre
sentatives, 1871-1877: A Roll-Call Analysis," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968); and John Lockhart McCarthy,
"Reconstruction Legislation and Voting Alignments in the House of
Representatives, l863-l869,, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale
University, 1970). Two useful guides to the application of scaling
are Lee F. Anderson, Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox,
Legislative Roll-Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1966), ch. VI; and Charles M. Dollar and Richard J. Jensen,
Historian*s Guide to Statistics: Quantitative Analysis and Historical
Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971)» especially
116-21.

The format used to present the scale results has been adapted
from Alexander, Sectional Stress and Party Strength; and Folmar,
"Erosion of Republican Support for Congressional Reconstruction."
Unless otherwise indicated, all scales are ranked from the largest
passing set to smallest passing set. The initial table (A) in each
set gives the distribution of scale scores by region and party, the
coefficient of reproducibility, and any notable deviant scores for
Southerners. The second table (b ) in each set identifies the items
in each scale position, the vote, the positive position, and the
citation to the Congressional Globe.
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opposition stemmed from the declared intent of both proposals (H. R.
2167 and S. 38O) to pay the interest and principal on the new bond
issues in coin.

Southern Republicans generally followed their party

in support of refunding, but the scale distribution by region indicates
that they were less enthusiastic in doing so than were Republicans
from other regions, especially those from the New England and Middle
Atlantic states.21
After being killed by the Senate in the Fortieth Congress, the
question of redistribution of the national bank notes resurfaced in
the Forty-First Congress.

This time redistribution was coupled with

an attempt to alter the volume of circulating currency.

During the

Second Session, the House and the Senate skirmished over the currency
question, the House generally favoring expansion and the Senate
inclining toward maintaining the existing volume of paper money.
at issue was the kind of currency to be expanded or contracted.
both Houses, the currency question transcended party lines.

Also
In

Southerners

and many Midwesterners appeared willing to accept any expansion in
either greenbacks or bank notes.

A sizable contingent of Northern

Democrats disliked bank notes and favored expanding greenbacks, but
certain hard-money advocates in the Northern wings of both parties
opposed expansion of paper currency in any form.
PI

Other Northeasterners

For the nineteen Southerners who were present often enough to
be assigned a scale position, there appears to be very little connection
between personal or constituent characteristics and their vote. The
only evident difference is that scalawags scaled somewhat lower than
did carpetbaggers: Scale position: 3 ^
5
6
Scalawags:
1 ^ 3 1
Carpetbaggers: 0 1 3
3

Ik6

(primarily Republicans) opposed expansion of any kind, not necessarily
because they favored hard money, but because their section already
possessed adequate currency and banking facilities. 22

Redistribution

further complicated the issue by splitting the House along sectional
lines.
The disposition of the House in favor of complete redistribution
had been evident in the previous Congress.23

On the question of

currency expansion, the mood of the House m s reflected by its passage
of a resolution offered in February 1870 by William Loughridge (R-Lfl.):
Resolved, That in the opinion of the House the business interests
of the Country require an increase in the volume of circulating
currency, and that the Committee on Banking and Currency are
instructed to report to the House, at as early a day as practi
cable, a bill to increase the currency to the amount of at
least $50 ,000 ,00 0.24
The vote on the resolution m s bipartisan and sharply sectional.

The

New England and Middle Atlantic States opposed it by a margin of
9-57, 'while the Midwest and the South favored it 8U-10 (see Table
h-h: A).

The potent bipartisan combination of the South and West

against the Northeast (in defiance of the Beard-Beale thesis) dcmon22por Northern attitudes toward greenbacks, national bank notes,
currency expansion and contraction, and specie resumption, see Sharkey,
Money, Class, and Party, passium; and Unger, The Greenback Era,
especially chs. II-IV. The debate over redistribution and currency
expansion during the Second Session is more specifically discussed in
George IaVerne Anderson, "The National Banking System, 1865-1875: A
Sectional Institution" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Illinois, 1933), chs. VI-VIII.
23During the Third Session of the Fortieth Congress, the House
had approved the Coburn amendment to S. hkO which proposed complete
redistribution of the national bank notes, see above, ch. III.

2l*Cons. Globe, to. Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1**60.

TABLE l*-V. A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON THE CURRENCY ISSUE
To pass the Loughridge resolution0.
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Yea
Dem.
Rep.
1
7
*+7
15
7

* *

1
17
5
10
1

• •

3b

Grand Total

77

Dem.

Nay
Rep.

1
Ik

1

21
21
9
1
b
2

16

58

0 0

« *
•

0

111

7^

j pass S. 378 as amended by the House13
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.
1
19
U7
21
6

• •

*

* *

5

9b

b5

2
3
•*

1

99

Nay
Rep.
18
11
5

00

19
11
3
10
2

• •

0

Dem.

*

0

1
1»

—

36
81

aCong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, ll(60 (February 21, 1870).
bIbid., Pt. 5, hh78 (June 15, 2870).
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strated that the South and West could control economic legislation in
the House— if the coalition could he maintained.
The Senate had killed the House's plan for complete redistri
bution during the Fortieth Congress and was on record as opposing
currency expansion.

Early in the Second Session, the Senate passed

a bill (S. 378 ) providing for partial redistribution and a change in
the volume of national bank currency.^

S. 378 called for an

additional issue of $1*5 million in national bank notes to banking
associations organised or to be organized in states or territories
having less than their share.

The additional issue would increase

the bank note circulation to $31*5 million.

As compensation for this

increase in the circulating medium, and to prevent any inflationary
effect, the Senate proposed cancellation of the $1*5 million in 3
percent temporary loan certificates still outstanding.

The 3 percent

certificates had been issued to banking associations as a temporary
loan in 1867 and 1868 and most were then being held in Northeastern
national banks as a portion of their reserve requirement.

As the new-

national bank notes were issued, the 3 percent certificates would be
retired at the same rate, and their place as part of bank reserves
25southem newspapers strongly favored a "natural alliance"
of the South and West against the Northeast on economic issues. See,
for example, Richmond Whig. August 13, 1869 , January 28, 1870;
Atlanta Constitution. July 15, 1870, March 3, IB7U; Daily Arkansas
Gazette (little Rock), April 4, 1869; and Debow1s Review (After the War
SeriesJ, VII (October, 1869), 837-38.

2^See Cong. Globe, 1+1 ConG., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 697-701, 9^»
Pt. 2, 970; for the initial text of S. 378, Senator John Sherman's
explanation of the bill, the amendment adding redistribution, and the
vote on final passage.
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would have to he filled with greenbacks. Thus the net effect would be
to leave the volume of circulating medium at the same level. For every
dollar of new national bank notes issued, an equal amount of 3 percent
certificates would be retired, and an equal amount of greenbacks would
be withdrawn from circulation to serve as bank reserves.To satisfy
Southern and Western members, the Senate added a section to S. 378
proposing a limited redistribution of $20 million in bank notes to be
taken from states having more than their pro rata share and given to
states in the South and West that had not received their quota of
national bank notes. This section, however, provided that no redis
tribution would take place until the $1+5 million in newly authorized
circulation was "taken up.

po

2?The 3 percent temporary loan certificates were issued by the
Secretary of the Treasury as a stopgap measure in 1867 and 2J868 to
meet government obligations to pay a large amount of maturing compound
interest notes being presented by banks for payment. Congress had
made the low-interest certificates more attractive by allowing banks
to hold them as part of their required reserve in place of greenbacks.
Theywere, according to Senator John Sherman, "the most dangerous and
offensive form of Government indebtedness" because they were payable
in greenbacks on demand or after ten days notice. Gherman feared that
in event of a panic the government might be called upon to redeem them.
Furthermore, if specie payments were resumed, the 3 percent certificates
could become payable in gold. In part, Sherman's proposal to retire the
certificates was simply a roundabout way to withdraw greenbacks from
circulation without rousing popular animosity. Sherman acknowledged
that withdrawing the greenbacks directly "would probably not receive
the assent of the House," as "the greenbacks are a great favorite of
the people." See Sherman's explanation in Cong. Globe. 1+1 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 700.
oO

eoFor the text of the amendment adding redistribution to S. 378,
see Cong. Globe. 1+1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 9W+. The Senate bill also
contained two other less controversial provisions that were included
in the final version as approved by both Houses. The first allowed
any banking association established in a state having more than its
sliare of bank note circulation to move to any state having less than
its share of circulation. The second provision provided for banking
on a gold basis. The requirements were similar to those established
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On June 9* 1870, Janies A* Garfield. (H-OH) of the House Committee
on Banking and Currency reported S. 378 to the House with a committee
amendment in the nature of a substitute.^9 The amendment stipulated
that $9? million of new bank notes be issued instead of $45 million.
The $95 million would cancel $45.5 million in 3 percent certificates .
and $39-5 million in greenbacks.

Thus the net addition to the circula

ting currency would amount to only $10 million. 3®

in addition, the

substitute bill provided for a redistribution of $25 million in national
bank notes instead of the $20 million as provided in the Senate bill.
A host of amendments, mostly inflationist, were offered during the
House debate but only one was adopted.

That amendment offered by

Norman B. Judd (B-XL), struck the clause in the substitute bill which
stipulated that $39*5 million of greenbacks would be retired along
with the $45*5 million in 3 percent certificates.^

in its final foim,

for regular national banks, with the major exception that instead of
being issued bank notes, the Comptroller of the Currency would issue
"coin notes" to the banking association. The coin notes were redeem
able upon presentation to the association in gold or silver coin.
This banking on a gold or specie basis was desired by areas (e.g., the
West Coast, New Orleans, and New York) having a gold and silver circula
tion and wishing to bank on that basis. The House modified this section
by striking out the word silver.
29£he substitute bill was almost identical to a House bill
(H. B. 1900} which had been under extensive discussion; see Cong.
Globe, 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 4176-94; 4224-44.
3°Some confusion existed as to the exact amount of 3 percent
certificates that were outstanding. Senator Sherman used the figure
of $45 million while Bepresentative Garfield used $45.5 million. The
bill stipulated neither figure— but merely stated that all would be
redeemed and canceled. The figures used herein are those used at
the moment in debate.
31ibid., 4477.
amendment.

The yeas and nays were not ordered on the Judd
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the House substitute for S. 378 provided that an additional $5 million
be redistributed, that $95 million of additional national bank notes
be issued, and that $45.5 minion in 3 percent certificates be retired
•which meant that a corresponding amount of greenbacks would be with
drawn from circulation to replace them as bank reserves.

The balance

of $50 million in bank notes was the increase in the circulating medium
asked by the Loughridge resolution.

Members estimated that the House

bill would, produce an inflation ranging from $11 million to $21.5

million.
Whatever its exact inflationary effect, the South and the Midwest
again combined to pass the bill by a margin of 99-81 (see Table 4-4: B).
The substitute bill represented a compromise between inflationists and
contraction!sts in the House.

Opposition to the bill included Northern

Democrats and Northeastern Republicans— an unlikely combination of
bank note-hating greehbackers, hard-money advocates, and. those who
simply desired a more inflationary measure.

The modest redistribution

clause offered an additional reason for Northeasterners to oppose the
32No one seemed quite sure about the amount of inflation or
increase in the circulating medium which the measure would produce,
but two calculations were offered. The $95 million in bank notes
would require a 20 percent cash bank reserve to be made up by with
drawing at least $19 million in greenbacks from circulation. Thus the
absolute increase of $50 million in bank note circulation, reduced by
$19 million reserve requirement, yields an increase in actual circula
tion of $31 million. Others argued that the actual inflation would be
reduced further as the new banks required an additional 20 percent
reserve to secure their deposits. If deposits in the new banks to
be created by the measure amounted to $100 million, an additional $20
million in greenbacks would have to be withdrawn from circulation to
be held as a reserve on the deposits. Thus the actual inflation
might be as low as $11 million. See GarfLeldfs discussion of the
potential inflationary effect of the substitute bill in Cong. Globe,
41 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5> 4472-73.
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"bill. The South probably stood to gain the most from the hill and
Southern Representatives responded by voting 2^-3 in favor of its
passage.33

Two conference committees were necessary to resolve the differ
ences between the House and Senate on the substitute passed by the
House.

The first reported a bill agreeing to a redistribution of $25

million as desired by the House, but the $95 million increase in bank
note currency was reduced to $1*5 million as stipulated in the original
Senate bill.3**- The House rejected the report of the first conference
committee by a decisive margin of 53-127 and called for a new committee
to represent the House in conference.35 House members on the second
conference committee managed to raise the increase in bank notes to
33rhe three Democrats who opposed passage were Connor (TX), Dox
(AL), and Shober (NC). Their vote on previous amendments indicates
that they favored a more inflationary measure. All three represented
heavily white, agricultural districts with a low level of per
capita wealth and low land values. Such constituencies probably
favored inflationary measures, but other Southerners, representing
the same type of constituency, voted for the inflationary amendments
and the House susbtitute bill. While the three Democrats stuck to
their principles and voted against the bill, the other zh Southern
Representatives were willing to take what they could get. As might
have been anticipated, the three bankers among the Southerners led
the way in supporting S. 378.
3**Cong. Globe, 1*1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6 , 1*91*8. The House
representatives on first conference committee were Garfield, who
opposed any increase in paper currency, Thomas L. Jones (D-KY), an
ardent greeribacker with a thinly-disguised hatred for the national
banking system, and Lionel A. Sheldon (R-LA) who favored currency
inflation in any form. Garfield approved the conference report;

Jones and Sheldon were not pleased, but both were convinced that the
Senate had yielded as much as it would. All three were roundly crit
icized for not representing House opinion on the bill, see ibid.,
^9**9-50, 1*961-61*, 1*966-70.
35Ibid., 1*970.

$5h million, "but otherwise the bill remained unchanged.

With the end

of the session only a week away, the House voted to take what they
could get from a reluctant Senate and approved the hill by a margin of
100-77.

Southerners favored final passage 16 -2 . ^

The Southern Representatives, both Democrats and Republicans,
tended to favor efforts to make the bill more inflationist.

They

were obviously disappointed that they did not get more currency and
fuller redistribution, but carpetbagger Lionel A. Sheldon of New
Orleans seemed to sum up the reasons for the Southerners1 willingness
to take what they could get:
I believe in an expansion, and I believe it not only to the
extent of $50 ,000 ,000 , as contemplated by the gentleman fran.
Illinois [Mr. Judd,] bub of $300,000,000; and I am willing to
vote for it to-day, whether in greenbacks or national bank
notes. But, Mr. Speaker, it is not always the case that a
man can have what he wants. I suppose if the Senate should
send to us a proposition to contract the currency we could
defeat the Senate. We send to the Senate a proposition to
expand the currency, and they can defeat us. Our demand is
for additional legislation; they are satisfied without further
legislation. I do not agree that this is all we want or ought
to have; but I am not willing to deny to Louisiana the advantage
of seven or eight millions more of banking capital because we
cannot get all that I think we ought to have .3?
A survey of Southern newspapers indicates bipartisan support of
3^ibid., 5302-303. The two Democrats opposing the bill were
Connor and Dox. Shober was absent. Future events proved that the
South did not receive all it anticipated due to the wording of the
bill to the effect that the $5h million would have to be "taken up"
by new banks before any of the $25 million could be redistributed.
The manner in which the Comptroller of the Currency eventually inter
preted this clause hindered assignment of the $5h million and thus
effectively undid redistribution. See below, ch. VI; and Anderson,
"The National Banking System," 298-312.
37cong. Globe, hi Cong,, 2 Sess., Pt. 6, h950.
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redistribution and currency expansion.

The editor of the Richmond Whig,

for example, concluded that "Increased banking capital is the peculiar
want of the Southern States," and he endorsed a movement in the North
Carolina legislature to instruct that state's Congressmen to procure
"an increase in banking facilities."38

Regarding redistribution, the

Whig's editor wondered "how long will it take the country to under
stand that if all the vital fluid is confined to one part of the body,
the other parts must wither and waste away? "39
The Whig favored currency expansion in any form and cautioned
against urging immediate resumption of specie payments.

Other con

servative newspapers were often contradictory in their attitudes on
the currency issue.

The editor of the New Orleans Daily Picayune, for

example, belittled inflationists "who live in terror of the contracting
process through which we can return to a sound currency" and later
lamented that "we have paper money, too much to count, and irredeemable
at that." 1*0

Still, the editor approved of S. 378 and noted "that the

South needs more currency is apparent to all engaged in business."
Always suspicious of Republican motives, the Picayune editor suspected
that the passage of S. 378 was a calculated maneuver to gain additional
^^Richmond Whig, December 17, 1869 . See also Montgomery (AL)
Advertiser as quoted in Debow1s Review (After the War Series), VIII
'(August, I870), 686 .
39Richmond Whig, March 15, 1870. For other pleas for redistri
bution, see, for example, ibid., February 24, I869 , December 14, 1869,
March 2, I87 O; New Orleans Republican, November 23, 3870; We^ly
North Carolina Standard (Raleigh), April 4, 1869; and Debow's Review
(After the War Series), VIII (April-May, 1870), 349-51.
4°New Orleans

Daily Picayune, January 21, 1869; July 16 , I87O.
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Southern recruits for the Republican party, and he speculated that the
currency expansion might he "more apparent than real," hut he con
cluded, "whatever the motives, we must he thankful for .favors, even if
small. 11 Ironically, the conservative editor was echoing the sentiments
earlier expressed by Lionel A. Sheldon, the carpetbagger representing
the Picayune's home district.^1
The Forty-First Congress produced no comprehensive revision of
tariff schedules, hut during the Second Session, the House did debate
a hill to reduce duties (H. R. 1068), and a portion of that bill was
later grafted onto a hill to reduce internal taxes (H. R. 20^5).

The

House debate on H. R. 1068 indicates that most Representatives favored
reduction of the high wartime duties hut differences emerged regarding
the degree of revision and the specific items on which the duties were
to he lowered.**2

The recorded roll calls on H. R. 1068 were not

content-orientated, hut the yeas and nays were recorded on several
related motions to reduce tariff duties.

On May 27, 1870, for example,

Norman B. Judd (R-IL) offered a motion to suspend the rules and pass
^ •Ibid., July 10, 1870. Regardless of how well Republicans might
represent Southern interests on economic issues, they seldom received
approval of the conservative press. Political affiliation meant so
much to Southern conservatives that they might approve an inflationist
proposal if offered by a Northern Democrat like Samuel Randall of
Pennsylvania or William S. Holman of Indiana, and then turn around and
disapprove of a similar measure sponsored by a Republican like Ben
Butler of Massachusetts or Robert Ingersoll of Illinois. Other con
servative newspapers simply ignored Republican sponsored economic
measures that benefited the South— rather than give the Republicans
credit. The Atlanta Constitution. a vehement critic of the national
banking system, did not bother to comment on S. 378. See Atlanta
Constitution. June 9, 23, 1870.
**%. R. 1068 was thoroughly debated in the House from March-May
1870; see Cong. Globe, kl Cong., 2 Sess., Pfcs. 3 and k.
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a simple resolution to reduce duties on certain items.**3 In part,
the Judd resolution represented the efforts of an impatient group of
reductionists to bypass the Ways and Keans Committee, hut the division
on the resolution does offer an indication of attitudes in the House
on tariff reduction (see Table 4-5: A).

The Democrats lined up solidly

in favor of the motion, but the Republicans split, with well over a
third of the party, led by the Midwesterners, joining the Democrats.
Southern Republicans were much more reluctant than their Midwestern
colleagues to favor the resolution.1*1*
Southern Republicans better demonstrated their independence on
other proposals for tariff reduction.

The clearest evidence came

on the vote on a resolution instructing the Committee on Ways and
Means "to report to this House forthwith a bill reducing the present
duties on all classes of salt fifty percent."1*? Southern and Mid
western Republicans joined the Democrats to pass the resolution over
the opposition of Northeastern Republicans (see Table 4-5: B). A
small sample of similar votes and an examination of speeches on the
tariff bill indicates that Southern Republicans favored reduction—
^3judd proposed reduction of duties on all sugars and salt by
33 1 /3 percent, on coffee and tea by 20 percent, and on pig and scrap
iron by 22 percent. Ibid., Pt. If, 3727.
^Ibid. The five Southern Republicans siding with the Democrats
to vote for passage were Ayer (VA), Barry (MS), Dockery (NC), Heflin
(Alt), and McKenzie (VA). Nothing was found in their backgrounds
on constituency characteristics that might explain their voting
behavior. With the occasional exception of Barry, all five consis
tently supported duty reduction. All 14 Republicans opposing the
resolution later supported proposals to reduce duties on specific
items.
u?Ibid., Pt. 6 , 4862.
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TABLE k-5: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON THE TARIFF ISSUE
A.

To suspend the rules and pass the Judd resolution0.

Nay
Rep

Yea

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem.

Rep.

17
Ik
8
11
_2

3
1*
3 *f
5
1
_2

52

k9

Grand Total
B.

Dem.

18
25
16
1^
8

J.

^

1

101

81
82

To pass a resolution instructing the Committee on Hays and Means
to report a bill reducing duties on salt by 50 percent
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Yea
Bern.
Rep,
11
15
5
9
_2

6
2
39
1^
5
_2

k2

68
110

Dem.

Nay
Rep

*«

9
2k
13

• «

• •

m 0

m m

3
k9
k9

aCon£. Globe, 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3727 (May 23, 1870).
The resolution did not pass as a two-thirds majority was
needed to suspend the rules.
bIbid., Pt. 6 , U863 (June 27, 187<J>.

particularly on items widely used in the South.^

But most Southern

Republicans were not willing to abandon all of the protective features
of the tariff in favor of free trade. Neither, however, were they as
protectionist as Republicans from the New England and the Mid-Atlantic
states.^
The House bill to reduce tariff duties was never put to a final
vote, but most of its proposals were incorporated in a bill "to reduce
internal taxes and for other purposes” (H. R. 2045).

The measure

gathered bipartisan support in both Houses, but the Democrats were
inclined to favor a more drastic lowering of tariff duties.

After

considerable debate, H. R. 2045 easily passed the House by a margin
of 152-35*

Robert Schenck (R-PA), the floor leader for the bill,

estimated that it would reduce internal taxes by $45 million and tariff
duties by $25 million. ^9 The Senate returned the bill to the House
with a large number of proposed amendments.

On the few significant

roll-call votes on the bill as amended the Democrats tended to vote
as a unit in favor of reduction, but the Republicans were badly
^Southerners were adamant that duties be reduced or eliminated
on certain items. See, for example, the rigorous, but unsuccessful
efforts of two Alabama carpetbaggers (Buckley and Buck), to reduce
the duties on cotton bagging materials; ibid., Pt. 3, 2695-96 , 2257;
Pt. 6 , 5^19*
**7See, for example, the speeches of Hays (R-AL), ibid., Pt. 3
2202-204; McKenzie (R-VA), ibid., 2262-63; Perce (R-MS), ibid., 2697-98
Connor (D-TX), ibid., 3042.
^Por the text of the amendment attaching tariff reduction to
H. R. 2045, and the vote on its passage, see Cong. Globe, 4l Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 5j 4090-91. The amendment included sections listing
the new duties on certain items, and considerably expanded the number
of items on the free list. The amendment passed 137-44. Democrats who
favored greater reduction in tariff duties made up the opposition.
^Ibid., 4091, 4107
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spilt.

A sizable number of Southern and Midwestern Republicans, for

example, voted with the Democrats to concur in a Senate amendment to
abolish a series of special taxes (see Table 4-6: A).
The conference committee called to resolve differerences between
the two Houses on H. R. 2045 submitted its report on July 13, 1870.
In its final form the bill reduced internal taxes and tariff duties
by an estimated $80 million.

Most popular seemed to be the reductions

on such common commodities as coffee, sugar, spices, and certain
kinds of liquor.

In addition, a large number of items (mostly drugs)

were added to the free list.5° The reductions, however, were not
enough to satisfy the Democrats, some of whom were quick to point out
that the duties were raised on certain items manufactured in Hew
England.'**' As Table 4-6: B indicates, most Democrats opposed passage
of the bill.

Southerners, including three or four Democrats, were

apparently satisfied with the reductions and voted for the measure by
a margin of 19-2.

The conservative Southern press reprinted the

provisions of the bill, but most editors refrained from comment— an
indication of backhanded approval. 52
5°The revised estimation of $80 million was cited by Schenck
during his final explanation of the bill. The figure must have been
fairly accurate as it was not challenged by the Democrats, see ibid.,
Pt. 6 , 5517* For the text of H. R. 204? as passed, see ibid., Pt. 7,
Appendix, 701 -707 .
5-**See in particular the charges brought against the bill by Samuel
S. Cox and James Brooks, two New York Democrats, and Schenck*s countering
remarks, ibid., Pt. 6 , 5517-22.
52See, for example, New Orleans Daily Picayune, July 20, 21, 1870j
Atlanta Constitution, June 9, 1870, Richmond Whig, July 12, 19, 1870,
December 31, 1876"; Tuskaloosa (AL) Independent Monitor, November 1,
I87O; and Debow*s Review (After the War Series), VIII (August, 1870),

i£ o

TABLE If-6 : A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY ON H. R. 2045
A.

To concur in a Senate amendment to H. R. 2045 to abolish special
taxes8.

Yea
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Nay

Bern.

Rep.

1
15
12
4
12
2

9
9
28
12

46

60

••

2

Dan.

Rep.

• •

9
20
25
9
9

• a
♦ •

1
e •
'* *

1

106

Grand Total

•

0

72
73

0 adopt the conference report on H. R. 2045b

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

Nay
Dem.
Rep.

T

20
37
52
16
11
2
r^"T

20
03
lc
11
_2

7

138

47

1
• •
* *

3
2
1

145

• a

• •
a •

1
ld
• a
• a

2
49

aCong. Globe, Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, 5417 (July 9, IB70 ),
bIbid., 5522 (July 13, 1570).
cSherrod (AL).
dHays (AL).
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One internal levy not eliminated toy H. R. 20^5 was the income
tax— another product of the wartime search for revenue.

Northeastern

Republicans and most Northern Democrats conducted a strong campaign
to repeal the income tax.

Considerable sentiment for its abolition

also existed among conservative Southern newspapers.

The Atlanta

Constitution, for example, referred to it as "odious,” and the New
Orleans Prices Current declared that such a tax was clearly uncon
stitutional. 53 & scalogram of the significant roll calls on the matter
(see Tables h-7: A and k-7: B) indicates that Republicans from the
Southern, Midwestern, and Border states favored retention of the
income tax, although many were willing to increase the exemption from
$1,500 to $2,000 (scale position l) and several favored reducing the

686. Only the Richmond Whig commented (favorably) on the bill. Other
Southern newspapers appeared to toe more interested in the outbreak of
the Franco-Frussian War than they were with the bill to reduce internal
taxes.
The bill did prompt an encounter between one Southern Senator
and a rabidly conservative newspaper in his heme state that reveals
the kind of irrational opposition which occasionally greeted Southern
Republicans. Senator George E. Spencer, a carpetbag Senator from
Alabama, had sent the editor of the Tuskaloosa Independent Monitor a
copy of his speech on the tax and tariff bill. The editor indignantly
dismissed Spencer's speech and noted, with a certain amount of pride,
that "We did not even look to see what side of the question the
Senatorial adventurer took. . . . We will not thank the toad-resembling
Senator1 for his remembrance of the 'Monitor'." In that speech,
Spencer had been very defensive of Southern economic interests and
had called for complete repeal of duties on tea and coffee and for
reductions on gunny cloth and sacks and cotton bagging materials. See
Independent Monitor, July 19, 1870; and Cong. Globe, 5l Cong., 2 Sess.,
Pt. 6, ^927-2$.' ibe Monitor ranked among the most vehement critics of
all things Republican; for a sampling, see Sarah Van V. Woolfoik, "The
Political Cartoons of the Tuskaloosa Independent Monitor and Tuskaloosa
Blade. 1867-1873," Alabama Historical Quarterly, X XV TT (Fb .11 and Winter,
19^

1^0-6 6 .

------

^Atlanta Constitution, July 12, 1870, February 28, 1871; New
Orleans Prices Current, January 3, 1873,

TABLE U-7: A
INCOME TAX SCALOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS

Scale
Position
0

NE
D

R

D

2
•■

b

..

b

18

23

20

1

3
11*

Coefficient of reproducibility = .978

51

6

23

5

3
11

23

*•

21
35

2

••
12

3

♦«

7

35

•*

•«

1

5

«•

••

36

••

3

5
2

5
36

1

Total
D
R
7

••
3

6

3

15

1

«*

R
♦m

5

7

5

8

10

Total

1

••

••

2

PS
D
*■

3
4

20

8

5

1

1

1

REGION AN!D PARTY
SS
BS
D
R
D
R

20

3

1

R

3

1

••

D

2

2

3

R

••

•*
5

1

MW

MA

3

2

31
55

11*6

TABLE U-7: B
ITEMS IN INCOME TAX SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position

Identification

0
1

To amend H. R. 20**5 by increasing the amountof income
exempted from $1,500 to $2 ,000 . 138-52 ; + = YEA.
Cong. Globe. Ul Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 5> **063 (June 3f
1570).

2

To amend H. R. 20^5 by reducing the incometax rate from
5$ to % . 11^-76; + = YEA. Ibid.

3

To suspend rules and pass a bill to repeal the income tax
(H. R. 299*0 * 91-116; + = YEA. Ibid.. 4l Cong.,
3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1851 (March 2, 1871)7

h

To suspend rules and strike out a section in a Senate
amendment to H. R. 20**5 relating to the income tax.
67 - H 6 ; + = YEA. Ibid., lfl Cong., 2 Sess., Ft. 6 ,
5**15 (July 9, 187071

rate from 5 percent to 3 percent (scale position 2).^

But most Repub

licans from the South and Midwest apparently viewed the tax as a just
means of securing revenue as very few of their constituents had to pay
the tax.

It has been estimated, for example, that only 250,000

citizens paid a tax on their income in 1868.^5 During the House dehate
on the measure, carpetbagger Logan H. Roots of Arkansas summarized the
arguments of the supporters of the tax.

Roots declared that "it is

my most positive opinion that the demand of the people is that the rich
men who are accumulating wealth rapidly should continue to pay an
income tax.

Most Southern Republicans apparently agreed, and they

were willing to vote against the unlikely combination of conservative
Southern newspapers and Northeastern Republicans who wanted to retain
the tax.
Of all the economic measures considered during the Forty-First
Congress, those calling for federal appropriations and subsidies for
a variety of internal improvement projects commanded the most attention
and created the most controversy.

Substantial disagreement developed,

for example, when a Massachusetts Republican offered an amendment to
strike from a public works bill appropriations for all new public
projects not already commenced.

In part, the amendment was a serious

5^No significant correlation was found between position on the
income tax issue and such member characteristics as personal wealth.
Milnes (D-VA), the wealthiest of the Southerners, favored abolishing
the tax while Hays (R-AL), the second wealthiest, voted to retain the
tax. A moderate correlation (gamma = .3^), existed between scale
position and the percent agricultural index— in that members from heav
ily agricultural districts tended to vote against abolishing the tax.
--

^patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies» 116.

^Cong. Globe, 1*1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 5> *+308.
speech of Hays (R-AL), ibid., Pt. 2, 2202-20h.

See also the

165
effort to cut government expeditures, but the retrenchment was to be
accomplished primarily at the expense of the South, whose Repre
sentatives had offered numerous proposals for new federally-funded
projects (e.g., public buildings).

The amendment carried over the

opposition and protests of most Southerners (see Table 4-6: A).

On

the surface, the issue seems of little consequence, but securing
federal appropriations for district projects was particularly impor
tant to the survival of Southern Republicans.

They received little

assistance from New England Republicans who voted 21-5 for the amend
ment .57
Southerners were usually unanimous in their support of federal
subsidies, in the form of land grants, to aid in the construction of
internal improvement projects— even those outside the South.

They,

for example, voted 25 -1 for a bill granting a right of way and ten
alternate sections of public land per mile to the Oregon Central
Railroad to build a line frcm Portland to Astoria and McMinnville.^
They probably did so in the hope that west coast Representatives would
return the favor on similar projects in the South (see Table 4-8: B).
The internal improvement measure most vital to Southern interests
was the bill incorporating and subsidizing the Texas-Pacific Railroad
Company which was considered and passed late in the Third Session when
See the comments of Stevenson Archer (D-MD) regarding the

effect of the amendment on Southern projects in Cong. Globe, 4l Cong..
3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1756.
5®For the text of the bill, see ibid., 4l Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 7,
Appendix, 644-45.

a£6

TABIC k-Q: A and B

SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON APPROPRIATIONS AND SUBSIDIES
A.

To amend H. R* 30&U to strike out appropriations for every new
puDlic work not already commenced8.
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Yea
Den.
Rep.

Grand Total

Nay
Rep.

21
25
37
11
6
■m_

1
15
11
10
11
_2

b
10
13
19
If
_2

100

50

52

••
5
k
*•
1
mm
10

Dem.

110

102

0 pass S. 396 granting public lands for a railroad and telegraph
line in Oregon8

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Yea
Dem.
Rep.

Dem.

Nay
Rep.

•«
a*
6
7
••

11
18
25
18
7
_2

»a
33
7
1
9
••

5
Ilf
18
9•
2
•»

16

81

30

39

97

69

aCong. Globe,> Ifl Cong,>, 3 Sess., Pb . 3, 1756-57 (February 28, 1971)
bIbid., 1*1 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. h, 3110 (April 29, 1870).
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the South was finally at full strength in the House.

During the Second

Session the Senate had passed a hill (S. 647) "to aid in the construc
tion of a railroad and telegraph line from Marshall, Texas, to San
Diego, California, with branches and connections."

S. 647 provided for

the trunk line and six branch lines— all of which were granted subsidies
of a right of way and twenty alternate sections of public land per
mile, as well as the usual rights to resources on adjacent lands.

The

bill granted an estimated twenty-six million acres of the public
domain to the proposed trunk and branch lines.^9
The Senate's Texas-Pacific bill was not considered at any length
in the House until the last month of the Third Session.

On February

21, 1S70, William A. Wheeler (R-NY), chairman of the House Committee
on the Pacific Railroad, reported S. 647 to the House with a proposed
amendment that altered everything in the bill after the enacting clause.
5^The Senate's Texas-Pacific bill (originally referred to as the
Southern-Pacific bill), replaced the proposed Memphis, £1 Paso and
Pacific route which had passed the House during the Third Session of
the Fortieth Congress (see above, ch. III). The House had repassed
the bill during the First Session of the Forty-First Congress, but the
Senate defeated it. The Richmond Whig reported "rumors" to the effect
that the Senate had defeated the b i U because it granted no subsidies
other than the right of way and the Senators feared that it might set
a precedent. The editor of the Whip, however, suspected that the
negative reaction of the Senate was simply more evidence of sectional
prejudice against the South. But given the liberal subsidies for the
Texas-Pacific granted in the Senate bill, the rumors probably had some
basis in fact. See Cong. Globe, 4l Cong., 1 Sess., 196; Richmond Whig
April 3 1 1869 . For background on previous efforts to establish a
Southern route to the Pacific as well as the Texas-Pacific proposal,
see Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railways in the United
States. I85Q-I877 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1910), II,
120-126; C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of
1877 and the End of Reconstruction '(Boston: Little, Brown, “1951),
70-73; and Carter Goodrich, Government Promotion of Canals and Rail
roads, 1800-1890 (New York: Columbia University Press, I960), 194-96.

l£8
The effect of the amendment was to subsidize only the trunk line.
Wheeler explained to a generally approving House that by cutting the
branch lines out of the bill the land subsidies would be reduced to
13 milH.on acres.

Wheeler was very sensitive to what he referred to as

"the growing dislike of the American people to these large grants to
corporations," and he assured the House that the 'bill grants no
solitary acre of land upon which the cereals can be grown without
artificial irrigation.
Northern Representatives quickly proclaimed their opposition to
the bill as amended.

One Pennsylvania Democrat bluntly declared that

"these magnificent endowments to railway corporations by grants and
subsidies are undermining republican virtue," and another Democrat
attempted to interrupt the debate "to have read a petition from the
citizens of New Jersey against the absorption of the public domain by
land grants to railroad corporations."^ 1

Even so staunch a Republican

as James A. Garfield declared that he would not support the measure
unless subsidies for the branch lines were emitted and guarantees were
given that no money subsidies or loans on the credit of the government
were given to aid the railroad.

The Wheeler amendment to S. 3^7 met

Garfield's requirements and he echoed the sentiment of other Northern
Republicans when he declared, "that as a great act of commercial justice
6 °Cong. Globe, Hi Cong., 3 Sess., Pt.
2,1H70,
IH72 . Wheeleralso
noted that the bill granted no public lands in Texas as the government
owned no land in the state. For the dealings between the TexasPacific Company and the Texas legislature for subsidies, see Goodrich,
Government Promotion of Canftl« and Ra11roads, 22H-25-

6lCong. Globe, Hi

Cong., 3 Sess., Pt.

2,lH71,

lU?3.
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to the South) Congress should, by grant of public lands, aid the people
of the South and Southwest to build a great continental line of road,
as we have aided to build a line across the North and the center. "62
In his final arguments, Wheeler justified the bill as "a most important
and potent element in the reconstruction of the South."

In Wheeler's

opinion the Southern route would
bring the South into direct contact with northern men, northern
progress, northern ideas and capital, and in the general
commingling of interests, in the general prosperity, and in the
new enterprises opened to the South, the feelings of antagonism
engendered by the late war will be sure to fade out. "63
The House approved the Wheeler amendment, and the b i U passed 136-70 .6 1*
62ibid., 11*70-71.
63lbid., lh73.
^For the text of the bill as amended by the House, see ibid.,
11*68-69. Only two Southern Republicans, Degener (HX) and Buckley (AL),
opposed amending S. 6 U7 . Degener opposed the House bill because it did
not provide for a connecting line to the major cities in his district
(San Antonio, Austin, and Corpus Christl). Buckley's opposition was
based on the fact that the House amendment provided that the TexasPacific have a "uniform gauge" and not the standard Southern five-foot
gauge as the Senate bill had provided. Buckley's complaint was well
justified as the South had over 12,000 miles of railroad with a fivefoot gauge whereas the standard gauge on Northern railroads was 1* feet,
85 inches. If the directors of the Texas-Pacific Company so chose,
they could build the line on the Northern gauge, making it incompatible
with Southern rolling stock. Despite Buckley's persistent questioning,
Wheeler would not admit why the gauge was not specified nor did he
allow Buckley to move to amend the bill to require a five-foot gauge.
Frank Morey of Louisiana, another carpetbagger, declared that Wheeler
clearly intended the Texas-Pacific to become a feeder to the Northern
lines and that "it would cost the South $70 million to change the gauge
to the Northern standard of 4 feet, 8§- inches." The two carpetbaggers
defended the South and sharply denounced the Northeastemers with fireeating rhetoric. Their actions and rhetoric should have been applauded
by Southern conservatives— but the section's conservative press made no
mention of their able defense of Southern interests. Two other South
erners, Whitmore (R-TX) and Harris (R-MS), also made major speeches
favoring the bill. No Southern Democrat spoke on the bill. See ibid.,
11*88-72 (Buckley-Wheeler exchange); ibid.. Pt. 3» Appendix, 175-76
(Morey's speech), 177-78 (Whitmore's speech), 237-38 (Harris's speech).
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The Senate refused to agree to S. 6k7 as amended by the House and
the bill vent to a conference committee.

On March 3, 1871, the last

day of the Congress, Wheeler submitted the conference repoit to the
House.

Two significant changes had been made in the House version of

the bill.

One added a branch line from the eastern terminal, to New

Orleans via the Red River Valley; the other provided authorization for
the Southern Pacific Railroad to connect with the new line by estab
lishing a route running from Tehachapl through Los Angeles to connect
with the trunk line at or near the Colorado River.
The two branch lines, added at the insistence of the Senate, were
Justified by the advantages of connecting the line with the New Orleans
and the San Francisco ports.

The two branches added between five and

six million acres of the public domain to the thirteen million acres
granted to the trunk line.

Wheeler reassured the restless House

members that most of the additional subsidy was desert land and the
House passed what proved to be the last huge subsidy for railroad
construction.

The South voted 4h-0 for the bill; the Pacific states

6-0, and the border states 15-2.

Support in the Northeast was more

reserved; New England favored passage 12-9, and the vote in the Middle
Atlantic states was 27-21.

The Midwestern states, the South's occasional

^For the conference report see Cong. Globe, lfl Cong., 3 Sess.,
Pt. 3, 1899- The beneficiary of the subsidy to build the eastern
branch was the New Orleans, Baton Rouge, and Vicksburg Railroad Company.
One of the three House members of the conference committee was William
C. Sherrod (D-AL). That a Southern freshman Democrat should be selected
to serve on an important conference committee was highly unusual at
this time. Sherrod was a former slaveholder, but he had a record as a
unionist and he had supported Douglas in i860. See Biographical Direc
tory, 1690; Sherrod to Andrew Johnson, November 23, 1&65; Joseph C.
Bradley to Andrew Johnson, November 22, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Alabama.
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ally, voted against the measure ty a margin of 23 -33 * ^
There was little doubt that the South desired the long-sought
route to the Pacific along the 32nd parallel.

Even such conservative

papers as the New Orleans Picayune and the Atlanta Constitution were
enthusastic about the Texas-Pacific grant. ^

But in comparison to the

earlier grants to the Union Pacific and the Northern Pacific, the grant
to the Texas-Pacific was small.

The company received no bonds or

money subsidies, its bond issues were not to be guaranteed by the
government, and the public lands were not of the quality or the quantity
that had been granted to the other transcontinental
the Southerners gladly took what they could get.

railroads. 6®

Yet

As the scalogram on

the Texas-Pacific issue indicates, most Northeastern and Midwestern
Democrats opposed the bill (see Table k-9% A),

Republican support was

moderate in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, but Midwestern
Republicans provided only grudging backing to the bill.

Representatives

from the Southern, border, and Pacific states scaled high in support of
the measure.
The tone of the House debate on the Texas-Pacific bill forecast
66 cong. Globe, lfl Cong., 3 Sess., Pfc. 3, 1889-1900.

^Tsew Orleans Daily Picayune, March 4, 1871; Atlanta Constitution,
March 5, 1871; April 21, 1B71. Both papers had previously spoken
against the policy of granting public lands to aid in the construction
of railroads; see, for example, Picayune, June 17, I87O; and the Con
stitution, January 16 , 20, I869 , July 13, 1870, March 1, 3, 1871. Most
other Southern newspapers were consistent supporters of continued
federal subsidies for internal improvements.
^®For a comparison of the size of land grants to the trans
continental lines, see Goodrich, Government Pranotion of American
Canals and Railroads, ch. 5*
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TABLE 4-9: B
ITEMS HI TEXAS-PACIFIC RAILROAD SCALOGRAMa
Scale
Position

Identification

To consider S. 64-7 as amended by the House Committee on
the Pacific Railroad. 143-50; + = YEA. Cong. Globe,
41 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1470 (February 21, 1871).
To suspend rules, and have the House insist upon their
amendments to S. 647 and agree to a conference committee.
137-595 + “ SEA. Ibid.. Pt. 3, 1759 (February 28, 1871).
To suspend rules, and take S. 647 from Speaker's table
and to refer it to the Committee on the Pacific Railroad
with leave to report at any time after February 15,
1871. 129-61; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 2, 999 (February 6 ,
1871).
To agree to conference report on S. 647.
Ibid., Pt. 3, 1900 (March 3, 1871).

125-645 + = YEA.

To pass S. 647 as amended by the House. 136-70; + = YEA.
Ibid., Pt. 2 , 1470 (February 21, 1871).

difficulty for future proposals for federally-subsidized, projects.

The

measure gathered Northern support almost solely on the strength of
the argument that the South should have its own route to the Pacific.
The House appeared particularly sensitive to Northern sentiment that
the public domain should he reserved for settlers and not given to
corporations.

The prospects for continued subsidies dimmed still

further when the Credit Mobiller scandal was exposed in 1872.

At the

conclusion of the Forty-First Congress, the South faced increasingly
frustrating times in its quest for an equal share of federal subsidies
for internal improvements.
The South1s economic interests were well represented by the
section's thirty-nine Republicans and fifteen Democrats in the FortyFirst House.

The South was of a divided mind on the public credit and

funding issues.

If certain areas of the South favored paying govern

ment bonds in greenbacks, other sectors liked the promise of an early
return to specie payments and placing the credit of the government on
a sound financial basis.

The South certainly approved of redistribution

of the national bank currency and Improved banking facilities for the
section.

Certain sections of the South undoubtedly desired a greater

inflation of the currency— as did most Southern Representatives.

But

it was the Senate, not the House, that set the limits on currency
expansion.

On the other hand, the modest expansion finally approved

did not arouse the displeasure of hard-money elements in the South.
Similarly, the moderate reduction in tariff duties did not satisfy
Southern advocates of free trade, but reductions beneficial to the
South were made on certain widely used commodities.

The more sub-
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stairtlal reductions in internal taxes should bare found favor in all
portions of the South.

Finally, Southern Republicans and Democrats

clearly represented the interests of their section on questions of
continuing federal subsidies for internal improvements.

The passage

of the Texas-Pacific hill was a major achievement for Southerners—
particularly since it was the first, and last, large subsidy the
section would receive from the federal government.
The creditable voting record of Southern Representatives, partic
ularly the Republicans, on economic issues was neither praised nor
damned by the section's conservative press.

But if Southern Repub

licans could not be attached for their response to economic issues,
they were vulnerable for their support of civil rights and reconstruction
legislation.

Their open activity in this area led Speaker of the House

James G. Blaine (R-ME) to conclude that the Southern Republicans in the
Forty-first House "were doomed to a hopeless struggle against the
influence, the traditions, [and] the hatred of a large majority of the
white men of the South. "^9 If conservative newspapers accurately
reflected public opinion, the question of home rule remained paramount
in the Southern mind.

Wien Southerners assessed the work of the Forty-

First Congress, they thought only of the measures of political recon
struction— particularly the two force acts and another, harsher measure
that was in the offing.

The force bills, in fact, seemed to provide an

additional impetus for the inevitable process of redemption.

The

69jgjmes G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From TAnpnip to
Garfield. (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1886), II, UH8 .
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Southern Republicans were obviously caught in a bind.

To vote for the

force bills, as most did, would only bring them additional abuse and
the increased opposition of Southern conservatives, but if they voted
against the force bills they would betray their party and risk their
already slim chances of survival in Southern politics.

As it was,

only 1*6 percent of the Southern Representatives were re-elected to
the Forty-Second House and only 2k percent survived to serve in the
Forty-Third House.
Finally, in reference to the Beard-Beale thesis, it is quite
dear that the Northeastern Republicans did not dictate how Southern
Republicans should vote on economic issues.

On most such issues,

in fact, Southern Republicans found themselves opposing Republicans
from the New England and Middle Atlantic states.

The alliance between

the South and Vest against the Northeast was especially evident on
the important currency and redistribution questions, but the coalition
broke down on the issue of continuing federal subsidies.

Southern

Representatives, for example, found greater support among Northeastern
rather than among Midwestern Republicans for the Texas-Pacific bill.
Economic issues dearly transcended party lines in the Forty-First
House and the Southern interests were well served by its Representatives.

CHAPTER V
THE FORTY-SECOND HOUSE
The Forty-Second Congress convened in the first of three sessions
on March 4, 1871.

The Republicans retained a sizable majority in both

branches, but for the first time since the Thirty-Ninth Congress, the
party bad less than a two-thirds majority In the House of Repre
sentatives.^- The Forty-Second Congress passed a record number of acts
and resolutions, but in terms of significant economic legislation, it
was the least productive of the Reconstruction Congresses.2 The onlymajor piece of economic legislation it adopted was a downward revision
of the tariff enacted during the Second Session.

The House did, how-

-*The Republicans numbered between 57 and 58 percent of the total
membership. The Tribune Almanac set the figures at 138 Republicans
and 103 Democrats, and George B. Galloway gives party membership as 139
and 104 respectively— which tally to a correct total membership of 243.
The Biographical Directory and Congressional Globe list 25k members
with 253 voting— a split of 147 Republicans and 106 Democrats. The
member not voting was James McCleery, an obscure Louisiana carpetbagger
who did not attend the First Session because of an illness resulting
in his death before the beginning of the Second Session. See The
Tribune Almanac and Political Register For 1B72 (Hew York: The Tribune
Association, 1972), 51-52; George B. Galloway, History of the House of
Representatives (Hew York; Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 196l)', 296';
Biographical Directory, 198-202; Cong. Globe, k2 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1,
ix-xii; ibid., k2 Cong.. 2 Sess., Index, adL-xiv; ibid., 1*2 Cong.,
3 Sess., Pt. 1, ix-xii.
^The House passed 531 public acts and resolutions and 481 private
acts and resolutions. The total of 1012 was not exceeded until the
Forty-Ninth Congress (1885-1887). See Galloway, History of the House,
304.
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ever, consider other economic subjects.

Some indication of attitudes

on such Issues as internal taxation, the currency question, and sub
sidies for internal improvements can be determined from scattered rollcall votes on those items.
All ten Southern states were entitled to membership in the FortySecond House, bub the section's fifty seats were rarely completely
filled.

Texas did not hold elections to the House until October I870—

well after the First Session— and contests and deaths created additional
vacancies during the three sessions. 3 The South was, however, more
fully represented than it had been in the two preceding Houses.

Fifty-

five men occupied the fifty Southern seats during the course of the
Congress.
The twenty-four Southern Democrats and thirty-one Republicans
were unevenly distributed among the ten Southern states.

The dele

gations from Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina remained
solidly Republican, but Alabama sent three Republicans and three
Democrats, and Democrats formed a majority in the delegations of
Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia.

Texas claimed the first

solidly-Democratic delegation when Democrat De Witt C. GlddLngs un
seated Republican incumbent William T. Clark on May 13, 1372, near the
end of the Second Session.

The Republicans consisted of twelve scala

wags, fourteen carpetbaggers, and five blacks.

But as time passed,

^Texas held elections to the House on October 3-6, 1371. One of
the Texas Representatives was seated late and another, carpetbagger
William T. Clark, was seated in January 1872 and unseated in May by
Democrat De Witt C. GiddLngs.
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contests and deaths thinned the Republican ranks.

Initially, twenty-

one Democrats, ten scalawags, fourteen carpetbaggers, and five blacks
made up the Southern delegation.

By the middle of the Third Session,

the delegation was nearly balanced, with Democrats holding twentyfour seats, scalawags eleven, carpetbaggers eleven, and blacks three.
The fiftieth Southern seat was vacant.^ The Democratic gains clearly
reflected the redemption process In the South, but the advances were
only temporary.

Proportionally, the Southern Democrats lost seats in

the 1872 elections— largely because of the attempted fusion between
Democrats and Liberal Republicans in support of Horace Greeley's
challenge to President Grant.
Among all House members, whose median age was

years, the

Southerners were again the youngsters with over 60 percent under the
age of forty.5 The age profiles by party are similar to those in
preceding Congresses.

Nearly half the Democrats were over the age of

forty-five while the same percentage of Republicans were under thirtyfive years of age.

The youngest was twenty-eight year old Josiah T.

Walls, the black first-tenner from Florida, but five others, including
one Democrat and two blacks, were trader thirty.

The oldest was the

well-traveled John Edwards (R-AR), who at sixty-five was the oldest
carpetbagger to serve during Reconstruction.
**In one of several contested elections, a South Carolina seat
was finally declared vacant during the Third Session, when the House
could not satisfactorily unravel the dispute between Robert De Large,
the seated member, and his challenger, scalawag C. C. Bowen.
'’The median age for all members of the Forty-Second House was
45.^1 and for first termers Ult-.jlf. See Stuart A. Rice, Quantitative
Methods in Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297.

The trend toward native representation continued.

Thirty-six of

the Representatives (including four of the five blacks) had been b o m
in slave states, seventeen in free states, and two were foreign bom.
The fifty-five Southerners were also better educated than their prede
cessors.

Only four possessed no formal education, and while eighteen

had not progressed beyond the elementary level, 67 percent had gone to
college and k5 percent had taken one or more degrees.

Among the whites,

the carpetbaggers were again the best educated with nearly 80 percent
having attended college for seme period of time.

Two-thirds of the

Democrats had college experience but only l+l percent of the scalawags
had attended college.

Most of the blacks bad been denied access to

formal education.^
^The blacks varied considerably in education. Benjamin S. Turner
(Mi) had apparently attained a fair education by "clandestine study."
Josiah wails (FL) had only a "rudimentary education," but he could read
and write well and later was admitted to the Florida bar. According to
a recent account, Joseph C. Rainey (SC) was "barely literate” although
he received some education while in Bermuda during the war. Robert C.
De large (SC) had graduated from high school in Charleston after the
war. Robert B. Elliott (SC), a lawyer, appeared to be the best trained
of the group, but his biographer found no evidence that he had been
educated at Eton College in England as he claimed. See Biographical
Directory, 8*+5 (be Large), 908 (Elliott), 1581 (Rainey), 1835 (Turner),
1874 (Walls); Peggy Damson, The Glorious Failure: Black Congressman
Robert Brown Elliott and the Reconstruction in South Carolina (Hew York:
W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1973)> 26-28 ; Bnily Bellinger Reynolds
and Joan Reynolds Fount (comps.), Biographical Directory of the Senate
of the State of South Carolina, 1776-196^ (Columbia: South Carolina
Archives Department, 19*S), 295 (Rainey); Okon Edet Yya, From Slavery
to Public Service: Robert Smalls, 1839-1915 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1917), 163 (Rainey); and Peter David Klingman,
"Josiah Walls: Florida's Black Congressman of Reconstruction” (unpub
lished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Florida, 1972), 15. For
biographical data on the three South Carolina blacks, see Joel William
son, After Slavery: The Negro in South Carolina During Reconstruction
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965); and for all
the black congressmen, see Alrutheus Ambush Taylor, "Negro Congressmen
A Generation After," Journal of Negro History, VII (April, 1922), 127-71
Samuel Denny Smith, The Negro in Congress, 1870-1901 (Chapel Hill:

lSl

Sixty-seven percent of the Representatives had resided in the
South in i860.

Thirteen (eleven Democrats and two scalawags) had been

slaveholders and two were formerly slaves.

Of the twenty-one whose

antebellim political affiliations are known, eight were Democrats
(seven Democrats and one scalawag), nine were Whigs (six Democrats
and three scalawags), and four, all carpetbaggers, were Republicans.
Two Democrats are known to have supported Breckinridge while two favored
Douglas and. two were Bell men.

Most Democrats and scalawags had taken

a unionist or cooperationist stance during the secession crisis*

Only

three, all Democrats, were found to be secessionists; thirty-nine were
unionists, and the position of thirteen (nine Democrats and four scala
wags) remains unknown.

During the war, twenty-three (seventeen Democrats

and six scalawags) sided with the Confederacy, seventeen (including one
Democrat and one scalawag) served the Union, and thirteen (including
five Democrats and four scalawags) did not participate on either side.
lawyers continued to increase their dominance in the Southern
delegations.

Sixty-four percent of the Southerners claimed the prac

tice of law as their primary vocation while only 20 percent were
involved principally in agriculture.

The remainder consisted of five

merchants and businessmen, two bankers, one engineer, one barber, and
one livery stable owner.

For the thirty-three whose real and personal

estate holdings were discovered, fifteen were worth less than $10 ,000 ,
six claimed property valued between $10,000 and $20 ,000 , and twelve
admitted to an estate worth over $20 ,000 . A cross-tabulation of party
University of North Carolina Press, 19**0); and Maurine Cristopher,
America's Black Congressman (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company *
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and wealth indicates that the Democrats were the wealthiest and the
scalawags the poorest.

For seventeen (of twenty-four) Democrats the

median position for real and personal estate holdings was $lU,000
(average $3^,782 ); for eight (of twelve) scalawags, the median wealth
was $1),250 (average $ 1 3 , 7 9 9 ) The average wealth in hoth cases was
raised considerably by the five Democrats and one scalawag who were
worth more than $30,000.

The wealthiest was a thirty-three old railroad

attorney William S. Herndon (D-TX) who claimed $122,000 in real estate
and $33,000 in personal estate.

Democrat Archibald T. MacIntyre,

although an extremely wealthy man, was a distant second with $30,000
worth of Georgia sugar land and $60,000 in personal estate.&
Considering their youth, the Southerners had amassed considerable
political experience.
experience.

Only three had no discoverable political

Sixteen had served in local offices, thirty-nine had held

office at the state level, and eight had held appointive federal posts.
Twenty-five had been members of at least one previous Reconstruction
House and three were veterans of antebellum Congresses.

Sion H.

Rogers (D-NC) had served as a Whig in the Thirty-Third Congress (18531855) and John T. Harris (D-HC) was elected on the Whig ticket, and
James M. Leach (D-NC) on the Democratic ticket, to the Thirty-Sixth
Congress (1859-1861) • Leach was also the first former member of the
?The wealth figures for the carpetbaggers and the blacks are too
incomplete to offer anymore than a rough indication of their rank in
relation to the Democrats. For five of fourteen carpetbaggers the
median wealth was $10,^50 (average $18 ,290) and for three of five
blacks the median wealth was $7 ,7 6 0 (average $7 ,760 ).
^Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Texas, Snlth
County) ibid., Georgia, Thomas County.
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Confederate House of Representatives to be elected to the U. S. House.9
All of the elections were seriously contested by both parties,
but thirty-seven Representatives still won by over 10 percent of the
vote and twenty-two had more than a 20 percent margin of victory.
Twelve of the elections showed close results (under 5 percent margin of
victory), and in eleven cases the results were formally contested.
Three of the contests were successful and in one South Carolina case
(scalawag C. C. Bowen vs. black Robert De large) the incumbent was
unseated and the seat was declared vacant.-10
A cross-tabulation of political affiliation with the racial
composition of the congressional districts yielded familiar patterns.
Eighty-four percent of the Democrats came from districts that were over
50 percent white.

Four of the five blacks and 70 percent of the

carpetbaggers came from black districts, while the scalawags were again
concentrated in the marginal, districts which were from *+5 to 55 percent
white.

Carpetbaggers continued their hold on the urban districts by

capturing five of six urban seats.
heavily agricultural districts.

Republicans also fared well in the

The middling districts from 50 to 79

^Biographical Directory. 1628 (Rogers), 1075 (Harris), 1273
(Leach). Leach, an antebellum Whig, was a unionist and self-acknowl
edged leader of the '‘peace party" in the Confederate House; see Thomas
B. Alexander and Richard Beringer, The Anatomy of the Confederate Con
gress: A Study of the Influences of kariber Charac^Serjstics on
Legislative Voting Behavior (NasfavSie: Vanderbilt University Press,
1972), h 6 , 261, 37^-75.
^°For the contested elections, see J. M. fhtith (comp.), Digest
of Election Cases. Cases of Contested Elections in the House of Repre
sentatives i Forty-Second. Forty-Third, and Forty-Fourth Congresses.
From. 1871~to 1376. Inclusive. House Misc. Document. b5 Cong.. 2 Sess.,

percent agricultural tended to select Democrats
The Forty-Second Congress showed less concern with the emotional
issues of Reconstruction than had its predecessors* although the most
explosive issue in the First Session was the consideration and passage
of the third and harshest force act.

The bitterness engendered by

the final force act was partially alleviated by the enactment of a
general amnesty during the Second Session.’^' After the Second Session*
the presidential campaign and election of 1872 commanded public
attention.

In the midst of the canvass* a New York newspaper exposed

the Credit Mobllier scandal* and the subsequent congressional investi
gation occupied much of the attention of Congress during the Third
Session. 12
The issues of Reconstruction* the presidential campaign* and the
scandals left little time for serious consideration of economic measures
during the Forty-Second Congress.

Fewer than twenty percent of 527

^For the text of "An Act to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States* and for
other purposes'1 (the third force act)* see Cong. Globe. k2 Cong.*
1 Sess. * Pt. 2* Appendix, 335-36. The general amnesty act removed the
political disabilities imposed by the third section of the Fourteenth
Amendment in all but a few cases; see ibid.. k2 Cong.* 2 Sess.* Pt. 6,
Appendix, 732 ,
■^^On the campaign of 1872 and the ramifications of the Credit
Mobilier scandal* see William Best Hesseltine* Ulysses S. Grant.
Politician (New York: Dodd and Mead, 1935)* ch. XVII, 309-12; Earl
Dudley Ross, The liberal Republican Movement (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1 J & 9 passlum; Fletcher M. Green* "Origins of the
Credit Mobilier of America. " Mississippi Valley Historical Review. XLVT
(September, 1959)» 238-51; and Jay B. Crawford, The Credit Mobilier of
America . . . . (Boston: C. W. Calkins and Campany. 1880) ."“passlum.
For the House investigation of the scandal, see House Reports. k2 Cong. *
3 Sess., Vol. 2, Nos. 77, 78, 81, 82 , 95.
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House roll calls were concerned with significant economic issues*
Ironically, the Forty-Second Congress would he remembered for its
inadvertent passage of the Coinage Act of 1873*

At the time, the act

seemed of only minor importance, hut it contained a little-noticed
clause which discontinued the *fl2 §- grain silver dollar and limited the
legal tender power of silver to amounts not exceeding five dollars*
The act effectively demonetized silver and the Forty-Second Congress
thus unwittingly committed the so-called "Crime of *73*" When the
demonetization of silver was "discovered" three years later, the act
was damnedty inflationists in general and silverites in particular for
the next twenty y e a r s . M u c h dehate was spent on a proposal reducing
tariff duties and internal, taxes.

The tariff act was probably the most

significant piece of economic legislation to emerge from the Congress,
hut roll-call divisions did occur on several other economic issues of
continuing importance.
Pressure to reduce tariff duties and internal taxes stemmed from
a number of sources*

Free traders and tariff-for-revenue-only advocates

had long clamored to reduce the high protective duties imposed during
the Civil War.

Midwestern Democrats constituted the core of the

^ % o r a discussion of the origins and ramifications of the Coinage
Act of 1873, see Walter T. K. Nugent, The Money Question During Recon
struction (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1967), ch. 5; and
Allen Weinstein, Prelude to Populism; Origins of the Silver Issue,
1867*1878 (New Haven; Yale University Press, 1970), especially ch. 1.
The coinage hill passed without a significant roll-call vote in the
House. For the text of the act, see Cong. Globe, h2 Cong., 3 Sess.,
Pt. 3, Appendix, 236 -hO. The Forty-Second Congress also passed the
notorious "Salary Grab Act" raising the salaries of the President and
members of Congress. Public criticism compelled the Forty-Third Con
gress to restore their salaries to previous levels.

1
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reductionist movement, but by the lS70 s their numbers were augmented by
a number of Republicans, particularly those representing agrarian
constituencies.

The growing disenchantment with the Grant administra

tion manifested in the emerging liberal Republican movement added more
recruits to the ranks of tariff reformers.

Moderate protectionists in

both parties objected to inequalities and excesses in tariff rates and
even the full-blown protectionists seemed aware that public opinion
favored further reductions.^
Furthermore, auspicious financial conditions, particularly a
redundant revenue, necessitated reductions in taxes and tariff duties.
After paying appropriations and interest on the public debt, the
government surplus averaged nearly $100 million in the fiscal years
1871-1872.

As several authorities have noted, the surplus greatly

exceeded sinking fund requirements.^

The act of I87O had brought

about substantial internal tax reductions and had expanded the free
list, but the duties on protected items had not been reduced substan
tially.

During debate on the 1872 bill, the central question was

whether the desired reduction in revenue should be effected by reducing
llfFor the forces compelling tariff reduction, see F. N. Taussig,
The Tariff History of the United States (8th ed., New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1931)7 lSo-81; and Edward Stanwood, American Tariff
Controversies in the Nineteenth Century (2 vols., Boston: Houghton,
Mifflin Co., 19037711* 173-77.
^See, for example, Taussig, Tariff History, 181; and Robert T.
Patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies, 1565-1879 (Durham: Duke
University Press, 195*0 >""1247 The intricate relationships between the
tariff and internal tax revenues and the public debt and sinking fund
are comprehensively treated in ibid., especially chs. VII-VIII.

protective or non-pratective duties.-1^
She mood of the Forty-Second Bouse on the issue of tariff reduc
tion was indicated early in the First Session with the summary passage
of hills to repeal the duties on salt, coal, and tea and coffee.1?
Repeal of the non-protective duties on tea and coffee won nearly solid
support from Southerners (see Table 5-1: A).

Southern Republicans, in

fact, faced considerable opposition on the hill frcm party colleagues
from the Northeast and Midwest.1®

The vote on the tea and coffee hill

offers a sample of the raveled motivations of the groups voting for
the issue.

It was later charged that protectionists sought to eliminate

2% > r a discussion of the differences between protective and nonprotective duties, see Taussig, Tariff History. 186-89. Non-protective
duties are those on items not produced in the United States (e.g., tea
and coffee) and are, in effect, indirect taxes, with the whole amount of
the duties recurring to the government. The primary function of nonprotective duties is to produce revenue. Protective duties, as their
name implies, are those imposed on imported items (e.g., wool, coal, and
iron) to enable American producers and manufacturers of the same items
to compete in the American marketplace* To the degree that they are
still imported, protected items produce revenue. But if the consumer
buys a protected item produced at home he is paying a tax, nob to the
government, hut to the producer of the item. High protective duties
may prohibit importation of certain items, elevate consumer prices, and
create monopolies capable of stifling competion.
^ T h e hills eliminating the duties on salt (H. R. 173), coal
(H. J. Res. 27), and tea and coffee (H. R. 17*0, each passed under
suspension of the rules and without debate on March 13, 3871. See
Cong. Globe. k2 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 81-83.
^^The only Southerner to oppose passage of H. S. 17^ was Charles
R. Thomas, a North Carolina scalawag. Thomas' voting record indicates
that he favored retention of tariff duties more times than did any
other Southerner. Thomas, a New Bern lawyer and railroad president
and the son of a wealthy shipowner and merchant, represented a
marginally black and heavily agricultural constituency. His pro
tariff stance may have stemmed from his background as a Clay Whig.
See Biographical Directory. l80lf; and John Gilchrist McCormick,
Personnel of the Convention of 1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1961 ), 82-83*
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TABLE 5-1: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY RECION AND PARTY
ON THE TARIFF ISSUE
A.

To suspend the rules and pass a bill (H. R. 17*0 repealing the
duties on tea and coffeea
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem.
•

Yea
Rep.
5
16
24
18
3

0

20
18
26

19
2
—nj 1
75

Grand Total

Dem.

NayRep.
9
9

• •

7
1
•

0

00

0 0

0 0

00

*

66

8

141

0

41
49

suspend the rules and pass a resolution (H. J. R<
repealing the duty on coalc

j

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Yea
Dem.
Rep.
11
7
38
4

m 0

20
19
16
14
2
**•«■*

•

»

0 0

60

71
131

Nay
Dem.
Rep.
3
18
8
13
3

«*

6
**
ld
6
•

0

0 0

13

45
58

aCong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 82 (March 13, 1871).
bThomas (NC).
cCong. Globe, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 82 (March 13, IB71 ).
dDox (AL).
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non-protective duties (e.g., those on tea and coffee) in order to
reduce the revenue and to relieve pressure to trim duties on protected
items.***9 it should he noted, however, that most anti-protectionists
also favored eliminating non-protective duties.

Most such sentiment

resided in the Democratic party, and Democrats voted 75-8 to put tea
and coffee on the free list.

The absence of debate on the tea and

coffee bill makes it impossible to determine which groups were acting
as protectionists and which as free-traders.
The scattered votes on protective duties indicates that seme
Southern Republicans did not favor complete elimination of such duties.
Southern Republicans indicated their opposition to continued protection
for Michigan and New York salt producers by voting lb-6 to place salt
on the free list, 20 but they voted U-13 against repealing duties on
^Taussig argues that the protectionists, led by the wool and
iron interests, adopted this 'bore far sighted policy" in 1872 because
of the strong public sentiment in favor of tariff reduction. The new
policy involved making "slight concessions" to the reductionists rather
than unconditionally opposing further reductions. The first step was
to repeal non-protective duties and then concede certain minimum
reductions on protected items— if necessary. Taussig's seemingly
plausable argument is based on but one source, a speech given by woollobbylst John L. Hays before a meeting of wool manufacturers in Boston.
Taussig, no friend of protection as it existed at the time, accepts
Hay's remarks at face value, and his account of the tariff revision
during the 1870's strongly suggests that protectionists successfully
conspired to maintain high duties on protected items. See Taussig,
Tariff History. 183-86, 189.
^Cong. Globe. kZ Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 81. In a later argument
to reduce duties on salt, Alabama carpetbagger Charles Buckley noted
that the South imported most of its salt from Liverpool and as salt
entered into the production of fertilizer the duties on salt functioned
as a tax on cotton producers using fertilizer. See the efforts of
Buckley and Archibald Maclntrye (D-GA) to reduce or repeal the duties
on salt, in ibid.. kZ Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. h, 321^, 3226, 323^-35»
3569. Very little salt was mined in the South. See the statistics
on salt productions in Francis A. Walker (comp.), The Statistics of
the Wealth and Industry of the United States . . . . (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1873) > Table X, 622.

1
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coal (see Table 5-1: B), and 3-1^ against a resolution "encouraging pasage of a bill to reduce the tariff on pig iron. ,r2^ On the surface, at
least, the response of Southern Republicans to the coal and pig iron
bills appears to reinforce the Beard-Beale thesis.

It is relatively easy

to conclude that most Southern Republicans disregarded the interests of
their constituents by offering their votes to Pennsylvania and Ohio coal
interests— or that they served as willing lackeys to protectionists like
William "Pig Iron" Kelly of Pennsylvania.

A paucity of evidence prohibits

refutation of such charges, but it should be noted that the complex
tariff issue makes difficult any simple explanation of motivation.

Any

number of factors might have determined the response of Southerners— one
of which may have been a desire to support Northeastern protectionists.
Virginia and Alabama either had or were developing substantial coal
mining and iron manufacturing interests.

The three Virginia Republicans

and the Alabama Democrat voting against repeal may have done so in an
honest effort to safeguard their fledgling industries.

The existence of

Southern coal and iron interests may have prompted the other nine Repub
licans (all from the Southeastern states) to oppose tariff reduction.22
If the dissenting Southern Republicans were moderate protectionists,
as seems to have been the case, they may have been hesitant to eliminate
21Cong. Globe, b2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1217. The motion to
reduce duties on pig iron to $5 per ton or less did not pass as io
necessitated suspension of the rules.
^For Southern coal measure estimations and actual productions
see Kennedy (comp.), Statistics of the Wealth and Industry. 755-56,
761 -65 . The "Pennsylvania fieldT^ which extended into Virginia, Ala
bama, and Georgia, was known to be quite rich. It should also be noted
that pig iron production was particularly important in Virginia, but
other producing states included North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
and Alabama; ibid., Table IX (B.), lf9^, 507, 556, 568, 578.

i
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the duties completely on protected items— not, at least, without dehate.
Southern Republicans exhibited particular interest in the development
of manufacturing and extractive industries in the South, and they may
have felt that an anti-protectionist stance would prove detrimental to
the future development of Southern industry.

Among the additional

rationales for the retention of both protective and non-protective
duties was a desire to keep revenues high in order on the one hand,
to retire the public debt and, on the other, to increase appropriations
/

for internal improvements.
Nor should it be assumed that the protective tariff had no support
among Southerners other than Louisiana sugar producers.

Early in the

period, Debow* s Review quoted, with approval, an articlein the Boston
Post to the effect that the central economic problem was not the tariff
but rather the deficiency of cheap money for economic growth.23

stronger

sentiment for a protective tariff existed in certain areas of the South
east.

The editor of the conservative Richmond Whig, for example,

declared in early 1870 that Virginia needed a high duty to protect local
iron industries:
Virginia may came to the conclusion that her welfare may best
be promoted by a high protective tariff. . . . our repre
sentatives should ponder this matter very seriously before
they determine to settle down in the old rut."'
Most conservative Southern newspapers, however, were not willing to
consider the benefits of a protective tariff.

The Atlanta Constitution

^jjebow1s Review (After the War Series), VIII (March-April, I87O),
285.
2^Rlchmond Whig. January 25, 1870.
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for example, led the onslaught against protection while simultaneously
proclaiming that Atlanta's future lay in manufacturing and Industry.2^
Although most Southern Democrats voted against protective duties, the
traditional Southern defense of free trade was open to question.

At

the very least, the range of potential motivating factors for a Repre
sentative's response to the complex tariff issue is too broad to con
clude that some Southern Republicans were simply servants of north
eastern protectionists.
The preliminary skirmishes over tariff duties foreshadowed the
more comprehensive legislation considered during the Second Session.
Tariff legislation inevitably- presents problems, but the maneuvering
resulting in the act of 1872 was particularly intricate.

The House

proposals to place salt, coal, and tea and coffee on the free list
during the First Session became lodged in the Senate Finance Committee.
At the beginning of the Second Session, the House passed a second bill
repealing the duties on tea and coffee which was reported in the Senate.
Rut during its deliberations on the bill, the upper chamber transformed
it into a measure making duty changes on a large number of items
including a horizontal reduction of 10 percent on most manufactured
goods.

Irritated at the Senate's assumption of the House prerogative to

originate revenue bills, the House, on April 2, 1872, voted 153-9 for
a resolution chastising the Senate and tabling the Senate bill.
2^see Atlanta Constitution. Jhly 8, 1870, January 1, 1871,
April 2, 1872, January 23, 1873.
2^Cong. Globe, k2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 3* 2105-12; Stanwood,
American Tariff Controversies, II, 179-81.

Ia the interim the House Committee on Ways and Means completed
-work on its own measure to reduce tariff duties and internal taxes
and on April 16 Chairman Henry L. Daves (R-MA) reported the hill
(H. R. 2322) to the House.

According to Daves, the bill offered an

$18.9 million reduction of tariff duties and a $12.8 million reduction
of internal revenue*

Following three weeks of debate and amendments,

Kelly (R-PA), in a surprise move during debate on the bill in the
Committee of the Whole, offered a motion to strike the enacting clause
of the bill.

Kelly* s motion, which was tantamount to killing the

measure, passed 95-75*

Kelly then moved to return H. R. 2322 to Ways

and Means with instructions to report another tariff bill— one presumably
more favorable to Kelly's interests.2? Within the next few minutes,
the entire complexion of H. R. 2322 changed as Daves moved to amend
Kelly* s instructions to require the Ways and Means Committee to report
H. R. 2322 with a clause reducing by 10 percent the duties on most
protected manufactures.

While the two motions were still pending,

Gustavus A. Finkelburg (R-MO), a sincere reductionist, offered an amend
ment to the Daves amendment to reduce the duties by another 10 percent.
The Finkelburg amendment would have provided a reduction on the
specified items to 80 percent of their existing level.

As the last

motion pending, the Finkelburg amendment was voted on first and the
House defeated it 86-114.

The division on the amendment tended to

follow party lines with Republicans comprising the opposition.

Nine

teen Midwestern Republicans voted for the amendment and thirteen
Democrats from the Middle Atlantic states— where protectionist
27Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 4, 3157.

19^
sentiment was strong— sided with the Republicans to defeat the measure
(see Table 9-2; A).

After defeating the 20 percent reduction, the

House passed the Dawes amendment and referred H. R. 2322 to Ways and
Means with instructions to report it with a clause stipulating a 10
percent horizontal reduction.2®
When H. R. 2322 re-emerged from the committee, another clause-byclause amending process occupied the House for two weeks.

No signif

icant roll-call votes were recorded during the amending process, hut
judging by the amendments offered by Southerners and their arguments
on the bill, they made a sincere effort to reduce tariff levels.
Southern Republicans offered amendments to reduce duties on a variety
of items from salt, cotton bagging, and iron used in the construction
of cotton machinery to vermouth, tropical plant bulbs, and fresh
fruit— and in some cases their proposals were approved. ^

During the

debate, another shred of evidence emerged that reinforces the view that
Southern Republicans were not merely passive followers of Northern
manufacturers. John F. Farnsworth (R-XL), an ardent tariff reformer,
charged that "protectionists" were "fixing up" Southern Representatives
to induce them to join the protectionist "ring" and vote to retain high
protective duties.

A day later, after offering an amendment to put

2®The vote on the Dawes amendment was 111-77 and on the motion
to refer, 117-75. See ibid., 3158-59* Southern Republicans opposed
the amendment 6-12 and the motion to refer, 8-11. Southern Democrats
favored both motions by margins of 11-3 and 10-U respectively. For
brief secondary accounts of the transformation of H. R. 2322, see
Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies. II, 181-83; and Taussig,
Tariff History, i M ^ H
29see, for example, Cong. Globe, kZ Cong., 2 Sess., Pt.
323^-35, 3399, 3^3, 3^56,“^,"35^9-70.
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TABLE! 5-2: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON H. R. 2322
A.

To pass the Finkelburg amendment6.
Nay
Dem.
Rep.

Dem.

NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS

2
Ilf
15
12
21
_2

19,
lb
• ■

• ■

66

20

18

Total
Grand. Total
B.

Yea
Rep.

Region

*

9

9

•

2
13
1
2®

86

19
29
27
15
3
96

111).

To suspend the rules, discharging the Committee of the Whole from
further consideration of H. R. 2322 and passing the samed
Yea
Rep.

Region

Dem.

NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS

If
Ilf
16
19
17
Js

13
11
36
l£
2
_1

72

79

Total
Grand Total

151

Dem.

Nay
Rep.
6
15
16
lfe
1
JL

• •

11
If
9 9

If
9 9

19

1*3
62

aCong. Globe, lf2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. If, 3158-59 (May 7, 1872).
^Turner (AL).
cHarper (NC), Leach (NC).
^Con«. Globe, lf2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 3652 (May 20, 1872).
eBarry (MS), Elliott (SC), McKee (MS), Perce (MS).

soap ingredients on the free list, Jacob H. Cypher, a Louisiana carpet
bagger, responded to Farnsworth*a charge:
If there is any fixing up of members on this floor fran the
South on this question, I do not know it. If I have
observed the votes of southern Representatives correctly on
the different interests involved in the pending bill, they
have not placed themselves under the would-be leadership of
either free-traders or protectionists in this House or out of
it, but they have uniformly voted independently and in the
interests of their constituents. I repel the charge that we
belong to any ring. . . . my colleagues from the South on this
floor have voted to reduce the duty on coal, salt, and
lumber.30

The bill that emerged from the extensive amending process appar
ently satisfied all but a hard core of Democratic and Republican pro
tectionists and a few diehard Democratic free-traders.

Democrats

voted 72-19 and Republicans 79-^3 to pass a motion to suspend the rules
thus cutting off further consideration in the Committee of the Whole,
and ensuring passage of H. R. 2322 (see Table 5-2: B). The bill
received particularly strong support from Southern Representatives.
Southern Democrats supported it by a margin of 19-0» and the Southern
Republicans outdid Republicans from all other regions by voting 16-4
for passage.

Given the response of the Southern Democrats, the South

could hardly criticize its Republican Representatives.

Nor does the

response of the Southern Republicans on this final vote offer credence
to the Beard-Beale thesis, 31
30ibid., 3509.
3%he four Southern Republicans voting against H. R. 2322 were
Elliott of South Carolina, and Barry, McKee, and Perce from Mississippi
Elliott's tariff attitudes remain unknown as he remained silent during
the debate, but the opposition of the three Mississippians is baffling*
Perce was particularly active in the debate on the bill and secured
reductions on iron used in constructing cotton machinery "in favor of
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Although the vote to pass the House version was the last roll
call on the hill, differences between the House and Senate necessitated
a committee of conference whose report won the approval of both Houses.
In the interim, the reductions created by H. R. 2322 were augmented when
the Senate resurrected and passed the first House bill repealing the
duties on tea and coffee.
revenues by $53>057,259-06.

Taken together, the two bills trimmed
A little over half of the amount came

from revision of the tariff schedules, the balance being produced by
reductions of internal taxes, particularly those on liquors and tobac
co.^2

The act of 1872 was the most substantial reduction of tariff

duties enacted during the Reconstruction period.

The duty on salt was

cut in half, coal duties were reduced from $1.25 to 75 cents per ton,
and the greatly expanded free list included such key items as paper
stock, hides, and jute.

Of greater consequence was the horizontal

reduction of 10 percent on such protected items as manufactures of
cotton, wool, iron and other metals, India rubber, glass, paper, and
leather. ^

But as Professor F. W. Taussig has noted, the central

the manufacturers of the South," but he may have been irked at not
securing reductions on cotton bagging; see ibid., 3*f03, 3^56. Barry
and McKee were not active in the debate and they were quite often
absent on other tariff roll calls, but both had favored reductions on
tea and coffee and McKee was one of a very few Southern Republicans to
favor putting coal and salt on the free list. Personal and constituent
characteristics reveal nothing that differentiated the four from other
Republicans voting for the measure.
32cong. Globe. h3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, ^206, 4215. For the
final text of the bill, see ibid., Pt. 6, Appendix, 764-7^5 for a more
useful chart showing tariff duties and the rates of reduction proposed
by an earlier version of H. R. 2322, see ibid., Pt. If, 3201-203.
3 % a u s s i g , Tariff History. 185; Stsnwood, American Tariff
Controversies, I I , 183-8^.

198
problem with a horizontal reduction of any amount Is that it
be revoked.

easily

In the name of financial urgency, the Forty-Third Congress

repealed the 10 percent horizontal reduction imposed by the Tariff Act
of 1872.^
The reductions in internal taxes imposed by H. R. 2322 marked the
climax of a repealing process that had eliminated nearly all the import
ant taxes created during the war. 35 As the internal tax provisions
excited little controversy, few roll calls were taken on the subject,
and only one, that reducing the tax on tobacco, was of particular
importance to the South.

Richard T. W. Duke (D-VA), a Charlottesville

lawyer and country gentleman, led efforts to reduce taxes on manufactures
of tobacco.

Privately convinced that "enormous taxes11 was "one cause

of the great disruption of our agricultural interests," Duke appealed to
the agrarian West and northwest to unite with the South and discard the
politics and economics of the Northeast.^ An appropriate first step
in this direction would be to reduce the tax on tobacco.

Although it

was a product of special interest to Duke's constituents, Southerners,
3**Taussig, Tariff History. 189-91.
ch. VI.

For the repeal, see below,

35patterson, Federal Debt-Management Policies. U9-21; Taussig,
Tariff History. 172. Taussig notes that the only significant internal
taxes remaining after 1872 were those on liquor and beer. In addition,
taxes were retained on matches, patent medicine, and a few other
"comparatively unimportant" items, ibid.
3&Richard T. W. Duke to Edmund Wilcox Hubard, February 8 , 1872,
in Edmund Wilcox Hubard Papers, Southern Historical Collection,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; Cong. Globe. k2 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. h, 3012-16. For biographical information on Duke, see
Biographical Directory. 88h; and Iynn Gardner Tyler (ed.), Encyclo
pedia of Virginia Biography (3 vols., New York: Lewis Historical
Publishing Company, 1915;, III, 115-16.
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Democrats and Republicans alike, rallied to bis appeal.

A last minute

amendment to H. R. 2322 succeeded in reducing taxes on most tobacco
products from 24 cents to 16 cents a pound.

House Democrats, led by

the Southerners, favored the reduction by a decisive margin of 74-7.
But Southern Republicans, in supporting the amendment 14-2, again
found themselves lined up against a majority of Hew England Republicans
and a surprising number of Midwestern Republicans (see Table 5-3: A).
Nevertheless, Southern Republicans, conceiving

of tobacco as a

"Southern interest," supported the reduction, even though very few of
their districts produced tobacco.37
A far more controversial issue, and one with serious sectional
overtones, was that of refunding the tax that had been collected on
raw cotton from 1862 to 1B68.

During that period, particularly in

the postwar years, raw cotton had been taxed at rates ranging frcm
one-half of one cent to five cents a pound.

By the time the tax was

repealed in January 1868, over $57 million had been collected on cotton
produced in the ten Southern states.^

Southerners charged that the

tax had been an unconstitutional levy upon the products of a particular
section while that section was not represented in the national councils.
Foregoing the fine legal arguments on the constitutionality of a direct
tax on agricultural productions, a North Carolina editor claimed that
37For the involved section of H. R. 2322 revising tobacco taxes,
see Cong. Globe. 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6 , Appendix, 771-73*
3%'heodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, I960), 25-26 ; Milton M.
Me Pherson, "The Federal Cotton Tax in the South, 1862-68” (unpublished
M.A. thesis, University of Alabama, 1959), 103; Cong. Globe. 42 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 6 , Appendix, 49*
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TABLE 5-3: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON INTERNAL TAXES
A. To amend an amendment to H. R. 2322 By reducing the tax on
tobacco from 2k cents to l6 centsa
Yea

Region
NE
MA
MW

SS
BS

PS
Total

Rep.

Dem.

Rep.

1
15
15
21
20
_2

5
22
18
11+
2
JL

3
2
2
• •

12
3
29,
2b
1

• *

• »

74

62

Grand Total
B.

Nay-

Dem.

* *

1+7

7

136

5k

To suspend the rules and pass a resolution instructing the
Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill refunding the
cotton tax (H. R. 3561+) and making said bill a special
order of business0

Region
NE
MA
MW

SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Yea
Dem. Rep.
•*

• «

5
7
22
18
_1

1
2
19

53

Nay
Dem. Rep.
16
19

3
13
9

39„

ld

* *

• *

1
_1

1
_2

2l+

27

78

2

77

105

aCong. Globe. 1+2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 5, 1+100 (May 31, 1872).
kperce (MS), Morphis (MS).
cCong. Globe. 1+2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 891 (January 27, IS73 )dPorter (VA).

201
the levy on cotton was a simple case of "taxation without represen
tation. "39 Most Southerners were willing to concede that portion of
the tax collected during the war, hat the section was united in favor
of refunding the balance.

Carpetbagger Legrand W. Perce of Mississippi,

the leader of the refunding movement, summed up the case in a speech
on May 1, 1872.

After noting that most Southern legislatures had

passed memorials favoring refunding, Perce presented an involved
argument against the constitutionality of the tax.

He claimed that the

tax was akin to "highway robbery," but he toned down the partisan over
tones in his argument and proclaimed that the "subject is entirely out
side party issues . . . . it is an appeal from one entire section of
the country, Including all classes, all colors, all parties, to the
General Government." 110 He might have added that the introduction of
$57 million into the South would give a healthy boost to its languishing
economy.
Southern Republicans were particularly active in the effort to
refund the cotton tax.

The three memorials from Southern legislatures

formally requesting the refund were presented by an Alabama black, a
Georgia scalawag, and a Mississippi carpetbagger.^ Of the eight
39rhe Raleigh (NC) Register, July 5, 1867. As over $1(0 million
of the tax had been collected in Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and
Mississippi, conservative newspapers in those four states particularly
desired the refunding legislation, but Southern Republicans were seldom
given credit for leading the refunding movement. See, for example,
Atlanta Constitution. March 8 , 1873; New Orleans Prices Current, Jan
uary 3, 1873; The Vicksburg Daily Herald, January l4, 1873> The Weekly
Clarion (Jackson), October 10,""1872.
^Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6 , Appendix, 411-19.
4lpor
Alabama memorial presented by Benjamin S. Turner, see
ibid.. 5*10-41; Richard H. Whiteley presented Georgia's memorial, ibid.,
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refunding proposals submitted by Representatives of the ten states,
Southern Republicans submitted five, and Republicans made two of the
three major speeches supporting refunding.^

Southern Democrats and

Republicans presented a united front on the issue, but Internal
differences existed as to the beneficiaries of the refunded revenues.
The state legislatures ashed only for a refund to "the people1' of the
cotton-producing states, and several of the proposed bills had similarly
vague clauses.

Benjamin S. Turner, the Alabama black, concluded that

the tax fell heaviest on the Southern laborer, and that it was there
fore due to "the poor people of the South, regardless of caste or
color. 1,lf3 Initially, the Republicans tended to favor general proposals
refunding the tax to the states which would then either distribute the
funds or use them for public purposes, but most of the Democrats favored
some proposal which would return a major portion of the tax directly to
the cotton planters.

Archibald T. MacIntyre (D-GA) went a step further

and stated that restitution should be made to each state which in turn
would reimburse those who actually paid the tax including elements other
than the producers such as commission agents or factors.^
Pt. 2, 1300-301; and Ferce presented the memorial from the Mississippi
legislature, ibid., Pt. 6 , Appendix, 1*U.
^Southerners presenting bills to refund the cotton tax were
Sheldon (R-LA), Morphis (R-MS), McKee (R-MS), Handley (D-GA), Niblack
(D-FL), MacIntyre (D-GA), Perce (R-MS), and Harris (R-MS). Of the
Democrats, only MacIntyre spoke on the issue.
^3cong. Globe. 1*2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 6, Appendix, 51*0-1*1.
Turner quite plainly felt that the refund should go to the Negro
laborers who produced the cotton, but he proposed no plan of
implementation.
^waclntyre summerized his proposal and three other pending refund
ing bills in ibid., 1*2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3j Appendix, 1*8-52.
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During the Third Session a caucus of Southern Representatives
finally agreed to support a hill (H. B. 3564) making restitution to the
party paying the tax.

But Southern unity was of little value as the

HOuse was not disposed to consider, let alone pass, a refund of the
cotton tax.

On January 27, 1872, with time running out in the Third

Session, George C. McKee (R-i4S) finally secured the floor and moved to
suspend the rules to call up H. B. 3564 and make the hill a special
order of business "from day to day until the same is disposed of. “
Prior to the vote on the motion, Perce, the bill* s sponsor, noted that
refunding legislation had been pending in the Committee on Ways and Means
for a year and that it was time for action on. it.

The vote on the

motion clearly split the House along sectional lines.

Southerners

supported the motion 41-1 and the border state Bepresentatives re
sponded favorably by a margin of 20 -2 , but members from the other
sections offered a resounding 14-102 negative vote (see Table 5-3: B).^
Southerners continued to press the issue in Congress during and beyond
the Reconstruction period but the efforts of solidly Democratic
delegations were no more successful than that led by carpetbaggers and
scalawags in the Forty-Second House.
Currency and related issues received very little attention in
the Forty-Second House.

The period after the passage of the funding

^Ibid., Pt. 2, 891. Southerners failed in a final attempt to
suspend the rules to set a time for consideration of the refunding bill
on February 17, 1873* This time the South was completely unanimous as
Porter (R-VA), the solitary dissenter on the earlier McKee motion,
joined his Southern colleagues in their 4-5-0 vote to bring the bill
before the House. She motion (suspension of the rules) failed 94-83.
For the vote, see ibid.. 1430.
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and currency legislation of 1B70 was relatively prosperous, and little
effort was made to agitate the question of the circulating medium of
the country.

The Panic of IB73 and the following depression shattered

that calm and the Forty-Third Congress did little else than to try to
resolve the resulting currency problems.

The Coinage Act of 1873,

which later became infamous in inflationist and silverite circles,
passed the House with scarcely a ripple of comment, but two unrelated
roll calls dealing with the currency are worthy of noue.
During the Second Session, Ben Butler, the Massachusetts greenbacker and ultra-Radical, offered a motion to suspend the rules and
pass a bill authorizing and directing the Secretary of the Treasury
"to collect and receive one-third of the amount of customs duties
assessed upon imports in legal tender notes of the United States.
Butler claimed that his bill would "hasten the return to specie pay
ments," but he was not allowed to explain exactly how the proposal
related to specie resumption.

Butler was probably more concerned with

enhancing the prestige of the greenbacks and further establishing them
as the central part of the nation's circulating medium than he was
with hastening the day of specie resumption.Denied time to debate
^Cong. Globe. 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1585,
^Ibid.. The legal tender acts bad stipulated that customs duties
on imports were to be paid in specie. Butler may have been trying to
enhance the value of greenbacks in relation to the national bank notes
which were not receivable for import duties. Like most greeribackers,
Butler disliked the national banking system and its currency. See
Robert Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party; An Economic Study of Civil
War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959) 46,
108-1X3, 212; and Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A Social and Political
History of American Finance. 1B&5-1B79 fPrinceton:- Princeton University
Press, 1954), 19.
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the MU., Butler made the offhand remark, "we understand it; it is the
people against the hanks; that is all.
The motion to suspend the rules and pass the hill split the
Republicans 47-50> hut Democrats supported the move 43-17 (see Table
i

5-4: A).

With Southern Republicans united solidly behind the bill,

the section1s margin of 22-3 for the bill was greater than that for any
other region.

Northern Republicans, however, provided enough votes

against rules suspension to defeat the proposal 9 0 - 6 7 * The measure
was not inflationist and therefore would, have done nothing to solve
the currency shortage in the South, but it did propose to strengthen
the legal tender qualities of the greenbacks and to make custom duties
partially payable in greenbacks.
As the South needed additional currency, Southern Representatives
were equally willing to support an unsuccessful attempt to expand the
national bank note circulation.

On February 17, lfl73» James Monroe

(R-OH) moved to suspend the rules and pass an amendment to the
Currency Act of 1870 to provide for an additional issue of $25 million
in national bank notes “to banking associations organized or to be
organized” In those states having less than their quota of such
^Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, I585 .
49it is notable that most Southern Democrats were willing to
forgo their obvious dislike for Butler and support his motion. The
three Southern Democrats opposing the motion, Braxton (VA), Terry (VA),
and Waddell (NC), may have simply disliked the idea of enhancing the
value of greenbacks, but as all three were Southern natives and
Confederate veterans and two were former slaveholders, the possibility
exists that they simply could not bring themselves to vote for a bill
offered by "Beast" Butler.
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TABLE 5-b: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON THE CURRENCY ISSUE
To suspend the rules and pass the Butler hill "to hasten the
return to specie payments "a
Yea
Dem.
Rep.

Region
NE

MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Nay
Dem.
Rep.

10
10
10
12
J=

7
k
20
12
1
-2.

4
7
3*
3
a♦

to

h7

17

Grand Total

90

7
19
23
1
t•
50
67

To suspend the rules and pass H. R . 397^ a bill providing for
an additional Issue of $2? million in hank notes0
Yea
Dem.
Rep.

Region
NE

MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Nay
Dem.
Rep.

3
9
17
5

4
16
to
23
3
JL

1+
18
9.
2
11
_1

..
_2

3^

87

to

28

121

13
7
6

73

^ong. Globe, to Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1585 (March 11, 1872).
^Braxton

(VA), Terry (VA), Waddell (NC).

°Cong. Globe, to Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, lto5 (February 17, 1873)
^Beck

(GA), MacIntyre (GA).
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circulation.

As a concession to the Northeast, the hill also proposed

repeal of the clause in the 1B70 act ■which proposed redistribution of
$25 million in bank notes.5°

The issue m s clearly one of currency

expansion with the South being the primary beneficiary.

Southerners

voted 40-2 to secure the expansion, but, despite the fact that the
New England and Middle Atlantic states did not stand to lose any of
their bank note circulation, they still voted 23-40 against the
measure (see Table 5-4: B).

Their opposition was more than enough

to deny the two-thirds majority needed to suspend the rules.
In the area of federal aid to internal improvements, two important
river and harbor appropriations bills were considered and passed by
the Forty-Second Congress.

Southern Representative^ particularly the

Republicans, participated effectively in the scramble to secure
federal monies for the improvement of their section's rivers and harbors.
The appropriation bill (H. R. 2208) approved during the Second Session
generated no roll-call divisions, but Samuel S. Cox (D-NY) initiated
a spirited sectional debate by charging that the Southern states received
less than their fair share of the appropriations in H. R. 2203 as
reported by the Committee on Commerce.

Cox was joined by Democrat

John Hancock of Texas who claimed that Michigan received almost as
much money as did all the Southern states combined.

The target of the

two Democrats was Omar D. Conger (R-Ml), the Chairman of the Commerce
Committee and the floor leader on H. R. 2208.

Conger denied the

charges of sectional discrimination and responded with a set of figures

^Cong, Globe, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 2, 1425.
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showing that the South received at least one-third of the appropri
ations— including those for work on the tipper Mississippi and its
tributaries, which he correctly cited as work in which the South had
a vested interest.

Conger noted that Southern members on the Commerce

Committee were "as talented and as zealous in behalf of the interests
of the section as the gentleman from New York [Cox] could possibly be
for them."'’1

In the heated exchange that followed, William S. Holman

(D-IN), Fierce M. B. Young (D-GA), and Lionel A. Sheldon (R-LA) came to
Conger* s support and denied the existence of any sectional bias against
the South in the committee.

An examination of H. R. 2208 reveals

that the Great Lakes area did receive something more than its propor
tional share of appropriations, but the Southern states also did quite
well, primarily because of the actions of Southern Representatives in
amending the bill.^3
Southerners fared better on the second rivers and harbors bill
(H. R. 3922) passed during the Third Session.
again entered the deliberations.

Charges of sectional bias

At one point, Mississippi carpetbagger

George C. McKee, having failed to secure an appropriation of $50,000
for the improvement of the Yazoo River, moved "that the Yazoo river be
considered as lying within the boundaries of Wisconsin and Michigan,
53-Ibid., 1+2 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1^25.
5gIbid.
53por the text of bill, see ibid., Pt. 6 , Appendix, 81^-16. For
Southern efforts to secure additional appropriations by amendment, see
ibid.. Pt. 3, 21+1+3-52.
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for then my amendment would get t h r o u g h . M c K e e ' s motion provoked
laughter, "but same Southerners were clearly irritated at not receiving
what they considered their fair share.

Carpetbagger James H. Hiatt,

Jr., for example, called for defeat of an additional appropriation for
a Massachusetts harbor, with the remark, "1 think Massachusetts is
pretty well provided for In this bill already," and Thomas Boles (R-AR)
and James M. Hanks (D-AR) denounced Northerners for refusing an
55

appropriation for Arkansas rivers."

The scattered roll-call votes on H. R. 3922 indicate that South
erners were nearly unanimous in support of additional appropriations
for their region, but the divisions also indicate a lack of enthusiasm
for such measures among Northern Republicans.

Democrats, for example,

strongly supported an additional appropriation of $50,000 for the
improvement of two Arkansas rivers, but Northern Republicans reacted
sharply against it (see Table 5-5: A).

Southerners apparently con

sidered the relatively obscure rivers as "Southern interests" and
voted 40-2 for the appropriation.

As an indication of their concern

for improving the upper Mississippi river, the section's Representatives
voted 41-3 to double the appropriation for improvements between St.
Louis, and Cairo, Illinois (see Table 5-5: B).

Opposition to the increased

appropriation was particularly pronounced in the Northeast, and Mid
western Republicans split 20-19 on the measure.
^Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3> 1463> 1469.
55jbid., 165a, 1643, 1549-50, 1657.
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TABLE 5-5: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY ON H. R. 3922
(RIVERS AND HARBORS APPROPRIATION BIEL)
A.

To amend H. R. 3922 by appropriating $50,000 for the improvement
of the White and St. Francis rivers (AR)a

Yea
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Rep.

Dem.

Rep.

1
13
15
22
13
_2

3
3
10
18
2

2
1+
2
00
1

13
18
22
2b
1
_2

66

36

9

58

Grand Total
B.

Nay-

Dem.

• *

102

67

To amend H. R. 3922 by increasing the appropriation for the
improvement of the Mississippi River (between the Missouri
and Ohio Rivers) by $100,000c
Region
NE
MA
MW

SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

Dem.

Nay
Rep.

8
Ik
21
13
_2

20
18
1

3
12
3,
ld
3

• •

»•

12
19
19
2
1
_2

58

39

22

55

• •

* •
• •

97

77

aCon£. Globe, 1+2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1758 (February 2k, 1873)*
bSheldon (LA), Stowell (VA).
°Cong. Globe, k2 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 3, 1&59 (February 2*+, 1873).
dBeck (GA).
eBuckley (AL), Platt (VA).
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Lacking an extensive railroad system, the South depended heavily
on its natural network of water transportation to move its agricultural
products to market.

And there is no doubt that the South, more than

any other region of the country needed federal assistance in renovating
its river and harbor facilities which had been damaged or neglected
during the conflict.

The section's Representatives did as much as

could be expected of any delegation to secure appropriations for marine
improvements, but the continued opposition of Northern Republicans
aroused the ire of Southern Republicans on more than one occasion.

In

the long run, the reluctance of Northern Republicans to assist their
Southern party colleagues could not have but hurt the party's chances
of survival in the South.
The Forty-Second House was swamped with scores of proposals to
grant land subsidies or rights of way to aid in the construction of
railroads.

Over the three sessions, Southerners offered more than

forty railroad bills, most of which asked for seme form of federal
assistance for local Southern lines.56 As an indication of the House's
growing opposition to the policy of granting public lands to railroad
corporations, most of the proposals never emerged from committee.

Of

the proposals offered by Southern Representatives, only a handful
passed— and those without roll-call divisions.

The House was particularly

unreceptive to outright grants of public lands, but substantial opposition
developed to proposals granting only the right of way over public lands,
56lbid., 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, Index; 42 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Index; 42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pt. 1, Index, In addition, the House con
sidered a number of Senate proposals for aid to Southern railroads.
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renewing of antebellum land grants, or extending coupletion times for
lines already under construction. 57
A scalogram of railroad issues reveals partisan patterns of
support (see Tables 5-6! A and 5-6: B).

Southern Republicans were

the most consistent supporters of efforts to grant rights of way, time
extensions, and other privileges to railroad companies.

Overall, they

scaled higher than did party colleagues from other regions, but Repub
lican support was quite strong in all areas except the Midwest.

On the

other hand, over half of the Northern Democrats, including those from
the border states, offered no support at all to the scale items (scale
position 0).

The partisan nature of the subsidy issue obviously

placed those Southern Democrats favoring railroad development in a
quandary.

The voting behavior of the Southern Democrats might be

explained by the fact that the scalogram includes no items relating
to Southern railroads.

But Southern Democrats could hardly have

expected outside support for their own projects if they voted with the
majority of their party against projects outside the South.

Under the

circumstances, over half of the Southern Democrats abandoned their
party and offered at least seme support to the proposals considered in
57see in particular a series of roll-call votes and the debate
on a bill (S. 565) extending the time for the state of Wisconsin to
complete a railroad from take St. Croix to Lake Superior, ibid., kZ
Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 127^-78, 1301-13, 171^-21, Pt. 3, 2^183783. The
Senate bill had extended the grants and privileges to the line for
another five years, but a House amendment eliminated everything after
the enacting clause and provided that the land grant revert to the
public domain. The Senate refused to agree to the amendment, and a
committee of conference recommended the House recede from its amendment.
The House, however, voted to adher to its amendment 110-54— thus killing
the bill. Southern Republicans and a large bloc of Southern Democrats
consistently supported the time extension.

TABLE 5-6: A
RAILROAD SCAIOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PASTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS
REGION AND PARTY

Scale
Position
0

NE
D

R

2

D

1

3

if

2

• •

2
• •

1

5

10
6

9 *

Total

3

1

• •

20

25

• ■

• •

U
28

18

l£

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .957

50

22

5
7

• •

2

22
60

2
• •

11

1

« #

21

8

• •

• ■

• •

23

9

1

* *

1

3

12

• •

2
1

3

6

1

1

11

9 9

• •

if

11

19

2

2

12

* *

1

2

• 9

« •

« •

U

3
2

* *

5
1

* •

2

if

1

50

• •

1

Total
D
R

• 9

• •

• •

R

■ 9

if

1

D

• *

• •

10

PS
R

13

2

2

D

• m

9

1

BS
R

10

if

1

D

1

• »

1

SS
R

7

2

• •

D

* «

2
2

R

18
1

1

MW

MA

2

3

89

126

TABLE 5-6: B

ITEMS IN RAILROAD SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position

Identification

0
1 .

To table a bill (H. R. 2199) incorporating the Great Salt
Lake and Colorado River Railway Company and granting the
Company right of way through public lands. 63-105;
+ = NAY. Cong. Globe, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2547
(April 1B,“W 2 ) .

2

To table a bill (S. 242) enabling the Atlantic and Pacific
Railroad Company to mortgage its road. 63-104; + = NAY.
Ibid., 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Pfc. 2, 745 (April 18, 1871).

3

To suspend the rules and pass a bill (H. R. 3743) granting
the right of way through public lands to the Atchison,
Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. 98-77; + = YEA. a i d .,
42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pfc. 2, 1577 (February 21, l£73T»

4

To pass a bill (H. R. 1553) relating to lands for the
Central Pacific Railroad Company. 100-87; + = YEA.
Ibid.. 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 4, 2739 (April 24, 1872 ).

5

To suspend the rules and pass a bill (S. 1537) granting
rights to a right of way for a western branch of the
Texas Pacific Railroad Company. 89-79; + = YEA. Ibid.,
42 Cong., 3 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2131 (March 3, 1873).

6

To table a bill (H. R. 3^3) repealing the appropriations
the Central Pacific Railroad Company made in an army
appropriations bill for fiscal IB72 . 12-163; + = YEA.
Ibid., Pfc. l, 540 (January 13, 1B73).
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the

scalogram.

5®

Quite clearly, the willingness of the House to

subsidize railroad corporations continued to decline during the FortySecond Congress.

In the face of the Credit Mobilier scandal and a

declining Republican majority, the Southerners and others who desired
to continue federal subsidies for railroads confronted difficult
times.

Economic issues were not of major import in the Forty-Second Con
gress— a situation due largely to the seemingly prosperous times.

The

divisions on the economic issue that were considered indicate that the
Southern delegations continued to serve the interests of their section
in a creditable manner.

Southern Republicans and Democrats tended to

vote as a sectional, unit, particularly on questions relating to
internal taxes, currency, and internal improvements, which indicates
that both parties had similar conceptions of what constituted Southern
interests.

The inclination of seme Southern Republicans to favor at

least a moderately protective tariff presents a problem if the South
is considered to be united in favor of free trade.

As an agricultural

region, the South probably favored greater reductions in tariff duties
5®The Southern Democrats ranking highest on the railroad scalngram were Connor (TX), Critcher (VA), Harper (NC), Leach (NC), and
Sloss (AL). The five had little in common except that they had all
been unionists as had been most other Democrats. But other factors
in their backgrounds suggest seme reasons for their interest in rail
roads. Connor, an Union army veteran, was extremely interested in rail
road penetration of his north Texas district through which the pro
posed Texas-Pacific line was to pass. Harper was a civil engineer and
railroad builder. Leach, a West Point graduate, had been a prominent
North Carolina Whig in the antebellum period. Sloss, a Douglas Demo
crat, had been involved in railroad dealings for all of his adult life.
Sloss offered more bills (8) aiding Southern railroad projects than
any other Southerner in the Forty-Second House.

I
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than those finally enacted hy the Forty-Second Congress, hut it is
evident that the concept of a tariff for protection 'was not without
friends in some sections of the South.

She substantial tariff and

internal tax reductions in the act of 1B72 received the nearly unanimous
support of Southern Republicans and Democrats, and the act did not create
adverse comment in the Southern press.
Those seeking evidence of a strong combination between Southern
Republicans and Northeastern Republicans would be sorely disappointed
by the roll-call divisions on economic issues in the Forty-Second
House.

If any combination was more evident than others it was that

between Southern Republicans and Democrats and Northern (primarily
Midwestern) Democrats on questions relating to currency, internal
taxes, and appropriations for rivers and harbors.

On these matters,

Southern Republicans deserted their party and sided with the Democrats.
On other questions, Southerners found greater support among Midwestern
or Northeastern Republicans, and the Southern Democrats were forced to
break with their party.

And on the question of refunding the cotton

tax, the Southerners stood alone.

The willingness of the Southerners,

Republicans and Democrats alike, to accept support wherever they could
get it strongly suggests that regional interests were far more important
than political affiliations on economic questions in the Forty-Second
House.

CHAPTER VI

THE FORTY-THIRD HOUSE
The Forty-Third Congress returned to the traditional two-session
format, with the First Session beginning on December 1, 1873•

Represen

tatives to the Forty-Third House were the first to he chosen under the
reapportionment based on the 1870 census, which increased the number
of Representatives from 2k3 to 293*

As a reflection of the westward

shift of the center of population, the Midwestern states gained the
most new seats.

The number of Southern seats increased from fifty to

sixty-three, but the proportion of the seats belonging to the ten
Southern states increased only slightly from 20.5 percent to 21.5
percent. 1

The elections of 1872 also changed the political composition

of the House in that the Liberal Republican-Democratic debacle enabled
the Republicans to regain a two-thirds majority. 2

Southern Democrats

XFor the increase in representation by states, see Biographical
Directory. k7. Alabama, Georgia, and Texas were each granted two
additional seats. Each of the other seven Southern states gained one
seat.
2At the beginning of the First Session, Republicans occupied 203
seats and the Democrats held 88 , with two vacancies; see George B.
Galloway, History of the House of Representatives (New York: Thomas
Y. Crowell Company, 1961), 296. The Congressional Record indicates
that the House seated 307 Representatives (208 Republicans and 99
Democrats) during the Forty-Third Congress. Figured either way, the
Republicans had slightly over a two-thirds majority, but that majority
was not as cohesive as it once was. The Republicans had always been
divided on economic questions and party unity on the issues of political
reconstruction steadily declined during the period. See John Kent
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fared better than did Democrats frcsn other sections, hut proportionally
Southern Republicans still gained seats.

Over the course of the two

sessions, the House seated twenty-nine Democrats and thirty-nine
Republicans from the South.
The twenty-nine Democrats included same familiar and famous names.
The solitary white district in Mississippi, for example, chose Lucius
q.

c . Lamar as its Representative— just as the former slave John Roy

lynch, himself a member of the Forty-Third House, had planned when
he redrew the state's congressional district lines.

Lamar, a veteran

of the antebellum House, a prominent secessionist, and a Confederate
diplomat, was thus launched on a renewed political career culminating
with his appointment to the U. S. Supreme Court.3

The seating of

Alexander H. Stephens, the former vice-president or the Confederacy,
received greater public attention.

The election of Stephens, a frail

symbol of traditional Southern leadership, was widely lauded in the
conservative Southern press.

The Atlanta Constitution, for example,

proclaimed that the occasion marked "the return of Southern statesman
ship to national activity." But the Constitution, a stronghold of
Folmar, "The Depletion of Republican Congressional Support for Enforce
ment of Reconstruction Measures: A Roll Call Analysis, 1871-1877"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968), nassium.
3por Lamar's distinguished career, see James B. Murphy, L.
C.
Lamar: Pragmatic Patriot (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University “
Press, 19731, passium. Lamar won national acclaim almost immediately
with an appeal for sectional reconciliation in his eulogy of Radical
Republican Charles Sumner of Massachusetts. For the eulogy see Cong.
Record. h2 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. h, 3^10-11, and for press reaction, see
Edward Mayer, Lucius £. C. Lamar: His Life, Times, and Speeches (2 ed.,
Nashville: Publishing House of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South,
1896 ), 188-9U.
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conservatism, nevertheless entered a suggestive caveat:
Let Mr. Stephens not forget that the times have changed—
sadly changed, perhaps— hut irrevocably changed, and that he
must be practically progressive -while adhering to the grand
old principles of constitutionalism.1*
The general amnesty and the continuing process of redemption
facilitated the return to politics of men formerly prominent in Southern
political leadership. The number of former slaveholders, secessionists,
and Confederate veterans among Southern Democrats increased sharply in
the Forty-Third House. Whether they were backward-looking 'bourbons"
or forward-looking "redeemers" or a mixture of both is subject to
debate, but the conservative Constitution1s acknowledgement of irrevo
cable change and its advice to Stephens indicated that newspaper's
preference for "practically progressive" leadership.
Seventeen scalawags, fifteen carpetbaggers, and seven blacks
represented those portions of the ten states that had, as yet, resisted
redsnption. The Republicans made gains in Alabama and Virginia, and
.retained their hold on Florida and South Carolina* But Louisiana and
Mississippi each elected their first Democrat during Reconstruction,
Democrats formed a majority in the delegations of Georgia and North
Carolina, and Texas was represented by six Democrats. The states with
large black populations tended to return carpetbaggers and blacks.
Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi sent ten of the fifteen
carpetbaggers and five of the seven blacks. Scalawags remained strong
in Alabama, Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia— all states with
^Atlanta Constitution, November 30, March 8 , 1873.
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sizable contingents of native unionists.^
The age profiles by party paralleled tbose for preceding delega
tions.

The median age was forty, over six years younger than that for

the House as a whole, but nearly 60 percent of the Democrats and 50 percent of the scalawags were over 45 years of age.

Carpetbaggers and

blacks again provided the youth with thirteen of the fifteen carpet
baggers and five of tne seven blacks under the age of thirty-five.

The

two youngest members, John Amber Smith (D-VA) and John Roy lynch (R-MS),
were barely twenty-five years of age at the time of their election to
the Forty-Third House.

At the other end of the age spectrum were sixty-

three year old Rees Tate Bowen (D-VA) and sixty-one year old Alexander
H. Stephens (D-GA).
Education levels declined somewhat from the Forty-Second Congress,
although only two Southerners, both blacks, had no formal education.
Two-thirds of the carpetbaggers, 59 percent of the Democrats, and 53 per
cent of the scalawags had attended college.

In addition, three of the

seven blacks had received same college training.
T. Rapier (AL) was by far the best educated.

Of the three, James

Rapier's father, a free-

black barber in Florence, had sent his son to Canada, where he received
private tutoring and completed his secondary education.

Rapier also did

^Six of ten states did not complete redlstrlcting in time for
elections to the Forty-Third Congress. Those states elected at-large
Representatives equal to their increase. Republicans won seven of the
nine at-large seats.
^The median age for all members was 46.54 years and 45.06 for
first termers. See Stuart A, Rice, Quantitative Methods in Politics
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297.
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scane -work at Montreal College before taking a bachelor’s degree and
doing graduate work at the University of Glasgow in Scotland.^
Sixty-nine percent of the Representatives had been born in the
South and 72 percent resided in the South prior to the war.

At least

seventeen (fourteen Democrats and three scalawags) were former slave
holders.

Of the fourteen identified as Democrats in the antebellum

period, twelve remained in the party and two became scalawags.

The

dispersion of the fourteen former Whigs is more interesting in that
eight joined the Democrats and only six became scalawags.

Only three

Representatives, all carpetbaggers, were positively identified as
having been Republicans in the late 1850* s. The known secessionists
numbered seven and those same seven men had supported Breckinridge in
the presidential election of i860.

Six of the Democrats had supported

either Bell or Douglas, and three scalawags had favored Douglas.
Seventy-six percent of the Democrats and 23 percent of the scalawags
were Confederate veterans.

The other Democrats and scalawags had sat

^Thomas J. Freeman, "The Life of James T. Rapier" (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 1959 ), k~6; Norman W.
Walton, "James T. Rapier, Congressman from Alabama," Negro History
Bulletin, XXX (November, 19^7), 6 -8 . In a much quoted passage, Horace
Mann Bond charged that Negro leadership in Alabama during Reconstruction
had no real connection "with the great masses of landless, utterly
penniless Negro ex-slaves they purported to represent." Bond cited
Rapier, who owned a "large plantation in North Alabama," as an example
of this leadership, which was "bent on achieving, within the economic
framework which favored them, the social and economic privileges which
were the dower of the white Conservativeswhom they publicly opposed."
See Bond, "Social and Economic Forces in Alabama Reconstruction,"
Journal of Negro History, XXIII (July, 1938), 296-97. Bond’s blanket
condemnation of Alabama's black leadership deserves reconsideration.
The voting behavior of the blacks (particularly Rapier) in the House
indicates that they did what they could, in the face of considerable
opposition, for their black constituents.

out the war while twelve of the fifteen, carpetbaggers had served in
the Union army.
Sixty-three percent of the Representatives were lawyers and only
23 percent were planters or farmers. Over three-quarters of the Demo
crats were lawyers, but the Republicans tended to be scattered among
other vocations. Real and personal property evaluation for forty-four
Representatives indicates that the Democrats were considerably wealthier
tnan any of the Republicans. William S. Herndon (D-TX) and Effingham
Lawrence (D-Lfl.) were worth over $100,000. Two other Democrats and three
scalawags held property valued at more than $50,000, but the scalawags
were again the poorest of any of the political factions, including the
blacks. For those whose wealth has been determined, fifteen (of
twenty-two) Democrats were worth over $10,000 while seven (of twelve)
scalawags had less than $10,000 in real and personal estate. The
information on the carpetbaggers is too incomplete to warrant compar
ison, but the five blacks for whom information is available were all
worth less than $10,000.
The general level of political experience continued to increase.
All but two of the Southerners were found to have held political office
at some level of government prior to their election. Twenty-one of the
sixty-eight had held local offices, and forty-eight had served at the
state level. Twenty-four had served in at least one previous Recon
struction House, four were members of the House prior to the war, and
three had served in the Confederate Congress.
The Southern elections to the Forty-Third House were the most
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closely contested ofthe.Reconstruction period. Twenty-six Represen
tatives won by a margin of less than 5 percent of the vote, and the
margin of victory for fifteen was under 2 percent. Thirteen of the
seventeen scalawags, who were again caught in the narrowly white or
black districts, won their seats by a margin of less than 5 percent.
By contrast, the carpetbaggers and blacks represented the safely
Republican districts. Nine of the fifteen carpetbaggers and five of
the seven blacks won with a margin of victory greater than 20 percent.
The Democrats also had relatively secure victories, for nearly 80 per
cent won by a margin of 5 percent or better. The close elections
spawned twelve formal contests of which four were successful. Two of
the successful contestants, Effingham Lawrence (D-LA) and George A.
Sheridan (R-IA), had the dubious honor of being seated on the final
day of the Forty-Third Congress.
Cross-tabulations of political affiliation with the congressional
district data for the newly created districts yielded familiar patterns.
Carpetbaggers continued to control four of six urban districts, and
Republicans fared well in heavily agricultural districts. Over SO per
cent of the Democrats came from districts that were over 55 percent
white— obviously districts in which the process of redemption met the
least resistance. All but two of the scalawags represented districts
that were 40 to 60 percent white, and two-thirds of the carpetbaggers
and aU but one black came from districts having black majorities.
Republicans still dominated the Southern congressional delegation,
but evidence of a shift was apparent. It seems probable that the
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absence of a viable Democratic presidential candidate in I872 promoted
Democratic disunity and placed Southern Democratic candidates for the
House at a disadvantage.

As a result of this situation and the fact

that they controlled the process of reapportionment in several states,
Southern Republicans gained seats in the House.

But the elections of

1872 were only a temporary setback, if even that, to the process of

redemption at the state level.

By 1874 all but four of the Southern

states were safely under Democratic control, and certain sections of
those four states had already been won by Democrats.

The process of

redemption caught up with the Republican Representatives in the
congressional elections of 1874.

The South sent forty-nine Democrats .

and only seventeen Republicans to the Forty-Fourth Congress.

In many

ways, the Forty-Third Congress was a last hurrah for Southern Repub
licans.
The Forty-Third Congress convened in the early months of what was
to be the longest depression in American history.

The depression, which

would last until early 1879, was touched off by a banking panic which
had its origins in the railroad boom of the early 1870s, a decline in
the attractiveness of railroad securities, and an overextended economy.®
®0n the Panic of 1873 and the subsequent depression, see Rendigs
Fels, American Business Cycles. 1869-1897 (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1959}* ch. 6 , especially 98-112; Irwin Unger,
The Greenback Era: A Social ana Political History of American Finance,
1865-1879 (PrincetonT Princeton University Press, 1964}, 213-33;
Samuel Rezneck, "Distress, Relief, and Discontent during the Depression
of 1873-78," Journal of Political Economy, LVTII (December, 1950),
494-513; and 0. V. Wells, "The Depression of 1873-79," Agricultural
History, XI (July, 1937)* 237-49- Walter T. K. Nugent discusses the
depression in its international context in Money and American Society,
I8 6 5 -I880 (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 175-84. Little is known
about the actual effects of the panic in the South. E. Merton Coulter
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Congress spent most of the First Session seeking a solution to the
economic orisis.

Among the proposed solutions, a number of measures

to expand the currency coupled with some form of free hanking and
general retrenchment won the most favor.

In the process, what little

party unity had existed on economic measures largely disappeared. 9
Several inflationist bills passed Congress during the session, but the
most comprehensive measure received Grant's veto.

That veto, along with

the continuing depression and the scandals of the Grant administration,
spelled disaster for the Republicans in the congressional elections of
1874.

The Democrats, standing on their own once again, secured a

majority in the House for the first time since the antebellum period.
As a result, during the lame duck session, the Republican majority
scrambled to secure several important pieces of economic legislation,
including a revision of tax and tariff schedules and a bill providing
for specie resumption.

The deliberations on economic issues were

punctuated by partisan controversy over the issues of political
suggests in passing that as the South had fewer institutions susceptible
to panics, the section suffered less than did the North, but the falling
prices for agricultural products did cause distress; see Coulter, The
South During Reconstruction, 1865-1877 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1947), 194-• For other references to the effect of
the panic, see Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 18651933 (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1960), 4-I5-46.
9F0r an exposition of the thesis that during periods of economic
distress, party lines give way to local and sectional interests, see
Hannah Grace Roach, "Sectionalism in Congress (1870 to IB90 )," American
Political Science Review, XIX (August, 1925), 500-26. From her analysis
of sixty-four roll-call votes, primarily on economic measures, Roach
concluded that in the periods of depression the agricultural sections
(the West and South) tended to unite in a bipartisan coalition in
defense of their interests. In more prosperous times, party voting
was the rule, although Roach notes, but does not emphasize, that the
two parties seldom achieved internal unity on economic questions.
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reconstruction-most notably the proposal that eventually emerged as
the Civil Rights Act of 1875.10
In a lengthy review of the currency debate during the First
Session, Charles Francis Adams, Jr., no friend of irredeemable paper
money, noted with satisfaction that President Grant had vetoed the
so-called "Inflation Bill" which Congress had passed in April 1874.
The time and rhetoric spent constructing this "legislative curiosity"
fascinated Adams: "the amount of groaning on the part of the mountain
which proceded its still b o m genius was truly portentous." He
calculated that over 125 set speeches had been given on the currency
issue and that the debate covered nearly 1700 columns in the Congres
sional Record.^- Congress did seem to do little else than try to
expand the currency during the session, and the net result certainly
was not commensurate with the effort expended.
Congressional proposals to cope with the currency question
numbered several score, but only three were of particular importance.
The first was the least complicated of the three.

Entitled "a bill to

fix the amount of legal tender notes at $1*00,000,000," the measure
10For the controversy over the civil rights b i U (H. R. 796),
see Cong. Record, 42 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 375-86, 405-30, 452-58,
787 -B7B7 9^3-&>7 977-92, 996-1012. Of the 485 roll-call votes,
approximately 30 percent related to major economic issues. Nearly
a quarter of the recorded roll calls were taken on procedural questions
relating to a sundry appropriation bill (H. R. 4729), an election bill
(H. R. 4745), and H. R. 796, the civil rights bill. The latter measure
generated an incredible string of 74 roll-call votes on January 27 ,
1875— representing the delaying tactics of civil rights opponents.
See ibid., 787-828.
^Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "The Currency Debate of 1873-74,"
North American Review, C3QX (July, 1874), 112, 120.
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proposed to resolve a dispute as to the authorized circulation of
tender notes— which were also referred to as legal tenders, United
States notes, or more popularly, greenbacks.

The wartime acts estab

lishing the greenbacks had authorized a circulation of $1*00 million.^
Starting in mid-1865 , the Secretary of the Treasury, Hugh McCulloch, an
avowed hard-money man, began to contract the volume of the greenbacks
in circulation, and in March 1866 McCulloch received congressional
sanction for his policy.

When Congress finally cut off further con

traction in early 1868, McCulloch had reduced the volume of circulating
greenbacks to a little over $356 million. ^3

The greenbacks remained at

that level until October 1873, when Secretary of the Treasury William
A. Richardson began to reissue the retired greenbacks to help ease
the effects of the depression.

By mid-January 187*1- Richardson, with

out congressional approval, had released $26 million to bring the
greenback circulation to $382 million.-*-14•^Actually $U50 million had been authorized, but fifty millions
were to be withheld from circulation to provide security for the tempo
rary loan deposits with the Treasury. The $50 million was retired in
1867 when the loans were repaid. On the origins and the amounts of the
greenbacks, see Robert P. Sharkey, Money. Class, and Party; An Economic
Study of Civil War and Reconstruction (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Press, 1959 ), 15-50; Unger, Greenback Era, l^-l£; and Robert T. Patter
son, Federal Debt -Management Policies, lSo5-1879 (Durham: Duke Univer
sity Press, 195*17, 179.
■*^The ramifications of McCullochTs contraction are extensively
treated in Sharkey, Money, Class, and Party, chs. II-III.
■^AHan Nevins has charged that the restoration of the greenbacks
to circulation was done to assist Republicans in the fall elections in
the inflationist West rather than to meet a real need for more currency.
See Nevins, Hamilton Fish: The Inner History of the Grant Administration
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1937}, 696 . Fish had no use for
paper money and liked Richardson even less. Nevins readily accepted
the biases of his subject on the currency question.
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Whether the legal ceiling on greenback circulation was $356
million to $400 million was therefore the subject of dispute during
the First Session.

James B. Beck (D-Kf), the bill's sponsor, explained

that H. R. 1068 proposed to resolve the dispute by legally establishing
the authorized greenback circulation at $400 million— thus sanctioning
Richardson's issue of $26 million and providing for the release of an
additional $18 million into circulation.*^

The proposed increase of

$18 million incited opposition among most Northeastern Representatives.
When the bill came up for final consideration on March 23, 1874, two
attempts were made to reduce the authorized circulation.

The first

called for a ceiling of $382 million— thus giving congressional sanction
to the $26 million issued by Secretary Richardson.

While the first

amendment was pending, Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) moved to amend the amend
ment to reduce the total amount of U. S. notes in circulation to $356
million which would entail calling in the $26 million issued by
Richardson.

The amendments failed by nearly identical margins.

As

Table 6-1: A indicates, the Dawes amendment received considerable sup
port in the Northeast, particularly in New England.

The Western and

Southern Representatives voted overwhelmingly to defeat the amendment.
The sides reversed positions on the motion to pass the bill (see
Table 6-1: B).

New England voted 1-22 against the bill, the Middle

Atlantic states split on the issue, and the Western and Southern states
provided most of the favorable votes.

Quite clearly, the House, led by the Western and Southern members,
•^Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 839 .

229
table : 6-1:

A and B

SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PASTY
ON H. R. 1398
A.

To amend an amendment H. R. 1398 by reducing the amount of U. S.
notes in circulation to $396 million8.
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem.

Dem,

3
19
18
Ik

_2

20
16
6
1
2
_2

2k

k7

5k

2
11
2
3
3

Grand Total
B.

Yea
Rep.

Nay
Hep
1
29
59
20
6
k

• •

» ♦

71

119
173

To pass H. R.
1398> ahill fixing theamount oflegal tender notes
at $1*00 million^
Yea
Rep.

Dem.

NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS

•a
3
18
20
13
_1

1
26
57
20
6
k

2
10
3
3
3
_2

20
18
8
1*
2
_2

55

ilk

23

5k

Total
Grand Total

169

Dem.

Nay
Rep.

Region

77

aCong. Record, lf3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2376 (March 23, 187*0.
^Ibid.
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favored an increase in the volume of circulating greenbacks as at least
a partial solution to the economic crisis— much to the chagrin of most
Northeasterners and hard money advocates.

In reference to H. R, 1398,

James A. Garfield (R-OH), for example, commented in his diary that
’’the House by this backward step has lost nearly’all we gained in the
direction of specie payments in the last seven y e a r s . I n a later
letter Garfield lamented that "We might as well address the patients
in the lunatic asylum on finance, as to hope to change the tone of the
House at present."*^
The anti-inflationists' fears that Congress would authorize a
substantial increase in the amount of paper currency in circulation
were at least temporarily confirmed.

The Senate did not consider

H. R. 1398 because it was then considering its own bill that not only
set the greenback level at $b00 million but also added $U6 million to
the national bank note circulation.

In the interim, the House turned

its attention to a bill "to amend the several acts providing a national
currency and to establish free banking, and for other purposes” (H. R.
1572).

As finally passed at the end of the session, H. R. 1572 bore

no resemblance to the measure that was first introduced.

Initially,

the main section of the bill proposed to establish free banking by
removing all restrictions on the amount of national bank notes in
l^Harry James Brown and Frederick D. Williams (eds.), The Piary of
James A. Garfield: Volume II, 1872-187^ (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1967)> 30^ (March 23, 187^}.
"^Garfield to Burke Aaron Hinsdale, March 26 , 187^> in Mary L.
Hinsdale (ed.), Garfield-Hinsdale Letters: Correspondence Between James
Abram Garfield and Burke Aaron Hinsdale~TAnn Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 19^9 ), 280.
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circulation and permitting national banks to increase their capital
and circulation as much as they 'wished. Another important section
proposed a gradual method of returning to specie payments by directing
the Secretary of the Treasury, beginning in July 1874, to replace $2
million in greenbacks every month with an equal amount of non-interest
bearing notes which would be payable in gold two years after their
issuance. Among the other provisions of the bill was one relieving
national banks from keeping a reserve on their circulation which would
have released the greenbacks then being so held.
H. E. 1572 was subjected to a lengthy debate on the House floor
during which a host of amendments and alternative proposals were
offered.

The four Virginians and one Mississippian who were allowed to

make major speeches on the bill presented divergent views but all
favored an increase in the volume of currency for their section.

James

H. Platt (R-VA), for example, spoke in favor of free banking and specie
payments if contraction could be avoided.

John T. Harris (D-VA)

criticized the Northeast for the maldistribution of national bank notes,
but he emphasized his preference for greenback expansion to bank note
expansion.

Jason Niles (R-MS) proclaimed that money was "almost a

stranger in the West and South" and indicated that he favored redistri
bution or free banking, but he did not advocate an increase in currency

volume.^
■^For the text of the bill see Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Pt. 1, 1007. See also the remarks of Charles B. FarweU (R-IL), a
member of the Committee on Banking and Currency, ibid., Pt. 3, 2508.
^Ibid., Pt. 3, 3871-7^ (Platt), 2739-^2 (Harris); Pt. 6, Appendix,
180-82 (Niles).
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Debate on the hill opened on March 26, 187^, and continued almost
unabated until the first votes were taken on pending amendments on
April 10.

The hill appeared to offer something to all interests, hut

the amendments which were offered indicated that no one was fully
satisfied with the measure.

The first feature to he eliminated was

the section proposing a gradual method of specie resumption.

Primary

opposition to the clause came from soft money advocates, especially
the greenbackers, hut the immediate resumption!sts from the Northeast
also opposed it— although they were willing to take what they could,
get.

Southerners were clearly split on the question (see Tahle 6-2: A).

Most Southern Republicans and a large portion of the Democrats favored
eliminating the resumption clause, hut nearly a third of the Southerners
voted for it.
On the other hand, Southerners consistently voted against amend
ments designed to counteract the inflationary effect of the hill and
in favor of those Intended to expand the circulating medium.

Anti-

greenbackers, for example, attempted to amend the free hanking proposal
in H. R. 1572 to provide that as national hank notes were issued in excess
of the $35*J- million then authorized, an equal amount of greenbacks would
he retired until the outstanding greenbacks were reduced to $300 million.
Southerners opposed the amendment (6 -lfO), as did Midwesterners (12-69),
hut New England supported it (23-0) and the Middle Atlantic states
split on the issue (30-2 9 ).^ 0
20por the text of the amendment and the division thereon, see
ibid., Pt. 3, 3002. A similar amendment later proposed that as the
hank note circulation exceeded $400 million, greenbacks would he retired
at the same rate until the $300 million level was reached. This amend
ment was also defeated. See ibid., Pt. h, 3073.

TABLE 6-2: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AND PARTY
ON H. R. 1572
To amend H. R. 1572 By eliminating the section providing for a
gradual resumption of specie paymentsa
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Don.

Yea
Rep.

Dem.

Nay
Rep.

*.
1
19
16
13
-A

1
21
53
17
6
_1

2
9
2
5
3

22
25
10
13
3

50

103

2k

75

Grand Total

153

99

0 amend H. R. 1572 by providing for a limit of $*(00
U. S. notes and making the U. S. notes convertible
percent "bonds®

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Yea
Dem.
Rep.
1
16
15
9
-2
*(3

Dem.

Nay
Rep.

2
20
27
20
5

2
11
3
5
7
J2

21
25
3**
9
*+
_2

79

30

$k

122

12k

aCong. Record, U3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3005 (Apri
forbid., 3U07 (April 10, 187*0-

3.65

A more interesting and controversial amendment proposed the
creation of a new type of bonds which would be exchangeable or "inter
convertible” with greenbacks.

The idea had long been advocated by-

soft money interests and by greeribaeker Benjamin Butler (R-MA). The
essence of the proposition, as offered by William D. Kelly (R-PA),
was that the greenback circulation be limited to $i*00 million and that
greenbacks, at the discretion of the holder, be interconvertible with
U. S. bonds bearing 3.65 percent interest.

These bonds, principal and

interest, would, in turn, be redeemable in greenbacks at any time.

The

bill instructed the Secretary of the Treasury to prepare the 3.65 per
cent bonds and to provide greenbacks in the amount of $50 million to
be used as a redemption fund for the bonds.

The bill also allowed

national banks to hold the 3*65 bonds instead of greenbacks to meet
their reserve requirement.

21

The initial effect of the proposal would

be to produce a significant expansion of greenback circulation, but
advocates of the interconvertible bond claimed, with much justification,
that the scheme would provide a needed elasticity to the circulating
medium and that it would assist in controlling interest rates.^
Kelly's amendment came within two votes of passage (see Table 6-2: B ). ^
It received substantial support in all areas outside New England, but
^For the text of the proposal, see ibid., Pt. 3, 3005. The green
backs exchanged for the bonds were to be applied to the purchase or
redemption of any other outstanding U. S. bonds or to purchase gold to
do the same.
no
For the origins and the sources of Northern support of the inter
convertible bond idea, see Unger, Greenback Era, 99-119; and Sharkey,
Money. Class, and Party. 187-206.

23jhe vote totals in Table 6-2: B include paired and announced
votes. The recorded vote was 120-122 instead of 122-124 as indicated
in the table.

the margin of support in the South was greater than that in any other
region.
With the excerption of the elimination of specie resumption, H. R.
1572 survived the amending process intact and was passed by the House.
As adopted, the measure was essentially a free banking bill, although
it did release most of the greenback reserves formerly held against
the bank note circulation and it set the maximum, greenback circulation
at $1*00 million.*^

The opposition to the bill in New England and the

Middle Atlantic states stemmed from its inflationary character and the
fact that the resumption clause had been eliminated.

In the light of

their behavior during the amending process, the Democrats' 15-63 vote
against final passage is more difficult to explain, but it seems
probable that most Democrats disliked enhancing the national banking
system and its currency (see Table 6-3).

Southern Democrats were

obviously less particular than other Democrats about what kind of
currency should be expanded.

Nearly half of them joined Southern

and Midwestern Republicans and a sizable group of Republicans from the
Middle Atlantic states to pass the bill on April 11*, 1873.
On the same day, the House took up and passed a third currency
measure— the so-called ’’Inflation Bill" (S. 617 ).

This measure

represented the work of inflationists in the upper house.

like H. R.

1398, which had earlier passed the House, S. 617 expanded the green
back circulation from the $382 million then in circulation to $1*00
2lfFor the text of the bill as approved, see Cong. Record, 1*1 Cong.
1 Sess., Pt. 3, 3022-23.

ZABLE 6-3
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY
TO PASS H. R. 1572®

Region

Dem.

NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS

Yea
Rep.
1
23
55
29
8

• •
• *

5
9
1
» <

Total

—

1

121

15

Grand. Total

Dem.

Rep

2
15
16
11
15
Jt

22
25
9
3
2
_2

63

63

136

126

®Cong. Record., 43 Cong., 1 Sesa., Pt. 4, 3073 (April 14, 1874),

TABLE 6-4
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS
THE INFLATION BILL (S. 6l7)a

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

Dem.

Rep

13
12
U
_1

1
36
56
27
8
-1

2
15
8
8
6
_2

23
30
9
4
2
_2

37

113

41

70

••
••

150

HI

aCong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3078 (April 14, 1874).
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million, but it also added $1(6 million to the volume of national bank
notes, raising that circulation to $1(00 million.

The additional $1(6

million was to go to banks in states having less than their quota of
such c u r r e n c y . The vote on S. 617 in the House was similar to that
on H. B. 1572 with the exception that the Midwestern and Southern
Republicans were now joined by a greater number of Democrats from the
same sections to pass the bill over the strong objections of Repre
sentatives from the Northeast (see Table 6 -l().
As the first currency bill to be passed by both Houses, the
"Inflation Bill," as it was dubbed by its opponents, quickly became the
center of considerable controversy.

Soft money advocates were con

fident that Grant, who seemed aware of the powerful expansionist
sentiment in his party, would sign the bill since he had earlier
approved Richardson's release of the $26 million in greenbacks.

Grant,

however, was also tinder intense pressure from businessmen, bankers,
reformers, resumptlonists, and hard money advocates who were opposed to
the bill, and he surprised everyone by assenting to their wishes and
vetoing it on April 22 . ^

In his veto message, the President reviewed

his own statements and those made in the Public Credit Act of I869
promising an early return to specie payments and declared that the
$44 million in greenbacks should be held as a reserve.

He added that

2 5fhe text of S. 617 is in ibid., 3077.
p/I

For Northern sentiment for and against the bill, see Unger,
Greenback Era, 220-33* 235-45. See also Nevins, Hamilton Fish,
706-14.
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'when the additional bank note circulation created by the act of 1870
was redistributed or taken up, and that "when specie payments are
fully restored, or are in rapid process of restoration, [then] will
be the time to consider the question of ’more currency’."27 Softmoney men and inflationists denounced the veto, but a motion to over
ride failed in the Senate and the bill died.2®
The final chance at passing currency legislation during the First
Session lay in H. R. 1572, the free banking proposal, which the Senate
next took under consideration. But with the threat of another veto
hanging over their heads, inflationists in both houses were forced to
compromise. The end result, after its consideration by two conference
committees, was a bill bearing no resemblance to the original H. R.
1572.2^ Samuel S, Cox (D-NY) referred to the bill as "broth or
froth" and declared that it was "poor, pitiful, impotent, unprincipled
patch-work."30 cox, a hard-money Democrat, opposed the modest inflation
provided by the bill and lamented the lack of a resumption clause.
House inflationists, on the other hand, felt that it did nothing to
alter the currency volume significantly. The proposal set the level
of greenbacks at $382 million, thus sanctioning Richardson's release
27James D. Richardson (comp.), A Compilation of the Messages and
Papers of the Presidents, 1784-1897 (10 vols., Washington: Government
PrintJug Office, 1897), VII, 265^1.
2®Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3271, 3436. For public
and congressional reaction to Grant’s veto, see Unger, Greenback Era,
243-45, 249-50.
2?For the evolution of the bill see Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Pt. 5> 4347-49, 4958-61; Pt. 6, 5310-16; and George LaVerne Anderson, "Hie
National Banking System, 1865-1875: A Sectional Institution" (unpublish
ed Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois, 1933), 321-24, 365-66 ).
3°Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5315.

of $26 million; those greenbacks held as a reserve requirement for
hank note circulation were to he released; and the West and the South
were to receive an immediate redistribution of $55 million in national
hank currency.

H. R. 1572 clearly satisfied no one, and for differing

and often opposing reasons, most Representatives agreed that it did
not resolve the currency

q u e s t i o n . 32

still the hill passed the House

by a margin of 221-1*0. Of the fifty-four Southerners voting on the b i H
only four Democrats opposed its

passage.
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The reaction of Representatives to the currency issue in the
First Session is summed up hy a scalngram (see Tables 6-5: A and 6-5: B)
Southerners, Democrats and Republicans alike, scaled in the strongest
inflationist positions (scale positions 5 and 6). 3^ Representatives
from the Midwestern and border states also strongly supported inflation
ary measures as did a sizable number of Republicans from the Middle
3XEtor the text of the bill, see ibid., 5310-11.
32por a sampling of House opinion on the hill, see the remarks of
Horace Maynard (R-TN), Henry L. Dawes (R-ME), Joseph R. Hawley (R-CT),
Eugene Hale (R-ME), William D. Kelly (R-PA), Samuel J. Randall (D-PA),
William S. Holman (D-IN), Samuel S. Marshall (D-Ui), and Samuel S. Cox
(D-NY), ibid., 5311-16. No Southerner spoke on the measure.
33®xe vote on the bill is in ibid., 5316.
3^Che five Southerners opposing the inflationary measures (scale
positions 0 and l) were Bromberg (D-AL), Herndon (D-TX), Hancock (D-TX),
Niles (R-MS), and Platt (R-VA). Apparently all five were simply hard
money men. Nothing in their backgrounds suggest any other reason for
their opposition to currency expansion— with the possible exception that
Herndon and Hancock were both extremely wealthy and established individ
uals. Of the five only Niles and Platt participated in the debate.
Niles favored redistribution or free banking as long as expansion was
limited and he favored specie resumption. Platt also favored specie
payments and free banking and was not a contractionist, but he also
disliked any further issue of irredeemable paper. See above, foot
note 19 .

TABLE 6-5: A
CURRENCY SCALOGRAM:
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS

Scale
Position

NE
D

0

2

D

R

•

• •
9

6

b

•

* «

2

22

8

12

lit
¥t

15

*t7

20

66

22

27

7

9

1
10

10

15

9 9

6
18

10

• •

• *

8
19

3

• •

1

2

7

• *

1
2

2lt
2

« •

It

3

11

• «

1
Total

It

9

7

• •

* •

2

23

1
« *

• ■

m m

2

5

• •

5

3

* *

• •

16

9

■ •

9

2

3

•

1
•

2

• •

5

• •

U

3

Total
D
R

1

2

2C
• •

« •

1

• *

1

lb

R

3
• •

• •

6

3

PS
D

2

2a

1

1

REGION AND PARTY
BS
ss
R
D
R
D

• •

5

• •

R

1

k

• *

1
3

D

10

8
2

R

6
12

1

MW

MA

3*t
5

It

Coefficient of Reproducibility = .961

^^Hancock (TX).

aBromberg (AL), Herndon (TX).

cNiles (MS), Platt (VA)

7

78

90
179

241
TABLE 6-5: B
ITEMS IN THE CURRENCY SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position

Identification

0
1

To agree to the second conference report on H. R. 1572.
221-40; + » YEA. Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6,
5316 (July 20, 187*0.

2

To amend H. R. 1398 "by reducing the amount of U. S. notes in
circulation to $356 million. 70-171; + = M Y . Ibid.,
Pt- 3, 2376 (March 23, 1874).
To amend H.* R. 1398 "by providing that the total amount of
U. S. notes in circulation shall never exceed $382
million. 74-173; + = KAY. Ibid.
To amend H. R. 1572 hy providing that after July 4, 1876
only gold and silver U. S. coins shall he legal tender
for the payment of debts thereafter contracted. 70-171;
+ = M Y . Ibid., Pt. 4, 3072 (April 4, 1874).

3

To pass H. R. 1398j a bill fixing the amount of legal tender
notes at $400 million. 169-77; + “ YEA. Ibid., Pt. 3>
2377 (March 23 , 1874).
To amend H. R. 1572 by providing that as national bank notes
are issued in excess of the present limit of $354 million,
a corresponding amount of legal tender notes shall be
canceled until the outstanding legal tender notes are
reduced to $300 million. 79-160; + = NAY. Ibid., 3002
(April 10, 1874).

4

To suspend the rules and consider a resolution instructing
the Banking and Currency committee to prepare and report
a bill increasing the circulating medium of the country.
135 -98 ; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 1, 767 (January 19, 1874).

5

To pass S. 617, a bill fixing the amount of U. S. notes at
$400 million and increasing the amount of national bank
notes by $44 million. 140-102; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 4,
3078 (April 14, 1874).

6

To amend H. R. 1572 by providing for a limit of $400 million
in U. S. notes and making the U. S. notes interconvertible
with 3.6 5 percent bonds. 120-122; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 3,
3007 (April 10, 1874).
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Atlantic states.

The "balance of Republicans from the Middle Atlantic

states joined that region's Democrats and New Englanders in opposition
to inflationary measures.

Quite clearly, the Southerners were an

Important element of the coalition favoring an increase in the volume
of the currency during the First

Session. 35

Grant's veto of the inflation hill was one of the factors con
tributing to the disastrous performance of his party in the congres
sional elections of 1874.

The evidence strongly indicates that most

Republican congressional leaders were determined to avoid the divisive
currency issue in the lame duck Second Session.

But the issue refused

to lie dormant, and Irwin Unger has argued convincingly that the party
leadership decided to "hammer out" a compromise measure which would
reunite the congressional Republicans in preparation for the elections
of 1876.

The result, referred to as the resumption bill, was quietly-

conceived in the Senatorial caucus committee under the leadership of
John Sherman. ^
3?ln what is probably the best secondary discussion of the currency
issue in the First Session, Irwin Unger repeatedly attributes the strong
est inflation sentiment to a coalition of Midwestern and Pennsylvania
Republicans. The contributions of the Southern Democrats to the coali
tion are rarely mentioned, and the Southern Republicans are ignored.
As the above discussion indicates, the Southern Republicans were a
crucial part of the House coalition voting in favor of inflationary
measures. They were not purist greenbackers as were many of the Mid
western Republicans and Democrats in that they also supported redistri
bution and increases in the bank note circulation, but they consistently
contributed twenty to twenty-five votes in support of any inflationary
measure. The thirty-five to forty Southern votes were far more critical
to the passage of inflationary measures than were the fifteen to twenty
votes offered by the Middle Atlantic states. See Unger, Greenback Era,
ch. VII, particularly 219-20, 233-35 .
36ibid., 249-56

2*4-3
As it passed the Senate in December l87*f-, the resumption bill
(S. 10***0 contained several significant provisions.

The first authorized

the Secretary of the Treasury to have minted subsidiary silver coins
of the denominations of ten, twenty-five, and fifty cents to replace
the fractional paper currency then in circulation.

The withdrawal

from circulation of the fractional greenbacks would be a first step
toward full resumption.

The clause attracted little attention at the

time, but a year later a congressional controversy over the release
of the stockpiled silver coins triggered a twenty-year debate over the
place of silver in the nation's monetary system.37
The resumption bill also established free banking by eliminating
restrictions on bank note circulation, but at the same time provided for
the contraction of greenback circulation.

The measure provided for

greenback redemption equal to 80 percent of the new bank notes issued
until the volume of greenbacks in circulation was reduced to a maximum
of $300 million.

Free banking was coupled with a proposal for specie

resumption which authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to stockpile
gold by direct purchase and bond sales as authorized by the Refunding
Act of 1B70.

This gold reserve would then be used to purchase green

backs presented for redemption on or after January 1, 1879.

On that

day, the irredeemable legal tenders would finally become redeemable
38
in gold.
“"The origins and ramifications of the silver clause in the re
sumption bill is the subject of intense analysis in Allen Weinstein,
Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue, 1B67"1878 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), ch. 2.
3^The bill also repealed the mint charge for converting gold
bullion into coin. The text of the bill is in Cong. Record,
Cong.,
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Diehard greeribackers and immediate resumptionists, the extremes
of the currency spectrum, were not pleased with the measure for obvious
reasons.

But the Midwestern and Southern Republicans, the core of the

inflationist movement in the First Session, were apparently satisfied
with the free hanking provisions of the hill, even though the green
back circulation would he contracted.

The hill did restore Republican

unity on the currency question— as it was designed to do.

Republican

managers of the bill in the House successfully prohibited debate, and
the measure passed by a margin of 138-99 on January 7 , 1875 (see Table
6 -6 ). A H seventy-seven Democrats voting on the issue opposed it. 39

They were joined by twenty-two Republicans, mostly immediate resump
tionists, and a few dedicated greeribackers like Kelly of Pennsylvania.
The Resumption Act of 1675> as a consequence of its eventual
success, has been viewed as a hard-money measure.

But Unger1s

argument that its function was to restore Republican party unity is
quite convincing.

The act was actually more generous to soft-money

2 Sess., Ft. 1, 316. See also: Unger, Greenback Era. 25^; Weinstein,
Prelude to Populism. 39-**0; Anderson, "The National Banking System,"
367-68; and Patterson, "Federal Debt-Management Policies," 189-90 .
Senator John Sherman details his role in drafting the resumption bill in
Recollections of Forty Years in the House Senate and Cabinet: An Auto
biography t2 vols.. Chicago: The Werner Company, 1895), I, ch. XXV.

39uhger records two House Democrats as voting for the measure,
Walter T. K. Nugent found one, and Allen Weinstein concluded that the
bill prompted a strict party vote. See Unger, Greenback Era, 259;
Nugent, Money and American Society, 227; and Allen Weinstein, Prelude
to Populism, lfl. The ICFR data, which used the Biographical Directory
as the source for political affiliation, lists one Democrat for the
measure, but one Southern Republican, Hynes (AR), is miscoded as a
Democrat in the data set. Re-corrected figures including paired and
announced votes in Table 6 -6 indicate that the Democrats were solidly
united against the bill.

TABLE 6-6
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS
THE RESUMPTION BILL (S. 10^)a
Yea

Region

Rep.

Bern.

il.

13
1*2
53
20
6
_Jt

1
11
21
26
16
_2

9
5
2
2
2
_2

138

77

22

NE
MA
MW
ss

BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Nay-

Bern.

138

Rep.

99

aCong. Record, 1*3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 1, 319 (January 7, 1875)
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interests than to resunrptlonists as it promised immediate free hanking
while the vague specie resumption clause was at best problematical.
Unger's interpretation is supported by the opposition of the immediate
resumptionists to the measure in both Houses and by the fact that it
won ready support among Southern and Western Republicans.

He concludes

that "to most moderate Republicans, its long-run results were irrelevant;
it was sufficient that it promised momentary party peace.I,lf0 As Speaker
James G. Blaine noted, the Democrats had nothing to lose by opposing
the resumption bill in the House.

If the resumption scheme failed, the

Democrats could blame the Republicans, if it suceeded, the Republicans
could be held responsible for not restoring specie payments sooner.
Blaine also found it significant that Democrats did not delay passage
1*1
of the resumption bill as they could have done.
As it turned out,
the proposal worked and specie payments were resumed without difficulty
on January 1, 1879*

In the interim, the Democrats picked at the

Resumption Act, but inflationists were already turning their attention
to a new cure-all for the nation's monetary problems--free~s±lver;f
Of all the economic questions considered by Congress during Recon
struction, the currency problem was probably the most important to the
South.

Southern attitudes on the currency issue were a function of time

and circumstances, as they were in other sections.

The central problem

for the South was a paucity of stable circulating medium, whether specie,
national bank notes, or greenbacks.

The currency shortage was particu-

*%nger, Greenback Era, 250-63.
1*1

James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress; From Tdnnoin to
Garfield (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1886), II, 569.
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larly sharp in the immediate postwar period and during the depression
following the Panic of 1873*

Very little specie circulated anywhere

in the South, with the occasional exception of New Orleans, and the
South had never received its quota of national hank currency.

The

ten percent tax placed on the note issues of state banks contributed
further to the shortage.

Certain sections of the South were therefore

forced to rely on unauthorized issues of state and local scrip— at
best an unstable and dangerous form of currency.

The South did acquire

some currency by an influx of Northern greenbacks and bank notes in
return for Southern* agricultural products, but the flow was slowed
periodically by poor crops and the necessity of buying in Northern
markets.

Still George La Verne Anderson has found evidence of a drain

of currency from the North and considerable hoarding in the South in
the immediate postwar period— a drain that may have helped awaken
Northerners to the inadequacy of the currency supply.

42

The Panic of IB73 accentuated the South's currency problems in
that it hit when a ready supply of cash was needed for crop movement.
The panic had forced Northern banks to call in their obligations thus
forcing Southern banks in turn to pay their obligations to New York
banks in currency.

The influential New Orleans Price

Current observed

^2Anderson, "The National Banking System," 159 -69 . See also:
Anderson, "The South and the Problem of Post-Civil War Finance," Journal,
of Southern History. IX (May, 1943), 183-216; Airoistead C. Gordon, "The
Effects of Currency Legislation," in The South in the
of the
Nation (12 vols., Bichmond: The Southern Historical Society, I909 ), VI.
415-18; Gordon, "Currency Problems in their Relation to Southern Economic
Development," ibid., 418-20; and Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in
the South (Los Angeles: University of California Press, I9S0 ), 9-13,

'44-4?H
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that New Orleans had "been
victimized for the "benefit of the North and the West, especially
of New York, and while our hanks were never in sounder condition,
or had seldom, or perhaps never held, so little paper that was
not unquestionably good, they were compelled to discontinue pay
ments in currency and resort instead to certified chec k s . 3

The Price Current warned Northeastern bankers and financiers that they
would find it to their interest "to place no obstacle in the way of our

obtaining our legitimate supply of currency," but the newspaper was not
inflationist. The editor blamed the currency shortage on administrative
mismanagement and "speculators" and he regretted "to see indications that
a determined effort will be made in [the Forty-Third] Congress to inflate
the currency."1^ The conservative Price Current favored resumption
of specie payments as soon as possible:

'Ve pay all the rest of the

world in ^old, or its equivalent. Why can't we settle accounts among
ourselves on the same basis?

Other Southern newspapers ranged from the position typified by
the Price Current across the spectrum to soft-money inflationists.
Within the confines of

New Orleans alone, the newspapers offered a

wide range of opinion.

In 1369 the Daily Picayune sided with the

Price

Current and indicated its willingness to contract the currency

in order to achieve specie payments.

The effects of the panic, however,

cooled the Picayune's resumptionist ardor.

By April 1874, it was

^%ew Orleans Price Current» September 27, 1373; October 4, 1373.
^ Tbid., October

18, 1873;

January 8, 2373; December 8,1873.

^Ibid., February 1, 1873; January 23, 1873.
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declaring that Congress had wisely postponed specie payments.^

Still

the Picayune was not expanionist on the money question and its editor
constantly belittled parties seeking to inflate the currency.

The New

Orleans Bee and the city's Republican were more receptive to expanionist
sentiment, and the two papers conducted a small war on the currency
issue with the Picayune which the Bee referred to as the ’’Organ of
the Bondholders."^
The Republican was particularly critical of the Picayune’s oppo
sition to the inflation bill (S. 617) and charged that the paper was
going against the interests of the South and West:
It is not a fair representation of the wishes or interests of
Louisiana that the reasonable increase of circulating medium
should be censured. We repeat that Wall Street and State Street
have one interest, the planters and laborers in cotton and sugar
another and an opposite Interest.^®
The Republican reminded the Picayune that among those voting for the
bill were Southern Democrats who "preferred the property of their
constituents, white and colored, to that of the bloated foreign bond
holders and [who] sympathized with the planter and wished to relieve
his dependence upon the factor and country note shaver. "^9 The
Republican's editor claimed that it was "well known that our planters,
laborers, merchants, and bankers deplore the insufficiency of
circulating capital," and he could not understand "how any journal in
^ e w Orleans Daily Picayune, January 21, I869 J April 2, I87U.

187^.

^New Orleans Bee as quoted in the New Orleans Republican, April 8,
US
New Orleans Republican, April k , 187^.
^Ibid., April 5, I87U.
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the Southwest should, take the Wall Street stand in this controversy. "5°
The editor felt that specie payments would ccme of their own accord:
As the government "becomes more and more able to collect its
revenues in currency, the currency will approximate specie par.
This will satisfy our people who are hy no means clamorous for
specie payments.^1
Other Southern newspapers shared the Republican* s views on
currency expansion.

During the House debate on the inflation bill,

Christopher Y. Thomas (R-VA), under questioning by a Democratic
colleague, admitted that most, if not all, Virginia newspapers favored
an expanded currency supply.^2 But at least one Virginia journal
opposed the movement to inflate the currency.

The Southern Workman

(Hampton) declared that Grant Ts veto of the inflation bill
has, for the time at least, averted the threatened national
dishonor, and while it has alienated many who have been prom
inent members of the republican party it has rallied to his
support the ablest financiers and statesmen of all parties, and
strengthened the credit of the government at home and abroad.53
The Richmond Whig had long cautioned against the immediate resump
tion of specie payments, particularly if currency contraction was in
volved.

The Whig also confessed, long before the panic, that there might

be same merit in the interconvertible bond scheme when it was proposed by
Ben Butler in UB69*

The newspaper disliked the idea of more irredeemable

paper, but it noted that "the scheme is backed by a logic most potent
5°Xbid., April 10, lfl7^*
53lbid., February k, 1B7^.
^^Cong. Record, 1+3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 3> 39^1.
53rhe Southern Workman, May, 187*+.
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of all in a land of universal suffrage— numbers."5^ When It was
suggested that the interconvertible bond might help resolve the
currency shortage during the fall of 1873, the New Orleans Price
Current, as might be anticipated, declared that the 3.65 percent bonds
were the "panacea of the charlatan.

But other conservative news

papers, particularly those in the interior, were surprisingly recep
tive to the interconvertible bonds, whose chief promoters were the
Radical Republican greeribackers, Butler and Kelly.

The Atlanta Con

stitution, for example, announced that the interconvertible bonds
would offer a badly needed elastic currency

supply.

56

That the Constitution, long a bastion of financial conservatism,
should endorse the interconvertible bond indicates the impact of the
Panic of 1873 in the South and the growing Importance of the Southern
Grange.

57

By late 1873, the Constitution believed that the economic

crisis could be remedied by "an increase in the currency from time to
time to meet the wants of our rapidly growing country, taking care
that the increase is not so great as to produce overtrading and
5t*RicIroona Whig, January 23, 1869.
16; December 23, 31, 1369.

See also:

ibid., January 15,

55?few Orleans Brice Current, November 11, 1873.
•^Atlanta Constitution, November 2, 1873.

57
'The Constitution had tried to remain optimistic during and after
the September panic but by November, it was obvious that Atlanta was
suffering from a lack of currency to move the cotton crop and that
Georgians, like people elsewhere, were hoarding money. The editor was
not sure who was to blame for the depression, but he soon turned on
the most convenient scapegoat— the Radical Republican administration
and the Northeastern financiers and speculators. See, for example,
Atlanta Constitution, September 21, October 5, 26, November 2, 30,
1873.
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speculation.11 The Atlanta paper felt that such a policy would eventu
ally bring the nation to the "greatly desired" objective of specie
rQ
payments.
The Constitution was prepared to accept expansion in any
form; the newspaper even retreated from its sharp criticism of the
national banking system and indicated its willingness to accept bank
note expansion.

The newspaper accordingly supported the free banking

bill and the inflation bill and traded sharp words with the New York
World on the issue:
We know very well that New England and New York are interested
in preserving the national dependence on that locality as the
money stronghold of the country. It is to break that dependence
that the South and West are now striving, and to achieve which
they have united. 59
The Constitution did not, however, go so far as to give credit to
Southern Republicans who were a crucial element in the Southern and
Western coalition against the Northeast.
Grant* s veto of the inflation bill gave Southern soft-money advo
cates another reason to denounce the administration.

Hie Constitution.

which had earlier predicted defeat for the Republican majority if they
failed to expand the currency, was now fully convinced that Grant had
fid
been bought by Northeastern financial interests.0
The veto was

particularly harmful to Republican newspapers which had activelypromoted the currency needs of the South.

The New Orleans Republican.

for example, had continually criticized Boston and New York bankers
58Ibid., October 26, 1B73.
59ibld., April 1, 1874.
8oIbid., June 11, December

1874.
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and financiers for fighting currency expansion and urging Grant to
veto the inflation bill.^l The veto was hut another nail in the
coffin of Southern Republicanism.
The views expressed by Southern newspapers indicate that little
sectional unity existed on the currency issue.

The newspapers surveyed

generally agreed that the South suffered from a dearth of currency,
and most favored expansion, hut at the same time they preferred the
initiation of seme plan for specie resumption.

Southern Representatives,

particularly the Republicans, appear to have been responsive to the .
section's needs.

Southern Republicans were more inflationist than

their Democratic colleagues during the First Session in that they were
more willing to
bank notes.

accept expansion in any form— including national

The Republicans also supported proposals for specie

resumption (which should have pleased the hard-money elements in the
South) and in voting for the Resumption Act of 1875* they secured the
benefits of free hanking for their section.

But despite the economic

crisis, the creditable record of the Southern Republicans on the
currency questionwas not as important to the section's conservative
press as was their record on the political issues of Reconstruction.
Economic issues remained secondary to the pending civil rights hill
and other efforts to resolve the "Southern problem."^2
6lNew Orleans Republican, April U , 12, 18, 187^. See in partic
ular the Republican'3 critique of the New York Herald's position on the
issue, ibid., April 23, 187^.
^2Xouisiana newspapers, for example, were more concerned about
the turbulent state politics which were only temporarily quieted by the
Wheeler Compromise; Arkansas was still t o m by the so-called '^BrooksBaxter War;11 187^ was the year of redemption for Alabama and Arkansas;
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The currency controversy overshadowed all other economic issues
during the Forty-Third Congress, but as the depression diminished
government revenues, the subject of increasing taxes and tariff duties
inevitably entered the discussion.

Early in the First Session William

S. Holman (D-IN), in his continuing role as the spokesman for the
forces of retrenchment, offered a resolution calling for a reduction
in appropriations and "severe economy in the public expenditures" to
avoid an increase in taxation.

The House readily approved the

resolution by a margin of 222-3.^3 House Democrats, particularly
Northern Democrats, continued to press retrenchment as a solution to
the crisis.

Republicans, on the other hand, preferred to adjust exist

ing levels of taxation and tariff duties rather than to reduce
appropriations drastically.
The determination of the Republican majority to augment govern
ment revenues rather than to retrench precipitated a partisan struggle
over internal tax rates and tariff duties.

If any taxes were to be

increased, Southerners and Westerners made it quite clear that they
preferred to re-establish the income tax.

In May lB7k, Greeriburg L.

and conservatives across the South were obsessed with the pending
civil rights legislation.
6^Cong. Record. k3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 591-92. Two of the
three Representatives voting against the resolution were Southerners
and twenty-one Southerners abstained. The large number of Southerners
not voting on the issue suggests that some may have been unwilling
to go on record as favoring the resolution as it was contrary to
their campaign for federal aid to internal improvements in the
South.
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Port (R-IL) offered a resolution providing
That if it should he found necessary to increase taxation for
any purpose, such increase should commence by taxing persons
and corporations upon their annual incomes, dividends, and
salaries.°4
Southerners favored the resolution 36-4, and the Midwesterners, 64-U.
The Hew England and Middle Atlantic states opposed it 15-42.

The

resolution, which entailed suspension of the rules, passed 137-64,
but with conservative Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) presiding over the
Committee on Ways and Means, the chances of reinstituting the income
tax were nil.^5
After lengthy deliberation, the Forty-Third Congress passed two
measures to increase tax and tariff revenues.

Southern Republicans

generally favored both measures while their Democratic counterparts
opposed them.

But when specific Southern interests were involved in

either bill, the Southerners united to vote for What they conceived
to be good for their section.

They voted 40-1, for example, to

amend the first revenue bill (H. R. 3572) to cut back duties on
tobacco exports.

66

During the Second Session, Southerners again

united in an unsuccessful effort to suspend the rules and pass a bill
(H. R. 4544) providing for retail sales of leaf tobacco.

The vote on

64jbid., pt. 4, 3774.
6gIbid.
^Ibid., Pt. 5» 4434. For the text of H. R. 3572 as first passed
by the House on the first of June 1874 and the vote thereon, see ibid.,
4432-33. Republicans favored the measure 149-6. The Democratic vote
was 31-43. Southern Democrats split on the measure 11-11. After two
conference committees, the House finally approved the measure on
January 21, 1875 by a largely partisan vote. See ibid., 43 Cong.,
2 Sess., Pt. 1, 644.
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this particular measure again indicates the -willingness of Southern
Republicans to desert their party on proposals directly affecting the
Southern economy (see Table 6-7).^

This defection is even more

notable given the fact that the vote came -when partisanship was running
high over the civil rights bill.
Partisan feeling increased during the consideration and passage
of the second tax and tariff bill (H. R. 4680) in February 1875.

Anti

protectionists were noticeably upset because the bill repealed the 10
percent reduction in protective duties made in 1872, but the debate
centered more on the bill's provisions elevating duties on sugar and
revenue taxes on tobacco and whiskey.

Republicans justified the

increases as necessary to replenish declining revenues and labeled the
measure "an act to further protect the sinking fund and to provide for
the exigencies of government."^

Republican leaders produced figures

documenting the continuing decline in revenue receipts, but Democrats
charged that the bill was simply a means of reimposing protective
duties and raising taxes.
Scholars have tended to agree with the Democrats.

Professor

F. W. Taussig, for example, concluded that "there can be little doubt
that the need for providing for the sinking fund was used merely as an
^The text of the bill is in Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Pt. 2, 885.
^See the text of the bill in ibid., Pt. 2, Ul4, and introductory
remarks on the bill by Ways and Means Chairman Henry L. Dawes (R-MA),
ibid., 1180-85.

TABLE 6-7
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO SUSPEND THE RULES AND
PASS A BILE. PROVIDING FOR RETAIL SALES
OP LEAP TOBACCO (H. R. 4544)a

Region

Dem.

NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Yea
Rep.

Dem.

1
10
16
23
15
-3

1
9
18
6
_2

••
••
••

68

36

4

••

Grand Total

Nay
Rep.

•«
••

- 20
32
47.
lb
1

4

io4

104

108

aCong. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, 886 (February 1, 1875).
bIynch (MS).

TABLE 6-8
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS THE
TAX AND TARIFF BILL (H. R. 4680)a

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.
IB
40

«•

Dem.

18
6

2
10
23
23
18

4

-2

126

78

1
#*
9•
9*
0•

40

1

127

Nay
Rep
3
3
24
5
2

4o
118

aCon£. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 3, 1666 (February 23, 1875)
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excuse for raising the duties."^ Taussig argued that the sinking fund
had never been provided for in any rigid manner, and he echoed the
argument of House Democrats that the reimposition of duties on tea and
coffee -would have been a better means of increasing revenues.

But

during the debate Henry L. Dawes (R-MA) declared that tea importers
had already stocked a full year’s supply and that tea would not yield
any additional revenue for at least a year.

Professor Edward Stanwood

has noted that a lobby of tea importers was at the time urging the
imposition of duties to enhance domestic prices on the tea already in
stock.

Whether or not the repeal of the 10 percent duties was neces

sitated by financial conditions depends upon the observer’s attitude
toward the protective tariff.

As Stanwood has commented, the sincerity

or insincerity of the Republicans in promoting repeal to increase
revenues cannot be determined by debate on the issue, and therefore is
perhaps best left unanswered,?0
W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States (8th ed.,
Hew York: G. P. Putman’s Sons, 1931)» 190n. Taussig did not mention
that the repeal of the 10 percent reduction was only part of the bill.
?°Edward Stanwood, American Tariff Controversies in the Nineteenth
Century (2 vols., Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1903), XI, 189*
Stanwood’s discussion of the 1875 bill is fuller and more balanced than
that of Taussig. For the major speeches on the bill and proposed amend
ments thereto, see Cong. Record. b3 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1180-91*
1208-19, 1385-1^16,'"lS30-39> 1^8-52, 15^3-60, 1655-6 ^; Pt. 3, 1665-6 7 .
Reiraposition of the duties on tea and coffee was risky business for the
Representatives because the items were widely used. A year later when
Congress was considering duties on coffee and tea, one of Senator Matt
W. Ransom’s North Carolina constituents remarked that he was "afraid of
the duty on coffee" and he warned Ransom that "Every old woman will
attribute it to the Democracy.” See Henry F. Bond (?) to Ransom,
February 25, 1876 , in Matt Whitaker Ransom Papers, Southern Historical
Collection, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, hereinafter
cited as Ransom Papers.
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The second revenue hill split Southerners along party lines.

Few

roll-call divisions occurred during the amending process, hut South
erners, particularly the Virginia Republicans and Democrats, tried
unsuccessfully to strike the increase in tohacco taxes.71

Southern

Republicans seemed to take their cue from Horace Maynard (R-TN) who
favored the repeal of the 10 percent reduction because the "home, the
great depository of iron and coal in the country lies south of what is
known as Mason and Dixon's line," and such industry deserved "encour
agement ."72 Jacob H. Cypher (R-IA) added that the West and South
might "find some profit" in following the New England example by using
the protective tariff to develop their manufacturing and industrial
interests.73 whatever their motivation, Southern Republicans Joined
their party colleagues from other regions and voted 18-5 to pass the
bill, while Southern Democrats opposed it 0-23 (see Table 6-8).
While the Northern Republicans were willing to increase revenues,
they tended to side with the Democrats on bills to limit appropriations.
In his relentless efforts to curtail subsidies and appropriations,
Holman introduced another cleverly worded resolution at the beginning
71see, for example, Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4,
1398-99, 1406-407, 1438-3971858.
72Ibid., 1546.
73jbia., 1656 , Cypher was obviously pleased that the bill raised
duties on molasses and sugar of all kinds by 25 percent. During the
First Session, Cypher, mindful of Louisiana sugar interests, had intro
duced a resolution to restore duties on sugar which had been reduced by
a third in 1870. Sypher claimed that the reduction of the sugar duties
had decreased revenue by $12 million annually without reducing the price
of sugar to the consumer. See ibid., Pt. 1, 592.
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of the Second Session:
Resolved, That in the judgment of this House, in the present
condition of the financial affairs of the Government no subsidies
in money, bonds, public lands, or by pledge of the public credit
should be granted by Congress to associations or corporations
engaged or proposing to engage in public or private enterprises,
and that all appropriations from the public Treasury ought to be
limited at this time to such amounts only as shall be imperatively
required by public service.?^
Southerners opposed the resolution.13-36, but they received little sup
port from either Northern Democrats or Republicans (see Table 6-9).
New England supported the resolution, l£-2, the Middle Atlantic states,
3^-13, and the Midwest, 66-10.

The House failed by one vote to suspend

the rules and pass the resolution, but the division clearly indicated
that the body was not favorably inclined to grant further subsidies for
internal improvements.
The Holman resolution was aimed primarily at the Texas-Pacific
Railroad and its president, Thomas A. Scott.

The Credit Mobiler

scandal, the Panic of 18739 and the general clamor for railroad
regulation in the West had nearly ruined Scott and his railroad, and
he had turned to Congress to secure additional aid for the line.^
issue in the Second -Session was a bill (H.

At

at^ively promoted

by the Texas-Pacific, requesting that the government guarantee the
interest on the railroad's forty-year five percent bonds.

In return,

*^Cong. Record, lj-3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 173.
^Scott's difficulties and his campaign to win congressional
approval for additional subsidies are detailed in C. Van Woodward,
Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877 and the End of Recon
struction (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951), (3j-82. See
also, Lewis H. Haney, A Congressional History of Railroads in the
United States (2 vols., Madison: Democratic Printing Co., 1910),
II, 125-27.

I
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TABLE 6-9
VOTE BY REGION AMD PARTY TO SUSPEND THE BUIES AND PASS
THE HOIMAN RESOLUTION TO CURTAIL SUBSIDIES
AND LIMIT APPROPRIATIONS®

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep.

1
10
19
8
15
_1

16
2l+
1*7
5
2

5b

97

Grand Totalb

Dem,

NayRep.

2
2
15
2
_2

2
11
8
21
7
J+

23

53

* *

76

151

aCong. Record, 1+3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 1, I7 I+ (December 21, 187!+).
bGrand total Includes parted and announced votes.
vote on the question was 11+9-75*

The recorded

TABLE 6-10
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO SUSPEND THE RULES
AND CONSIDER. THE. SUPPLEMENTAL TEXAS-PACIFIC
BILL (H. R. l+5l+7)a
Yea

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Nay

Dem.

Rep.

Don.

*«

1
20
9
22
9

2
11
9
2

3
13
21
15
_2

61+

5b

118

1+
JL
29

Rep
17
22
50
5
1
98

127

aCong. Record, 1+3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 2, l601 (February 22, 1875).
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the company offered the government a first mortgage on the line, a
return of public lands, and the right to retain $5,000 of the maximum
of $35,000 per mile of bonds issued to finance construction."^

in a

letter to Senator Matt Ransom (D-RC), Scott emphasized that the pro
posal asked only that the government guarantee the interest on the
bonds.

The Holman resolution, which was pending at the time, was, in

Scott's opinion, "directed especially at the southern interests," and
he pleaded for support from the Southern congressional delegation.77
Southerners were willing to consider aiding the Texas-Pacific,
but the measure was never allowed to reach the House floor.

A motion

on February 22, 1875, to suspend the rules to consider H. R. k'jk'I and
to set a date for a vote on its passagw was greeted by Vermont Repub
lican Charles Willard's derisive query, "Is this not what is generally
known as the Tom Scott subsidy bill? "7® The House refused by a margin
of 118-127 to hear the favorable committee report on the bill (see
Table 6-10).

The Southerners, who voted if3-7 for the motion, received

solid support from the border and Pacific states which were also interested in the Texas-Pacific project.

79

Republicans from the Mid-Atlantic

7^House Reports, i*3 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 267, 1-^77Scott to Ransom, December 15, 187^, Ransom Papers. Ransom was
a member of the Senate Committee on Railroads and his papers are one of
a handful of Southern collections containing material relating to
economic issues during Reconstruction.
76Cong. Record, lf3 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, l£00.
7^For Southern support for H. R. 1*5^7, see New Orleans Republican,
March 6, December 17, 187^, January 30, 1875; Augusta Constitutional as
quoted in the Atlanta Constitution, January 6, 1874,''and The Vicksburg
(MS) Herald, March 3, 1&75. The line was widely supported in all areas
of the South, see above, ch. IV, and Woodward, Reunion and Reaction,
78-79.
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states split on the issue as did Midwestern Democrats; otherwise,
Northern support for the motion was negligible.80
The South fared scmewhat better on regular appropriations for
rivers and harbors. The recorded roll calls on the subject indicate
that the Southerners, almost without exception, united behind appro
priations for their section— often in the face of substantial Northern
opposition.^ Most importantly for the South, Congress finally
adopted a plan to remove the mud bars at the mouth of the Mississippi
river which blocked the passage or large ships into the river. The
movement to open the river had the unanimous endorsement of Southerners
and general support in both Houses, but the Southerners were split
over the best means of clearing the pass. One group, including most
Southern Republicans and the New Orleans press, backed a scheme to
construct a canal beginning somewhere below Fort St. Philip on the
Op

eastern bank and running southeast to the vicinity of Brenton Pass.

®®Very few roll-call divisions occurred on the numerous railroad,
bills, and those involved time extensions for the completion of lines
outside the South. See, for example, Cong. Record. 1*3 Cong., 1 Sess.,
Pt. 3, 2845; Pt. 5, 4241; Pt. 6, 5332. Southern Republicans consis
tently supported the time extensions— more so than did Republicans from
any other regions. Southern Democrats were less inclined than Repub
licans to extend time limits, but they too were much more receptive
than were Democrats frcm other regions.
On

OJ-See, for example, the votes on a bill to improve the Ostanaula
River in Georgia, Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 4, 3370; to pass
a resolution calling for a bill to promote cheap water transportation,
ibid., 3207; to pass a bill providing for construction of a public build
ing in Atlanta, ibid.. Pt. 6, 5199; and to amend the rivers and harbors
appropriation bill by making an appropriation for Mississippi River
levees, ibid., 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, IO69 .
^New Orleans Daily Picayune. February 28, 1869, April 8, 1874;
Republican. February 15, 22, 24, 26, 28, 1874; March 1, 13, 17, 1874.
The Picayune, in a rare display of bipartisanship, wholeheartedly

In 1874, however, Captain James B. Eads, whom one Representative
referred to as "a successful carrier-out of great works," submitted a
controversial and more radical plan to construct jetties to narrow
and extend the mouth of the river Into the deep water of the gulf.
The confined force of the river current, Eads explained to a host of
doubters, would then clear the mud bar.^3 Given a choice between the
two proposals, the House passed the Fort St. Philip canal proposal on
June 5, 1874,^ but the Senate preferred the Eads scheme, and in 1875,
the House agreed to let Eads try his experiment.

By 1879 Eads had

opened up a channel thirty feet in depth.^
endorsed the Fort St. Philip canal, which was pushed by two Louisiana
carpetbaggers, Lionel A. Sheldon and Jacob H. Sypher. Judging from the
comments and endorsements collected by the two papers, the canal was
strongly favored by most of the shippers along the lower Mississippi
and the mercantile and shipping community in New Orleans. For the
speeches of Sheldon and Sypher on the canal, see Cong. Record. 43 Cong.,
1 Sess., Pfc. 5, ^569-73 (Sheldon); and ibid., Pt. 6 , Appendix, 407-10
(Sypher).
^^Both plans are thoroughly debated in ibid., Pt. 5 , 4518-34,
4566-73, 4624-26. See also: Florence Dorsey, Road to the Sea: The
Story of James B. Eads and the Mississippi River (New York: Holt, Rine
hart, and Winston, 1 9 4 7 " chs. XI-XIII; and James B. Eads, Mouth of the
Mississippi. Jetty System Explained (St. Louis: Times Print, 187£)»
1-38.
ou
Cong. Record. 43 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 5 , 4626. Southern Repub
licans supported the canal proposal by a margin of 23-8; Southern Demo
crats opposed it, 5-16. This particular vote was considered by Hannah

Roach and she found "the entire Atlantic coast voting against the im
provement of the Mississippi River and all sections west of the Alleghe
nies voting for it. . . . shewing clearly that section interest was the
chief determining factor in the vote." Roach*s discussion and map of
the vote are misleading as the question was not one of whether the
river should or should not be improved, but rather one of how the bars
could best be removed. See Roach, "Sectionalism in Congress," Map I,
507-10.

^^Cong. Record, 43 Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 2, 1440, 1448; Dorsey, Road
to the Sea, 215. No roll calls were recorded in the House on the final
passage of the Eads proposal, but one of its most attractive features to
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A final economic issue, that of railroad regulation, opened up
questions of congressional powers and the relationship and responsi
bilities of private corporations to the public.

That this matter

should appear in 1873 was primarily because of the growing influence
of the Patrons of Husbandry in the Midwest and elsewhere.

The

Grange, faced with discriminatory and excessive freight rates fostered
by railroad consolidation,

had passed rate regulations in several

Midwestern states, but most of the lines, as interstate carriers, were
subject only to congressional regulation.®®
In response to Granger pleas for congressional action, George W.
McCrary (R-IA) introduced a bill to regulate interstate railroad
commerce early in the First Session.

The McCrary bill forbade excessive

and discriminatory rates on every railroad line extending into or
through two or more states.

The bill set up a nine member board of

"disinterested" railroad commissioners to be appointed by the President
with the advice and consent of the Senate, which after investigating
retrenchment-minded Democrats was that Eads agreed to accept no pay until
he had achieved at least 20 feet of water. Congress agreed to pay him
$500,000 for the first twenty feet and $500,000 for every additional two
feet thereafter until the channel reached a depth of 30 feet. In addi
tion, Eads was to receive another $500,000 for every two feet maintained
for one year and an additional $2 million for maintaining the 30 foot
depth. Total cost of the project, if successfully completed, was $8
million. The Hew Orleans newspapers and the Louisiana delegation upheld
the canal proposal until the very end, because they doubted that the
Eads jetties would hold up under gulf currents and storms, and they were
convinced that it would take too long to complete. See Mew Orleans
Republican, February 25, 1875*
®^See Solon J. Buck, The Granger Movements; A Study of Agricul
tural Organization and its Political Economic and Social Manifestations,
1870-1660 CCambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913), passium;
Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, ch. II; and Haney, A Congres
sional History of Railways, II, ch. XIX.
“
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existing rates, was to create and enforce a schedule of reasonable
maximum rates on passenger and freight carriers.

The commission was

granted the power to bring suits against offending parties for damages
of not less than $500 nor more than $5,000 for each offense.®7

in the

opinion of one authority, the McCrary bill was "one of the most notable
attempts to regulate railroad rates prior to the passage of the Inter
state Commerce Act."®®
The House had already adopted, by a margin of 176-64, a resolution
affirming the power of Congress to regulate rates on all common carriers
and calling for "prompt and wise execution" of that power (see Table
6-11: A).

The vote on the resolution was highly partisan with Repub

licans voting 156 - H in favor and Democrats 16-53 against.

The

resolution had not been debated, but the McCrary bill generated a fulldress debate.

The Republicans tended to believe that the commerce

clause of the Constitution conferred the power to regulate rates on
interstate carriers, and most of the party favored McCrary*s proposal.
The Democrats were less willing to admit the regulatory power of Congress,
and most opposed the bill on constitutional

grounds. ®9

Midwestern and

Southern Republicans, however, mustered sufficient support from Repub®7ihe text of the McCrary bill is
1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1946-47-

in Cong. Record, 43 Cong.,

^^Haney, A Congressional. History of Railways, II, 255, 283-85.
89
'Tor the extensive House debate on bill, see Cong. Record, 43
Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 1941-48, 1963-68 ; Pt. 3, 2044-50, 2144-60, 217180, 2206-209, 2230-51, 2414-37. 2459-71. Of the two Southerners who
spoke on the bill, Thomas Whitehead (D-VA) opposed it and John Amber
Smith (R-VA) favored it. See ibid., 2427-31 (Whitehead); ibid., Pt. 6,
Appendix, 189-90 (Smith).
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TABLE 6-11: A and B
SELECTED VOTES BY REGION AMD PARTY
ON THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ISSUE
A.

To suspend the rules and pass a resolution favoring the regulation
of interstate commerce0.
Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total

Dem.
1
8
k
1
_ 2

Dem.

Nay
Rep

18
35
65
23
8
_Z

1
9
11
18
13
_1

m a

156

53

11

16

Grand Total
B.

Yea
Rep.

172

k
5
* *

1
1

6k

To pass the McCrary hill (H, R. 1358) to regulate interstate
commerce'3
Yea
Rep.

Region

Dem.

NE
MA
MW

0w
m
3
lc

SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Nay
Dem.
Rep.

_2

7
16
59
2k
5
6

2
13
19
20
17
_2

12
21
7,
2d
3
_1

6

117

73

k6

•

-• «

123

119

^ong. Record, 43 Cong. , 1 Sess., Pt. 2, 13^2 (February
*Ibid., Pt. 3, 2U93 (March 25, I87U).
cRohbins (NC).
‘'Niles (MS), Sener (VA).
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licans in other regions to pass the measure over Democratic opposition
(see Table 6-11: B).
Southern Republicans approved the McCrary hill by a margin of
24-2; Southern Democrats opposed it 1-20.

Ironically, the conservative

Southern press, particularly those newspapers connected wish the
Southern Grange, supported the measure.

As early as 1870, Debow*s

Review had expressed concern about the growing power of the railroads
and had called for freight rate regulation.

In the same year the

Atlanta Constitution published an appeal to railroads to lower passenger
rates, and by 1873 the Constitution was promoting the Grange.

The New

Orleans Picayune declared that the McCrary bill was one of the most
important measures considered by the Forty-Third Congress.9° Only the
Picayune noted that the "carpetbaggers" had voted to pass the bill, but
the conservative newspapers neglected to mention that the region* s
Democrats had voted solidly against it.

In any event, railroad rate

regulation was postponed as the Senate took no action on the McCrary
bill.
The South had no. grounds for complaint about the voting record of
the section*s Representatives on economic issues during the Forty-Third
Congress.

If the South generally desired both currency expansion and a

"Railroad Legislative Policy," Debow* s Review (After the War
Series), VIII (March-April, I87O), 237-53; Atlanta Constitution, July 3,
1870, December 21, 1874. See also: Mew Orleans Republican, April 4,
1874, and The Southern Workman, February 1873> November 1873, February
1874• Saloutos comments on the attitudes of Southern Grangers on rate
regulation in Farmer Movements in the South, 38-39.
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plan for specie resumption, Southern Republicans compiled a more credit
able record than did Democrats.

The section's Democrats, because of

constitutional scruples, refused to vote for railroad rate regulation.
The Southern delegation waged a now familiar losing battle for subsidies
for internal improvements— with the exception of the bill to open the
mouth of the Mississippi Elver.

Most Southern Republicans voted with

their party in favor of the 10 percent reduction in tariff duties—
which may or may not have been justified by tne need for revenues— but
Southern Republicans readily abandoned their party when specific
sectional, interests were involved.
Thus, with the exception of revenue bills, Southern and New
England Republicans stood on opposite sides of the economic issues
which were considered by the Forty-Third House.

On currency questions,

the most evident coalition was that between Southerners, Midwesterners,
and Pennsylvania Republicans.

Southerners mustered little support in

other sections for appropriations and internal improvements other than
that for the Mississippi River.

Southern Republicans, however, were

not judged by their constituents on their voting record on economic
issues, and so the tide of redemption rolled on.

Of the thirty-nine

Republicans who served in the Forty-Third House, only nine survived
the elections of 107^, and two of those would lose their seats by
contest.

CHAPTER VII

THE PORTiT-FOURTH HOUSE
The two-thirds majority enjoyed by Republicans in the FortyThird House evaporated during the congressional elections of 187^.
Of the 309 men seated by the Forty-Fourth House, 189 were Democrats
giving the party a majority of over 60 percent— their first since the
antebellum period.^* The scandals of the second Grant administration
and the continuing depression contributed to the Democratic victory,
but the party fared particularly well in the Southern states, where
it directed and benefited from the natural process of redemption.
The House seated forty-nine Southern Democrats and only seventeen
Republicans during the course of the Congress.
Republicans lost ground in every Southern state except South
Carolina.

After the contests had been settled, a Republican and a

Democrat occupied Florida's two seats, but Democrats had a majority
in every other state, and the delegations of Arkansas, Georgia, and
Texas were solidly Democratic.
several ways.

Redemption had been hastened in

Louisiana remained in Republican hands at the

1At the beginning of the First Session in December 1875, the House
membership consisted of 181 Democrats, 107 Republicans, and 3 Independ
ents with two vacancies; see George B. Galloway, History of the House of
Representatives (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 19S1 ), 296 .
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state level by virtue of the so-called Wheeler Compromise, hut the
White League, for example, had been particularly effective in New
Orleans during the congressional elections of l87h. Mississippi did
not hold elections to the House until November 1875, and it was in
that campaign that the conservatives developed the classic method of
redemption.

The "Mississippi Plan,1' a simple matter of intimidation,

would become the model for other states.^
The forty-nine Southern Democrats formed a far more variegated
group than is usually depicted.

Southern conservatives, in fact, appear

to have suffered from stereotyping nearly as much as have the
various elements in the Republican party.

Southern Democrats in the

Forty-Fourth House were a particularly diverse lot.

Among those

returned were such familiar names as L. Q. C. Lamar and Alexander H.
Stephens.

Lamar, an avid advocate of hard money and federal subsidies

for internal improvements, had established himself as a spokesman for
reconciliation in the previous House, and he chaired the important
Committee on Pacific Railroads in the Forty-Fourth House.

If Lamar

represented the rising Southern leadership, Stephens in his own eccentric
way, symbolized a dying breed.

Although he would serve in the House

until 1882, Stephens lacked the ability and vigor to adjust to the new
conditions.

He was in such poor physical condition that he was bedridden

2For the White League, see H. Oscar Lestage, Jr., "The White
League in Louisiana and its Participation in Reconstruction Riots,"
Louisiana Historical Quarterly, XVIII (July, 1935), 617-95; and Allie
Bayne Windham, ’^Methods and Mechanisms Used to Restore White Supremacy
in Louisiana, 1872-1876" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State
University, 19^9). The workings of the Mississippi Plan are detailed
in Vernon L. Wharton, The Negro in Mississippi. 1865-1890 (Chapel Hill:
of North Carolina Press, 19^7), ch. XIII.
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for most of the First Session.
Lamar and Stephens were joined by others who had been prominent
in antebellum and wartime Southern politics.

John H. Reagan of Texas,

for example, a lifelong Democrat, had been a member of the antebellum
House and a somewhat reluctant secessionist, but he had served in the
Confederate Congress and Cabinet.

In the Forty-Fourth House, Reagan

reflected his connections with the strong Texas Grange by promoting an
expanded currency, bimetallism, and regulation of railroad rates.
Mother Texan, James W. Throckmorton also favored railroad regulation,
but Throckmorton and Lamar were the leading proponents of further
subsidies for the Texas and Pacific.

Throckmorton, a former unionist

Whig, had been heavily involved in Texas state politics since 1851 and
had served as Andrew Johnson's provisional governor of the state until
1867.3
To this select group, Georgia added Benjamin H. Hill, a wealthy
former slaveholder, whose Identification with the Whig, American, and
Constitutional Union parties forecast his stance as a cooperationist

3
For the careers of the two Texans, see Reagan to Andrew Johnson,
May 28, 1865, July 18, 1865 , June 20, 1865, Amnesty Papers, Texas; Ben
H. Procter, Not Without Honor: The Idfe of John H^nn^wger Reagan
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 196217 Reagan, Memoirs With Special
Reference to Secession and the Civil War (New York: Neale Publishing
Company, 1906 ); Walter Prescott Webb and H. Bailey Carroll (eds.), The
Handbook of Texas (2 vols., Austin: Texas State Historical Association,
1952}, n T M a - W (Reagan), 776 (Throckmorton); Ralph A. Wooster,
"Analysis of the Membership of the Texas Secession Convention," South
western Historical Quarterly, IXII (January, 1959), 328-29; John
Pressley Carrier, "A Political History of Texas During Reconstruction"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1971), 288-H8 9 ,
502; and Alwyn Barr, Reconstruction to Reform: Texas Politics, 18761906 (Austin: University Press, 19?l7» chs. I-II.

273
in i860.

When Georgia seceded, Hill went to the Confederate Senate for

the duration of the war, hut he never really became a Democratic
"regular.” During the 1870s he announced his acceptance of the "fact"
of Reconstruction and become an outspoken advocate of the Hew South.
Another newcomer was John Randolph Tucker, member of a distinguished
Virginia family and a professor of law at the University of Virginia.
Tucker, an old line, hard-money Calhoun Democrat, was well-known for
his closely reasoned defense of the doctrine of strict construction.
Less well-known Democrats were nevertheless familiar names in
their own particular areas, and some, like Randall Gibson of Louisiana
and Roger Q. Mills of Texas, would achieve prominence in the national
councils.

Gibson, a former Whig and secessionist and a member of

Louisiana's "sugar aristocracy," would serve in the House and Senate
until his death in 1892. Mills, who entered political life as a
Know-Nothing, had been a fire eater in i860 and would serve in the House
and Senate until 1899* Mills, a low-tariff, hard-money retrenchmentminded Democrat, became the first Southerner in the postwar period to
^For Hill's career, see Hill to Andrew Johnson, June lk, 1865,
May 3j 1867, Amnesty Papers, Georgia; Haywood J. Pearce, Jr., Benjamin
H. Hill: Secession and Restoration (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1926); Ralph A. Wooster, !,The Georgia Secession Convention,"
Georgia Historical Quarterly, XL (March, 1956), 51; and E. Merton Coulter,
"The Hew South: Benjamin H. Hill* s Speech Before the Alumni Society of
the University of Georgia, 1871," Georgia Historical Quarterly. LVII
(Summer, 1973), 179-99* For Tucker, see Tucker to Andrew Johnson,
June 19, 1B65, Amnesty Papers, Virginia; and the Introductory Polder,
and especially "Political notebook" Humber 9, in Tucker Family Papers,
Southern Historical Collection, University of Horth Carolina, Chapel
Hill, hereinafter cited as Tucker Papers. The Tucker Papers are rich
in family correspondence— much of which relates to politics during
John Randolph Tucker's six terras in the House.
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chair the powerful Committee on Ways and Means.?
At a lower rank were long time Democratic regulars as well as
a number of men who plainly disliked the party into which Recon
struction had forced them. E. John Ellis of Louisiana, for example,
came from a Whig background and had been a Constitutional Unionist
in i860. He had joined the Confederate army with great reluctance:
I am in, am willing to enlist and fight till the foul
monster Democracy shall cease to exist. If the sanctity
of home and friends were left out of this quarrel, like
the immortal Cass I would break my sword over a stump
and retire to Private
To me abolitionism is not
more odious than Democracy.
Twenty years later Ellis assured his brother, "Only let me say that I
am not a devout believer in the infallibility of the Democratic
Party either National or State." But the Democratic Party was the
only vehicle available to men like Ellis, and he joined the White
League to drive the Republicans from power in Louisiana.?
The party also harbored other mavericks like William H. Felton
of Georgia.

Felton, a former Whig, had favored secession and joined

the Democrats, but during the 1870s he became an agrarian insurgent,
^See Donald Eugene Dixon, "Randall Lee Gibson of Louisiana, 18321892" (unpublished M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 1971); and
Russell A. Purifoy, Jr., "Statesman from Texas, Roger Q. Mills" (unpub
lished M.A. thesis, North Texas State College, 195*0 •
Ellis to his father (Ezekiel Park Ellis), Jaauaxy 9, 1862, in
Ellis (E. John, Thomas C. W., and Family) Papers, Department of
Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
^EUis to Thomas C. W. Ellis August 9, 1882; ibid; Robert Cinnsmond
Tucker, "The Life and Public Services of E. John
(unpublished
M.A. thesis, Louisiana State University, 19*4-1), 55 -65 .
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and he von his seat by defeating the candidate of the regular DemoO
cratlc party.
Still another type, this one unique, was represented
by William W. Wilshire.

Wilshire, an Arkansas carpetbagger, had been

elected to the Forty-Third House, had been seated, and was then ousted
by his Democratic opponent.

In the interim, Arkansas was reapportioned

and the opportunistic Wilshire ran and was elected as a Conservative to
the Forty-Fourth House where he joined the Democratic caucus.

Wilshire

was the only Southerner to serve both parties in the House during Recon
struction. 9

If its Representatives in the Forty-Fourth Congress are a
valid sample, the Southern Democratic party possessed little unity on
economic issues.

The party contained states righters and New South

advocates, free traders and moderate protectionists, soft money and
hard money advocates, resumption!sts and antiresumptionists, and
monometallists and bimetallists in a bewildering array of combinations.
Nor were the Democrats solidly united behind the notion of federal
subsidies for internal improvements.

They appear to have been united

only by their opposition to the forces behind Reconstruction.

While

they differed on methods of redeeming their section, the common bond
against "carpetbaggers” and "Negro domination” was more than sufficient

®D.A.B., VI, 319i Felton to Andrew Johnson, July 25, 1865, Amnesty
Papers,“Georgia; Justin C. Ward, Jr., "The Republican Party in Bourbon
Georgia, I872-I890 ," Journal of Southern History, IX (May, 1<&3), 197201; Mrs. William H. Felton, Mjr Memoirs of Georgia Politics (Atlanta:
The Index Printing Company, 1911),' lMt-59; and John E. Talmadge,
Rebecca Latimer Felton: Nine Stormy Decades (Athens: University of
Georgia Press, i960 ), 32-45. Felton*s second wife later became the
first woman to be appointed to the U. S. Senate.
^Biographical Directory, 1935.
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to guarantee their success.
As a group, the seventeen Republicans were even more obscure
than those who served in the Fortieth Congress.

Of the nine incum

bents who survived, only carpetbaggers Frank Moray and Chester B.
Parmi l of Louisiana and Charles Hays, an Alabama scalawag, had
left much of a mark.

Even less is known about the eight newcomers.

Their weight in the Southern delegation was further diminished as
four of the Republicans served only partial terns.

During the

First Session, Democrats unseated Morey and Josiah Walls of Florida.
Carpetbagger Charles W. Buttz of South Carolina contested the election
of his fellow carpetbagger Edmund W. M. Mackey, and succeeded in getting
the seat declared vacant and was subsequently elected to fill it. At
the beginning of the Second Session the party numbers had stabilized
at forty-nine Democrats, six blacks, five carpetbaggers, and three
scalawags.
A profile of the delegation is obviously biased toward the
Democrats because of their numbers and the deficiency of biographical
data for the Republicans.

Still, a profile is useful for what it

reveals about the Democrats.

The median age of the Southerners was

forty-four, the highest of any of the Reconstruction delegations,
but still two years younger than that for the House as a whole. 10
The Republicans again pulled the median age down as all but four
were under the age of forty.

Forty-one of the forty-nine Democrats

10
Stuart A. Rice calculated the median age for all members of the
Forty-Fourth House at H6.69 years; see Rice, Quantitative Methods in
Politics (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 297.
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were over forty.

The Southerners ranged in age from twenty-seven

year old John Boy lynch (K-MS) to sixty-four year old Alexander S.
Wallace, a South Carolina scalawag*
In terms of formal training, the seven blacks and two of the
three scalawags had no more than an elementary education.

Four of

the seven carpetbaggers had been to college, but the carpetbaggers
were no longer the best educated of the Southerners.

FOrly of the

forty-nine Democrats had attended college and thirty-five had taken
one or more degrees.
Eighty-four percent of the Representatives had been b o m in
the slave states, and proportionally the number of former slave
holders, Breckinridge supporters, secessionists, and Confederate
veterans increased sharply.

At least twenty-two Democrats and one

scalawag were former slaveholders.

Eighteen of the thirty-one

Democrats for whom antebellum political affiliations were discovered
had been Democrats, but another thirteen had belonged to the Whig
party.

Nineteen of the Democrats had voted for Breckinridge in

i860 and ten had favored either Douglas or Bell. Most of the
latter were Unionists Whigs still in search of a political heme.
Twenty-one Democrats had been either unionists or cooperatlonists
during the secession crisis, and sixteen had favored secession
(twelve unknown).

When the war broke out, forty of the forty-

nine Democrats served the Confederacy.

Only ten, including six

carpetbaggers, three blacks, and Wilshire, the carpetbagger-turnedconservative, were veterans of the Union army.

While most Democrats had substantial land holdings, 84 percent
claimed the practice of law as their primary vocation. Only four
teen (seven Democrats and seven Republicans) of the sixty-six Repre
sentatives were farmers or planters. Real and personal estate
holdings were found for thirty-four Democrats and nine Republicans.
Six of the Republicans held property valued at less than $10,000, and
only one, scalawag Charles Hays of Alabama, was worth over $50,000.
By comparison, most of the Democrats were men of substantial wealth.
The property holdings of twenty-four of the thirty-four Democrats were
valued at more than $10,000, and fourteen held property worth more
than $20,000. It should he noted, however, that same Democrats,
like many of their Republican counterparts, were in difficult economic
circumstances. E, John Ellis of Louisiana, for example, was continually in debt and had to borrow money to get to Washington.11
Only five of the sixty-six Southerners had not previously held
an elective office. Fifty-five had served in some capacity at the
state level and twenty-six were veterans of at least one term in the
postwar House. Six Democrats had served one or more terms in the
antebellum House, and eight Democrats had been members of the Confed
erate Congress.
The large number of Democrats renders cross-tabulations between
political affiliations and congressional district data meaningless
with one exception: all but one of the seventeen Republicans came
frcm districts with black majorities. The methods of redemption
■^^Tucker, "life and Public Services of E. John Ellis,1* 55, 73, 83.
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enabled the Democrats to -win nearly half of the thirty districts with
populations under 50 percent white.

The closest elections occurred

in these black districts, but only ten Democrats won with a margin
of victory under 5 percent.

Twenty-seven Democrats won by a margin

greater than 20 percent and six had only token opposition.

The

"Solid South" was emerging; in most future elections the real con
tests would take place in the confines of state Democratic nominating
conventions rather than at the polls.
After having played the role of a loyal opposition for so long,
House Democrats had difficulty adjusting to their newly-acquired
status as the majority party.
absence of decisive leadership.

Part of their problem stemmed from the
When the House Democrats caucused

in December 1875 to choose a Speaker, Michael C. Kerr of Indiana and
Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania were the leading candidates.
was a difficult choice for Southern Democrats.

It

Kerr, a free trader

and hard money advocate, had stubbornly opposed federal subsidies
for internal improvements.

Randall was a moderate protectionist

and had frequently been found on the side of hard money, but he also
had a record of opposition to subsidies.

Southern Democrats generally

favored a low tariff and subsidies for internal improvements, but they
were split on the money question.

At stake for the Southerners was the

issue of further aid for the struggling Texas-Pacific railroad.

The

line's president, Thomas A. Scott, threw his support to Randall but
Kerr emerged as the choice of the caucus.

Once he was formally

installed, Kerr was ineffective due to poor health and he died in
August 1876.

Randall became Speaker at the beginning of the Second
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Session) but neither of the two Democrats exercised the power of the
office as effectively as had James G. Blaine (R-ME), the Speaker in
the three preceding Houses.

TP

The disorganization of the majority party was evident through
out both sessions.

In terms of legislation passed) the Forty-Fourth

Congress was the least productive of any of the Reconstruction Con
gresses.

During the lengthy First Session which lasted until

August 15, I8T6 , the House, led by the Democratic majority, seemed
obsessed with investigations.

Among those attracting special attention

were the Louisiana election frauds, irregularities in the Navy Depart
ment, and the Whiskey Ring scandal.

The House also spent considerable

time impeaching Grant*s Secretary of War, W. W. Belknap, for accepting
bribes.^

During the lame duck session, the disputed election of I876

overshadowed all other business before the House. ^
Economic issues were of secondary concern to the Forty-Fourth
TO

See Albert V. House, "The Speakership Contest of 1875: Demo
cratic Response to Power, 11 Journal of American History* LII (September,
1965 ), 252-7lt; and C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Com
promise of 1877 and the End of Reconstauction*^Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 195l), 97.
^The Congress passed 278 public and 302 private acts and resolu
tions. The total of 580 was about half that of the Forty-Second Con
gress and about two-thirds that of other Reconstruction Congresses.
See Galloway, History of the House of Representatives * 30**.
ll*For the Belknap impeachment proceedings and trial, see Cong.
Record, ¥* Cong., 1 Sess, Pt. 7*
^See Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, passium; and Keith Ian
Polakoff, The Politics of Inertia: The Election of 1876 and the End
of Reconstruction (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1973), passim.

t
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House and no major piece of economic legislation emerged from the
Congress.

Of the 338 roll call divisions in the Forty-Fourth House,

fewer than 20 percent related to economic issues.

House Democrats

assailed the Resumption Act passed by the Republicans in the previous
Congress and finally succeeded in repealing the resunrption-day clause,
but the Senate took no action on the matter.

More important was the

opening battle on the silver question which climaxed with House passage
of a bill to remonetize silver in December 1876 . The tariff and taxes
generated no roll call divisions, and the South came away with very
little to show for its efforts to secure aid for internal improvements*

The Resumption Act of 1875 had split the Forty-Third Congress
along party lines and when the Forty-Fourth Congress convened in
December 1875> the act came under attack almost immediately.

During

the First Session, several efforts were made to repeal parts or
of the act.

The sentiment for repeal was strongest among Midwestern,

Southern, and border state Democrats— most of whom, as soft money men,
disliked the contraction of greenbacks.

Hard money Democrats from the

Northeast and elsewhere, including several prominent House leaders,
joined the Republican minority, who viewed the act as a party measure,
and opposed its repeal.^

late in the session, the Democrats finally

mustered sufficient support to pass a bill (H. R. 4o64) which repealed
that part of the Resumption Act setting January 1, 1879,) as the date
•^For the forces behind congressional efforts to repeal the
Resumption Act, see Irwin Unger, The Greenback Era; A Social and
Political History of American Finance , 1865-1879 (Princeton; Princeton
University Press, 1964), 286-312.
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when greenbacks would become redeemable in gold. ^7
The scalogram in Tables 7-1: A and 7-1: B indicates the partisan
'nature of the resumption issue.

With the exception of a handful of

Midwesterners, the Republicans opposed «.n attempts to alter or
repeal the Resumption Act (scale position 0).1® The Democrats were
slightly less united, but a large majority scaled in the higher
positions favoring repeal.

The hard money Democrats from the South

reacted to the question in several different ways with most favoring
repeal.

John Randolph Tucker of Virginia, for example, voted to

repeal while reaffirming his hard money

beliefs.^

a

few, like

L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi, openly favored the act, and Lamar
even preferred an earlier date for resumption. ^

Randall Gibson

-^Cong. Record, Ml Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 6, 5232. All ten Southern
Republicans voting on the issue opposed repeal; the section's Democrats
favored repeal 3^-5*

3j3

Of the Southern Republicans voting often enough to scale, only
John A. Hyman of North Carolina approved repeal of the Resumption
Act. The only other Republican to favor repeal was Charles Hays of
Alabama who does not scale because of excessive absences. The two
had little in common other than similar black, agricultural constit
uencies— not unlike those of other Republicans opposing repeal.
Hyman, a former slave, ran a small grocery and liquor store in
Warrenton and farmed, but he reportedly had to mortgage the farm to
run for office. Hays, on the other hand, was a wealthy planter.
■^See Tucker to Edmund Wilcox Hubard, July 30, IB78 , in Edmund
Wilcox Hubard Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of
North Carolina, Chapel Hill; R. Taylor to Tucker, October lU, 1875;
and W. Allan to Tucker, January 21, 1676 , Tucker Papers.
pA

cwJames B. Murphey, L. £. C. Lamar: Fragmtic Patriot (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 10737, 137«l«o=
The Weekly Clarion (Jackson, MS), March 29, 1876, which applauded
the Mississippi Democrats for voting against repeal. The Clarion
neglected to mention that Republican John Roy lynch had also voted
against repeal.

TABLE 7-1: A
RESUMPTION SCALOGRAM
REGIONAL AND PARTY DISTRIBUTION OP SCALE POSITIONS
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Coefficient of Reproducibility = .987
^otal includes one Independent.

cHancock (TX), Levy (LA).

bLamar (MS), Schleicher (TX).

^Hyman (NC).

165

102

i
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TABLE 7-1: B
ITEMS IN RESUMPTION SCALOGRAM
Scale
Position

Identification

To suspend the rules and pas’
s a resolution granting the
Secretary of the Treasury necessary powers to render
effective the policy of resumption of specie payments.
.
85-139} + = HAY. Cong.
Cong. Record,
¥+ Cong,, 1 Sess., Pt. 2,
107*1-75 (February l 4 , 1876).
To suspend the rules and pass a resolution providing that
the right of Congress to coin and regulate money does
not include the authority to issue the paper of the
Government as money. 97-11*6; + - NAY. Ibid., Pt. 1,
920 (February 7, 1876).
To pass a bill (H. R. 1*06k) to repeal the resumption-day
clause in the Resumption Act of 1875 . 106-86; + = YEA.
Ibid., Pt. 6, 5231-32 (August 5, 1876).
To amend H. R. 406U by substituting therefore H. R. **065 ,
a bill providing for a commission to consider measures
to bring about resumption of specie payments. 92 -10**;
+ = NAY. Ibid.. 5230-31 (August 5, IB76 ).
To suspend the rules
the Resumption Act
of the Treasury to
115-111; + = YEA.

and pass a bill repealing so much of
of 1875 that authorized Secretary
redeem and cancel U. S. notes.
Ibid., Pt. 3, 2862 (May 1, 1876).

To suspend the rules and pass a bill repealing the
Resumption Act of 1875* 110-108; + = YEA. Ibid.,
Pt. 2, 1815-16 (March 20, 1876).
To suspend the rules and pass a resolution providing that
it is unwise and inexpedient at this time to set a
specific period prescribed by law at which legal-tender
notes of the U. S. should be paid by the Secretary of
the Treasury in coin. 112-158; + = YEA. Ibid., Pt. 1,
. ****** (January 17 , 3876 ).
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of Louisiana privately remarked that hard money men were "embarrassed
by the demands of our Western friends for the repeal of the resump
tion clause."21 Gibson resolved the conflict between his hard money
principles and the party position by simply not voting on most of
the repeal proposals.
The partisan nature of the resumption question clouded Southern
opinion, and, as discussed earlier, it is difficult to determine
where the South stood on the question at any given time.22

It is

apparent that resumption had substantial support in the South provided
the process was gradual and involved little or no contraction.

Part

of the Southern Democrats* opposition to resumption probably stemmed
from the fact that Secretary of the Treasury Benjamin Bristow, a
hard money man, had interpreted the act in such a way as to contract
the amount of currency in circulation.

Bristow* s contraction, albeit

small, nevertheless accentuated the depression.2^

Still, the blanket

opposition of most Southern Democrats to resumption baffled some
observers.

One of Senator Matt Ransom's correspondents, for example,

exclaimed that
cotton commands gold, every where in the world, and the
south is not in favor of specie payments, your politicians
are speculative philosophers, not statesmen.2^
21Quoted from Unger, Greenback Era, 310*
"Randall Lee Gibson," 135-37.

See also:

Dixon,

22See above ch. VI. See also: Unger, Greenback Era, 304; and
Theodore Saloutos, Farmer Movements in the South, 1865-1933 (Los
Angeles: University of California Press, I960), lf8-^9*
23unger, Greenback Era. 263-65 .
Janies Mant (?) to Matt W. Ransom, February 13, I876 , in Matt
Whitaker Ransom Papers, Southern Historical Collection, University of
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The congressional dehate over the remonetization of silver
during 1876 was largely ignored by historians until Allen Weinstein* s
recent investigation revealed its significance*

Weinstein concluded

that the debate served as an opening round during which Souse lines
first formed in the renonetization struggle that would climax with
the passage of the Bland-AlHson Act over President Rutherford B.
Hayes* veto in 1B78.25
The Resumption Act of 1875 had directed the Secretary of the
Treasury to mint subsidiary silver coins to replace fractional green
backs as a first step toward the resumption of specie payments.

The

silver debate began in January 1876 , when Congress endeavored to
force Secretary Bristow to release some $10 million in subsidiary
silver coinage already stockpiled in the Treasury.

Bristow had

refused to issue the silver coins because he feared they would
disappear from, circulation as their value was greater than the
fractional greenbacks they were to replace.2^ Most members of Con
gress disagreed with the Secretary and in April Congress passed a
"silver resumption bill" ordering Bristow to begin immediately to
exchange the silver coins for fractional paper notes.2? But in the
North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
25Weinstein discusses the 1876 silver debate in great detail in
Prelude to Populism: Origins of the Silver Issue* 1867-1878 (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), especially chs. 5 and 7 .
^Ibid., 3h, 83 -8U.
^The House vote on the initial passage of the silver resumption
bill (H. R. 2h50) is in Cong. Record,
Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 3, 2130.
Southern Republicans favored the issue 9-° and Southern Democrats
split 17-20. Their response paralleled that of their respective
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interim, the congressional debate strayed from a discussion of sub
sidiary coinage to proposals to issue additional silver without pro
viding for greenback contraction and to increase the legal tender
qualities of subsidiary silver.

The direction of the debate led

almost inevitably to proposals to overturn the "Crime of '731' and
pO

restore bimetallism by remonetizing the silver dollar.
The debate came to a climax early In the Second Session with
House passage of a bill remonetizing the standard silver dollar.

The

bill (H. R. Ul89) j a substitute measure offered by silverite Bichard
P. Bland (D-MO), provided
That there shall be, from time to time, coined at the mints
of the United States, silver dollars of the weight of kl2^
grains standard silver to the dollar, . . . and that said
dollar shall be legal tender for all debts, public and
private, except where payment of gold is required by law.^9
House lines on remonetization had hardened and Bland* s proposal passed
by a margin of 169-53 (see Table 7-2).80
At least four of the six Southerners voting against passage were
monometallists who were opposed to any further issue of silver with or
without legal tender qualities.

Bandall Gibson of Louisiana, for

parties. For an analysis of the Democratic opposition to the bill as
it passed the House for the first time and the Senate debate thereon,
see Weinstein, Prelude to Populism. 85-91*
28Ibid., 86-123.

29cong. Record, Ml- Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 172.
30rhe grand totals in Table 7-2 include two announced votes for
the proposal. The recorded vote on the measure was 167-53. For the
debate on the bill, see ibid., 149-51* 163-72; and Weinstein, Prelude
to Populism, 188-93*
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TABLE 7-2
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY TO PASS H. R. Ul89
AUTHORIZING COINAGE OP THE STANDARD
SILVER DOLLAR AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
H. R. 3635*

Region
NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS
Total
Grand Total

Dem.

Yea
Rep,

1
19
37
39
23
3

6
35
3
2

122

h7

• •

Dem.

Nay
Rep,

k
6
3
3
1

26

3b
3

•

0

0 0

169

36

17
53

a£2££* Record, M* Cong,, 2 Sess., Pt. 1, 172 (December 13, 1876 )
^Includes one Independent.

289
example, was an immediate resumption!st opposed to currency expansion
in any form.^

Gibson was supported by two fellow Louisianians,

Democrat William M. Levy and Republican Charles Nash, the former a
wealthy Natchitoches parish cotton planter, the latter a black about
whom almost nothing is

k n o w n . 32

John Roy lynch (R-MS) indicated his

attitude on the measure by trying to strike the section in the original
bill (H. R. 3635) granting legal tender powers to silver, 33 and. Milton

Candler (D-GA), a wealthy Atlanta lawyer, was simply anti-silver.3^
The sixth Southern vote against the Bland bill came from Jeremiah
Haralson, an ex-slave from Alabama.
remonetization remain unknown.

Haralson* s reasons for opposing

The forty-two Southerners voting for

the Bland bill probably reflected the wishes of most of their constit
uents, but remonetization never excited much public response in the
33-Dixon, "Randall Lee Gibson," 135-37.
32Por Levy, see Biographical Directory. 1286; Alc6 e Fortier
(ed.), Louisiana; Compromising Sketches of Parishes. Towns, Events,
Institutions, and Persons Arranged in Cyclopedia Form {3 vols.,
Madison, WI: Century Historical Association, 19^i)VII, 65; Man
uscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Agricultural Schedules,
Louisiana, Natchitoches Parish; and ibid., 1880, Agricultural
Schedules, Louisiana, Natchitoches Parish. Levy admitted to a personal
worth of $ 37 ,00 0 in 1870 and his real estate holdings increased sub
stantially over the following decade. For the sketchy biographical
information on Nash, see Biographical Directory, 1460-61; Fortier (ed.),
Compromising Sketches, II, 191; and Maurine Cristopher, America's
Black Congressmen (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1971), 64',' 104-107.
Nash's life is a virtual blank from the end of the war to the time of
his election to the Forty-Fourth Congress.
33cong. Record,

Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 1, 149-5°*

3tfBiographlcal Directory, 1701; Memoirs of Georgia . . . . (2
vols., Atlanta: Southern Historical Association, 1905 ), I, 739 ; and
Manuscript Census, 1870, Population Schedules, Georgia, Dekalb County.
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South until the congressional debate on silver reached its climax in
the winter of 1877-1878.35
Southern Democrats assumed control of their section's drive for
internal improvements with less success and less support from other
regions than Southern Republicans had previously had.

Chief among the

obstacles were the Northern Democrats, now in increased numbers, led
as ever by William S. Hainan (d-IN).3^ On December 15, 1875, Holman
offered one of his familiar retrenchment resolutions proposing that
Congress grant no subsidies of any kind to public or private corpora
tions and that all appropriations ought to be limited "to such amounts
only as shall be imperatively required by public service."37 .The
House approved the resolution by an overwhelming margin of 223-31
(see Table 7-3).

Southern and border state Representatives provided

twenty-five votes against the resolution but it was quite clear that
35por Southern attitudes on the silver question, see Salnutos,
Farmer Movements in the South, 49-52; Weinstein, Prelude to Populism,
270-72, 292-93; Woodward, Reunion and Reaction. 237-42; Woodward,
Origins of the New South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1951), 47-48; and Walter T. K. Nugent, Money and American
Society, 1865-1880 (New York: The Free Press, i960), 217-18 .
3%he South's desire for internal improvements and their Repre
sentatives' efforts to secure such, were, according to Woodward, the
"quid pro quo" for the Southerners. In the electoral crisis of
1876-77> the Southern Democrats appeared willing to support Rutherford
B. Hayes in return for Republican guarantees of federal aid for Southern
projects— particularly the Texas and Pacific railroad. See Woodward,
Reunion and Reaction, passlum. Woodward* s account, however, leaves
the erroneous impression that Southern Republican delegations in
previous Congresses had been negligent in making every possible effort
to secure aid for internal improvements in the South. See ibid.,
12-13, 45 ch. III.
3^cong. Record, 44 Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 227. The resolution
was identical to the one Holman offered a year earlier in the Second
Session of the Forty-Third Congress. See above ch. VI, Table 6 -9 .
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TABLE 7-3
VOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON THE HOM A N
RESOLUTION CURTAILING SUBSIDIES®
Yea

Region

Dem.

Nay

Rep.

Dem.

Rep,

» #

00

MA
MW

8b

16

35
kQC

20

1

k

kO

2

2

SS
BS
PS

28

6

17

1
_1

15
k

5
1

NE

Total
Grand Total

8k

139
223

0 0

0 0

22

12
3k

aCong. Record, Vf Cong., 1 Sess., Pt. 1, 227 (December 15, 1875).
^Includes one Independent.
cIncludes two Independents.
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the House was more opposed than ever to the continuance of federal
subsidies.38

As a consequence of the Northern attitudes toward public expend
itures for internal improvements Southerners received little aid for
their projects.

Northern Democrats effectively cut off consideration

of a new Texas and Pacific measure despite an intensive Southern effort
to call it up led by

L. Q. C. Lamar (D-MS).39 Ko roll-call divisions

occurred on the Texas and Pacific measure, but the division on an
equally important proposal, a Mississippi river levee appropriations
bill, gives an indication of what the South was up against.

On the

last day of the Second Session, E. John Ellis (D-LA) moved to suspend
the rules and pass a bill (H. R. 3^30) appropriating

$^,202,000

"to repair and rebuild the levees of the Mississippi River, and to
reclaim the alluvial lands thereof, to improve its navigation, and
promote and protect its commerce. 11**0
from the appropriation, but

Six states were to benefit

$3*527,000 was to go to Arkansas,

^Woodward discusses the vote in Reunion and Reaction, 62 , but
he neglects to note that the margin of the handful of Southern Repub
licans for the measure was far less than that of the Southern Demo
crats. The 28-15 margin of the Southern Democrats in favor of the
resolution was hardly an emphatic statement for continuing federal
subsidies. Ironically, John Randolph Tucker of Vriginia voted
against the resolution as he felt it prohibited aid for various
Virginia projects and the Texas and Pacific railroad. He confided
to his son that he "was surprised and dismayed with the heavy attack
on me" for voting against the resolution. See Tucker to Henry St.
George Tucker, December 21, 1875* January 9* I876 , Tucker Papers.
39®ie Texas and Pacific issue, which was intimately connected
with the resolution of the electoral dispute, is the subject of intense
analysis in Woodward, Reunion and Reaction, especially chs. V-VI.
^Cong. Record,

Cong., 2 Sess., Pfc. 3, 2232.
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Mississippi, and Louisiana.

The measure was of tremendous importance

to the South; Woodward haB concluded that in terms of public interest,
immediate practical need, and popular demand, "there was much more
to be said for government aid to Mississippi levee construction than
for subsidies to a new Pacific railroad."^

If the South could

unite behind the Texas and Pacific proposal, it certainly should have
viewed the levee proposal as vital to Southern interests.
The House defeated the proposal 73 -11^> but the Southerners'
reaction to the measure was revealing (see Tables 7-4 and 7-5)•

Of

the fourteen Southern Republicans thirteen voted for the levee bill.
Their response was particularly notable given the partisan atmosphere
at that time and the fact that all but three were lame ducks.

The

response of the Southern Democrats, on the other hand, was less
decisive.

The ten Democrats opposing the measure were from the South

eastern states, but the proposal should have commanded support through
out the region.

In addition, sixteen Democrats, including one from

Mississippi and one from Louisiana, did not vote on the question.
Some of the Democrats may have been necessarily absent, but they failed
to avail themselves of the opportunity to pair or announce their votes.
Their response to the levee bill suggests that the unanimity long
attributed to Southern Democrats in favor of federal aid for internal
kp
improvements merits reconsideration.
^IWoodward, Reunion and Reaction, 1^5^2For Woodward* s discussion of the levee issue, see ibid., Xk6-k7Woodward did not note that the Southern Republicans were nearly unanimous
in support of the measure— nor did he mention the twenty-six Southern
Democrats who either opposed or did not vote on the measure.

TABLE 7-k
TOTE BY REGION AND PARTY ON H. R. 3^30 TO REBUILD
THE LEVEES OP THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER8-

Region

Dem.

NE
MA
MW
SS
BS
PS

Yea
Rep.
*•
k
9

1
3
10
23
10

Total

NayDem.
Rep,
&>
a£

13

2^
10

12
15
22
1

e•

••
_l

k
JL

_1

k6

27

63

51

Grand Total

73

•*

Ilif

aCong. Record, 1|4 Cong,, 2 Sess., Pt. 3 , 2232 (March 3, 1877).
^Total includes one Independent.

TABLE 7-5
DISTRIBUTION OP THE VOTE ON THE MISSISSIPPI
LEVEE BILL BY SOUTHERN STATE AND PARTY*

Den.
AL
AR
PL
GA
LA
MS
NC
SC

3
k
1
2
3
3
1
••

Yea
Rep.

Nay
Dem.
Rep.

2

1

••

•*
•»

1
«•

2
2
1
5

*•
••

If

•«

VA

k
_2

**
•*
JL

a

23

13

10

TX

Not Voting
Rep.
Dem.
2

•*
•*
•♦
««
«*
•*
««
#*
•«
JL

2
JL

1

16

aCong. Record, ¥f Cong., 2 Sess., Pt. 3» 2232

•*
m •

3
1
1
2
«•
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With the exception of the scattered subsidy measures, the FortyFourth Congress did not consider economic issues of major import to
the South*

The South was of a divided mind on the resumption question,

and as yet the section showed little concern about the remonetization
of silver.

The partisan climate, the paucity of economic issues, and

the small number of Southern Republicans prohibit any conclusions on
how well they served their section's economic interests.

But it was

altogether fitting that the surviving handful of Southern Republicans
should break with their Northeastern party colleagues and vote for
the appropriation for Mississippi levees on what was, symbolically at
least, the last day of Reconstruction.

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
This study has attempted to determine how well Southern Repub
licans represented the interests of their section on economic questions
in the House of Representatives during Reconstruction. When judged by
their response on recorded roll-call votes in the five Reconstruction
Houses, it must be concluded that Southern Republicans, often under
difficult circumstances, served the economic interests of their
section in a creditable manner.

They were particularly responsive

to their section's need for federal aid for internal improvements, for
reduction of internal taxes, and for the expansion of the currency
supply and banking facilities.
The assumption that Southern Republicans ignored their constit
uents' interests and voted with Northeastern party colleagues on
economic questions is not supported by the evidence.

Even during

times when the partisan feeling generated by the issues of political
reconstruction was running high; Southern Republicans remained
conscious of their section's economic interests and they did not
hesitate to differ with Northern Republicans.

In the interests of

maintaining internal unity, the two political parties wisely avoided
taking a stand on divisive economic questions and, during Reconstruction
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at least, only a few economic questions (e.g., the public credit Issue)
provoked a partisan response.

House Republicans tended to vote

together on the tariff issue, but there is no evidence that those
Southern Republicans who favored a moderately protective tariff were
acting as "agents" of Northeastern protectionists.

Many Southern

Republicans openly promoted the development of Southern manufacturing
and industry and they were aware of the benefits of a protective
tariff for emerging industries.
Southern Representatives usually voted as a bipartisan unit on
economic questions of major importance to their section and they
willingly accepted support from any region or party.

The most evident

coalition on questions relating to banking and currency was that
between the South and Midwest against the Northeast, but on other
questions, such as that of federal subsidies for internal improvements,
Southerners often found more support in the Northeast than in the
Midwest.

But outside the South, support for the granting of federal

subsidies steadily waned during the period— particularly after the
last big grant to the Texas-Pacific Railroad in I87I.
Only minor relationships were found between an individual's
response to specific economic Issues and his personal and constituent
characteristics because Southerners tended to vote along sectional or
party lines.

In either case, personal and constituent characteristics

are virtually meaningless as determinants of voting behavior.

Regional

interests, in fact, appear to have been the primary factor in determining
voting behavior on most economic measures in the House during the period.
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It is quite dear, however, that the issues of race and political
reconstruction were more important to conservative Southerners than
were economic questions.

Their constituencies did not judge Southern

Republicans on their responsible voting record on economic issues,
and only a handful of Southern Republicans survived the congressional
elections of 337^ to the Forty-Fourth House.

Eight Republicans

represented the South in the Forty-Fifth House and half that many
served in the Forty-Sixth House.

The Republican survivors more often

than not represented districts which the Democrats had gerrymandered
to contain heavy black majorities.

Until such time that these

districts could be redeemed by intimidation or black disfranchisement,
they were conceded to the Republicans.
The subsequent careers of the ninety-seven Republicans who had
represented the South during Reconstruction were generally undis
tinguished.

The scalawags tended to remain in the South where most

had economic roots.

A few remained active in the Republican party

and accepted patronage positions, bub most simply retired from public
life as their tainted record blocked effective participation in
Southern politics.

Only 25 percent of the carpetbaggers, on the

other hand, stayed in the South for the remainder of their lives.

The

others moved, sometimes involuntarily, to new locations and new
pursuits.

A few returned North and resumed political activity in

their home states, but a large number successfully petitioned Repub
lican administrations for patronage positions. Most of the blacks
stayed in the South, almost all remained active in the Republican
party, and a few were granted minor patronage jobs.

But of all the

I
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Republicans, the blades suffered most from redemption; their eventual
disfranchisement eliminated them from all involvement in the political
process.
Former Speaker of the House James G. Blaine's observations on
the Southern Republicans in the Forty-First House seem to be equally
applicable to other Republican Representatives 'who served the section
during the period.

Blaine came to the defense of the much maligned

carpetbaggers and scalawags, but he noted that "their misfortune was
that they had assumed a responsibility that could be successfully
discharged only by men of extraordinary endowments." Blaine speculated
that had they been brilliant orators or extremely wealthy, they might
have been able to cope with their situation, but after surveying the
list, he found that
there was not one who was regarded as exceptionally eloquent
or exceptionally rich; and hence they were compelled to enter
the contest without personal prestige, without adventitious
aid of any kind. They were doomed to a hopeless struggle
against the influences, the traditions, [and] the hatred of a 1
large majority of the white men of the South.
Southern Republicans were obviously caught in a very difficult
situation.

They were under continual harassment and they seldom had

any real political security.

Their responsible voting record on

economic questions mattered little to conservatives, but to have
adandoned their support of political reconstruction meant betrayal
of principle and party.

And in their effort to survive in Southern

politics, Republicans received little material aid from their
James G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to
Garfield (2 vols., Norwich, CT: The Henry Bill Publishing Company,
1855), II, kkQ.
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Norfcnem party colleagues.

The relationship between Northern and

Southern Republicans during Reconstruction merits farther consideration.
In the eyes of Northern Republicans, the Southerners appear to have
been the "ugly sisters" of the party.

Northern Republicans welcomed

Southern support for the party's reconstruction policy, but the
Southern Republicans received little in return.

The survival of the

Southern Republicans depended upon continued Northern backing for
Reconstruction, and as that support declined and the process of
redemption increased, the Southern Republicans were slowly but surely
eliminated from Southern politics.
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APPENDIX I
CODEBOOK FOR BIOGRAPHICAL AND CONSTITUENT DATA
Variable
Number
(Held)

IBM
Card
Column

Identification

Code

State Number

0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

- VA
- AL
- AR
- FL
- GA
- LA
- MS
- NC
- SC
- TX.

1

1

2

2-3

Individual
Number

Numerical: alphabetical
sequence within each
state

3

4-13

Last Name

First 10 characters

4

14-15

5

16

Age (at beginning of
tern)
Age Group

1 - 25-29
2 - 30-34
3 - 35-39
4 - 40-44
5 - 45-49
6 - 50-54
7 - 55-59
8 - 60-64
9 - 6 5 and over
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Variable
IEM
Number
Card
(Field) Column

6

17-35

Identification

Code

Birth State

ICPR Code:

01 - Connecticut
02 . Maine
03 - Massachusetts
oh - New Hampshire
05 •* Rhode Island
06 “ Vermont

51 Kentucky
52 Maryland
53 - Oklahoma
5*v ** Tennessee
55 - Washington, D. C
56 West Virginia

11
12
13
lh

-

21
22
23
2h
25

- Illinois
- Indiana
- Michigan
- Ohio
- Wisconsin

6l _ Arizona
62 - Colorado
63 - Idaho
6h - Montana
65 - Nevada
66 - New Mexico
67 - Utah
68 - Wyoming

31
32
33
3h
35
36
37

-

Delaware
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania

Iowa
Kansas
Minnesota
Missouri
Nebraska
North Dakota
South Dakota

hi
h2
h3
hh
h5
h6
h7
h8
h9

- Alabama
- Arkansas
- Florida
- Georgia
- Louisiana
- Mississippi
- North Carolina
- South Carolina
- Texas
ho - Virginia

8

71
72
73

-

California
Oregon
Washington
Foreign

91 - Scotland
92
England
Germany
93
9U - France
95 - Ireland
96 a* Canada

19

Birfch State:
Slave/Free

1 - Slave
2 - Free

20

Ethnicity

1 - White
2 - Negro

329
Variable
IBM
Number
Card
(Field) Column

Identification

Code

9

21

Level of formal
1
education. Informal
2
preparation for the bar
(self or reading) codes 3
at any level; evidence
of formal training
4
coded 3+5

- Self
- Common: Public and
Private
- College or Lav School:
No degree indicated
- College graduate
- Graduate/Professional/
2d degree

10

22

Military Service

-

11

23-24

0
1
2
3

Unknown
Union
Confederate
None

Occupation
Legal:

Semi- and Professional:

10
U
12
13
14
15
16
17

Lawyer
lawyer/Judge
Lawyer/Agriculture
Lawyer/Mercantile
Lawyer/Editor
Lawyer/Railroads
Lawyer/Banker
Lawyer/iron and
Coal
IB - Lawyer/Educator
19 - Lawyer/Federal
Official

bO
41
42
43
44
45
b6
47
48
49

Agriculture:

Public Official:

20
21
22
23
24
25

-

-

26 27 28 29 -

Agriculture
50
Planter
51
Farmer
52
Rancher
53
Agriculture/Banking 54
Agriculture/
55
Railroad
56
Agriculture/Editor 57
Agriculture/
58
Insurance
59
Agriculture/Lawyer
Agriculture/
Mercantile

- Physician
- Minister/Preacher
- Banker
- Educator
- Editor
- Railroads
- Insurance
- Architect/Builder
- Army
- Civil Engineering

- Federal Official
- State Official
- Local Official
-

1

I
<

!

330

Variable
HM
Number
Card
(Field) Column

Identification

Code

Business:

Trades:

30 - Mercantile
31 - Mercantle/Lavyer
32 - Mercantile/
Agriculture
33 - Mercantile/
Shipping
3** - Express Company
35 - Wholesale Grocer
36 - Lumber Business
37 - Iron Business/Mfr
38 - Mercantile/Editor
39 - Mercantile/Banking

60 - Photographer
61 - Livery Stable
62 - Carpenter
63 - Bricklayer
6b - Barber
63 - Shipping Clerk
66 - Pilot
67 - Millwright
68 - Printer
69 - Tailor

12

25

Primary Occupation

1
2
3
b
5
6

13

26

Former Slaveboldlng
Status

0 - Unknown
1 - No slaveholding
2 - Former slaveholder

ll*

27

Wealth: Value of
Estate (1870)

0 1 2 3 1* 5 6 7 8 9 -

15

28-29

Length of Residency

10 - Native
11 - 11+ years before 1861
12 - 10- years before 1861

-

Legal
Agricultural
Business
Semi- and Professional
Public Official
Trades

Unknown
Below $500
$500 - $900
$1,000 - $i*,900
$5,000 - $9,900
$10,000 - $1^,900
$15,000 - J>19,900
$20,000 - i;i*9,900
$ 50,000 - $99,900
$100 ,000+

20 - 1861-1861*
21 - 1865+

1
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Variable
Number
(Field) Column
16

17

30

31-32

Identification

Code

Residency 2361

1 - South
2 - North

Congressional District
(ICFR)

01 - 1st Congressional
District
•
98, 97, 96 - At large:
Alpha
assigned

18

33

Political Affiliation
Prior to i860

0
1
2
3
4

19

3*

Secessionist/Unionist

0 - Unknown
1 - Secessionist
2 - Unionist

20

35

Vote for President,
i860

0
1
2
3
4

21

36

Southern Party Faction

1 - Native Democrat
2 - Outside Democrat

-

-

Unknown
Democrat
Republican
Whig
American

Unknown
Breckenridge
Lincoln
Douglas
Bell

3 - Native Republican
(Scalawag)
If - Outside Republican
(Carpetbagger)
5 - Native Black Republican
6 - Outside Black
Republican
22

37

Congressional Party:
Democrat/Republican

1 - Democrat
2 - Republican

332
Variable
Number
(Field)

Column

Identification

23

38

Prior Political
Experience

0
1
2
3
4
5
6

2l*

39

Margin of Victory:
Present Congress

0 - Unknown

-

None, Party
Local
State
Federal
Local, State
State, Federal
Local, State, Federal

1 *
2 - 3-5$
3 - 6-10$
1* - 11-20$
5 - Over 20$
6 - Unopposed or Token
Opposition (Less
than 10$)

25

UO

Contested/Not Contested 0 - Not contested
1 - Contested unsuccess
fully
2 - Contested successfully
3 - Won by contest

26

1*1

Congressional District:
Percent White

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

- Under 1*0$
- 1*0-1*!*$
- 45-l*9fc
_ 50-54$
** 55-5936
- 60 -69$
- 70-79$
- 80$ and over

27

1*2

Congressional District:
Per Capita Wealth

1
2
3
l*
5

feloo-$ll*9
pl50-$l99
fe200-i2l*9
B250-S299

7

$i*oo-si*i*9

8

$i*50-|l*99
Over $500

6
9

ROO-43l*9
teo-4399

333
Variable
Number
(Field)

Column

Identification

Code

28

43

Congressional District:
Percent Agriculture

1
2
3
4
5
6

-

Under 5036
50-599&
60-69%
70-79%
80-89%
90-9956

29

44

Congressional District:
Land Value Per Acre

1
2
3
4

-

$l-$3
;;4-;;6
J!7-?9
$10 and over

30

45

Number of Houses

Range: 1-5

Current House

0
1
2
3
4

31

47-68

BLANK

32

69-73

ICPR Identification
Number

33

74-77

Congressional Party
(ICER Code)

-

40th
4lst
42nd
43rd
44th

0100 - Democrat
0105 - Conservative

Democrat
0112 - Conservative
0120 - Liberal Democrat
0200 - Republican
0208 - Liberal Republican
0209 - Liberal Republican
and Democrat
0328 - Independent

0331 - Independent
Republican
0402 - liberal

33^

Variable
Number

(ileld) Column
78-80

Identification

BLANK

Code

APPENDIX II
BIOGRAHtECAL DIRECTORY
The following directory lists each of the 185 Southern Representatives and gives his birth date and
state, state served in Congress, party (D = Democrat, R-S = scalawag, R-C = carpetbagger, R-B = black),
former political party, secession stand (S = secessionist, U = unionist or coqperationist), military
service (C = Confederate, U = Union, HP *= nonparticipant), occupation (coded according to scheme in code
book, Appendix I, variable 11), real and personal property valuation in 1870 (coded according to scheme
in codebook, Appendix I, variable 14), and Houses served in (0 = 40th Cong. . . , 4 = 44th Cong.).

SecesName

Birth
Date State

Ashe, I. S.

1812

NC

NC

D

Ayer, R. S.

1829

ME

VA

R-C

U

Barry, H. W.

1840

NY

MS

R-C

U

Beck, E. W.

1833

GA

GA

D

Bell, H. P.

1827

GA

GA

D

Sethune, M.

1816

GA

GA

R-S

Bigby, J. S.

1832

GA

GA

R-S

Blackburn, W. J.

1820

AR

LA

R-S

Blount, J. H.

1837

GA

GA

D

State
Served

Party

Former
Party

sion
Stand

Whig

U

Dea.

U

Mil.
Ser.

Occ.

Property
(I870 ) Houses

12

6

U

22

5

U

10

c

10

3

c

10

3

13

4

11

7

44

6

12

7

c

U
c

34
1

123
2

3
1
2
0

34

Boannan, A.

1839

MS

LA

R-S

Boles, T.

1837

AR

AR

R-S

Booker, G. W.

1821

VA

VA

D

Bowen, C. C.

1832

RI

SC

Bowen, R. T.

1809

VA

Boyden, N.

1796

Bradford, T.

c

10

U

u

10

U

NP

10

3

1

R-S

c

10

3

01

VA

D

NP

22

7

MA

NC

R-S

12

7

2B35
%

AL

AL

D

C

10

5

Braxton, E. M.

1B23

VA

VA

D

C

10

Bromberg, F. G.

1837

My

AL

D

u

NP

^3

Buck, A. E.

1832

ME

AL

R-C

u

U

37

Buckley, C. W.

1835

NY

AL

R-C

u

U

1+2

Buttz, C. W.

1837

PA

SC

R-C

u

15

1+

Cabell, G. C*

1836

VA

VA

D

C

Ik

1+

Cain, R. H.

1825

VA

SC

R-B

NP

kl

Caldwell, J. H.

1826

AL

AL

D

s

C

10

Callis, J. B.

1828

NC

AL

R-C

u

u

1+8

Candler, M. A.

1837

GA

GA

D

u

C

10

Carpenter, L. C.

1836

CT

SC

R-C

u

NP

10

Whig

Whig

U

Rep.

Dan.

Bern.

1+

2
012

3
0
1+
2

k

3
1

k

012

3
3

3k

0
7

3
3

Clark, W. T.

1B31

CT

IX

R-C

U

u

1+2

Clift, J. w.

1837

MA

GA

R-C

u

u

1+0

5

Cobb, C. L

181+2

NC

NC

R-S

u

NP

13

3

Connor, J. C.

181+2

IN

IX

D

u

u

10

Cook, P.

1817

GA

GA

D

u

c

10

1+

Corker, S. A.

1830

GA

GA

D

c

12

6

Corley, M. S.

1823

SC

SC

R-S

u

c

69

1+

Critcher, J.

1820

VA

VA

D

u

c

10

7

Culberson, D. B.

1830

GA

IX

D

u

c

10

Darrall, C. B.

181+2

PA

LA

R-S

u

u

29

Davis, At M,

1833

VA

VA

D

c

10

Davis, J. J.

1828

NC

NC

D

c

10

Begener, E.

1809

Ger.

IX

R-S

NP

35

De Large, B. C.

181+2

SC

SC

R-B

NP

29

Deweese, J. T.

1835

AR

NC

R-C

u

u

10

01

Dixon, J.

1828

NC

NC

R-S

Whig

u

NP

29

1

Dockery, 0. H.

1830

NC

NC

R-S

Whig

u

c

21

Douglas, B. B.

1822

VA

VA

D

Dam

s

c

10

Whig

u

12
0
123
12
3^
1
0
2
1+
6

123!+
3
l+

1+

1
2

l+

01
1+

Dox, P. M.

1813

NY

AL

D

mi Bose, D. M.

183^

TN

GA

Duke, R. T. W.

1822

VA

Edwards, J.

1805

Edwards, W. P.

Dem.

U

NP

28

D

c

10

8

2

VA

D

c

28

5

12

KY

AR

R-C

u

10

1835

GA

GA

R-S

c

10

Elliott, Ji T.

1823

GA

AR

R-S

Elliott, R. B.

UBl+2

MA

SC

R-B

Ellis, E. J.

I8if0

LA

LA

D

Whig

Felton, V. H.

1823

GA

GA

D

Whig

Finley, J. J,

1812

TN

FL

D

Whig

Forney, W. H.

1823

NC

AL

D

Dem.

Freeman, J. C.

1820

GA

GA

R-S

French, J. R.

1819

NH

NC

R-C

Gause, L. C.

1836

NC

AR

D

Gibson, J. K.

1812

VA

VA

D

Dem.

Gibson, R. L.

1832

KY

LA

D

Whig

Giddings, D. C.

1827

PA

TX

D

Goode, J., Jr.

1829

VA

VA

D

U

Dsn.

2
0

ifif

5

u

Ik

k

U

c

10

3

if

S

c

27

5

if

c

10

c

10

5

29

8

s
u

Rep.

12

u

0
23

if

NP

ifif

c

10

7

u

NP

29

7

s

C

28

7

u

C

16

8

s

c

10

5

if
3
0
If
1
if
23
if

Goss, J. H.

1820

SC

SC

R-S

Gove, S. P.

1822

MA

GA

R-S

Gunter, T. M.

1826

TN

AR

D

U

c

10

Hamilton, C. M.

18U0

PA

EL

R-C

U

u

10

Hancock, J.

08214-

AL

TX

D

U

NP

12

8

23k

Handley, W. A.

183^

GA

AL

D

c

30

7

2

Hanks, J. M.

1833

PA

AR

D

Haralson, J.

l£k6

GA

AL

R-B

Harper, J. C.

1819

PA

NC

D

Harris, G. E.

1B27

NC

MS

R-S

HArris, H. R.

1828

GA

GA

I)

Harris, J. T.

1823

VA

VA

D

Harbridge, J.

2B29

GA

GA

D

Haughey, T.

1826

SL

AL

R-S

Hays, C.

183^

AL

AL

R-S

Heaton, D.

1823

OH

NC

Heflin, R. S.

1815

GA

Herndon, W. S.

1B35

GA

c

30

5

0

29

Boa.

0

3k

3

01

12

2

NP

22

U

NP

k9

U

c

10

5

U

c

20

6

Bern.

U

NP

11

Dem.

s

C

10

7

u

u

l+o

k

Dem.

u

c

21

8

R-C

Rep.

u

NP

10

AL

R-S

Dem.

U

NP

10

3

EC

D

Dem.

s

C

15

9

Whig

■

k

2
12
3k
23k
h

0
123^
01
1
23

C

10

4

4

U

NP*

12

7

4

U

u

10

Hewitt, G. W.

1834

AL

AL

D

Hill, B. H

1823

GA

GA

D

'Whig

Hinds, J.

1833

NY

AR

R-C

Ban.

Hodges, A.

1822

AL

AR

R-S

U

Hoge, S. L

1836

OH

SC

R-C

U

u

10

Hooker, C. E

1825

SC

MS

D

S

c

10

5

Howe, A. R.

1840

MA

MS

R-C

U

u

21

7

Hunton, E.

1822

VA

VA

D

S

c

10

34

Ityman, J. A.

1840

NC

NC

R-B

NP

29

4

Hynes, W. J.

1843

XR

AR

R-C

u

Jones, A. H.

1822

NC

NC

R-S

u

U

38

01

Kellogg, F. W.

1810

MA

AL

R-C

Rep.

u

U

50

0

Lamar, L. Q. C.

1825

GA

MS

D

Dem.

s

c

18

7

Lash, I. G.

1810

NC

NC

R-S

Dem.

NP

42

3

Lawrence, E.

IB20

NY

LA

0

Dem.

u

21

9

3

Leach, J. M

1815

NC

NC

D

Whig.

u

c

10

3

23

Levy, W. M.

1827

VA

LA

D

Dem.

c

28

7

Lewis, B. B.

3838

AL

AL

D

c

17

Dem.

Dem.

TJ

29

0
8

3
1 4
4
3

10

3

34
01

4
4

Long, J. F.

1836

GA

GA

R-B

NP

69

3

lynch, J. R.

181+7

LA

MS

R-B

NP

60

3

MacIntyre, A. T.

1822

GA

GA

D

C

12

9

Mackey, E. W. M.

181+6

SC

SC

R-S

Mann, J.

1822

ME

LA

D

U

U

50

Manning, J., Jr.

1830

NC

NC

D

u

C

10

5

McCleery, J.

1837

OH

LA

R-C

u

U

21

5

McKee, G. C.

1837

IL

MS

R-C

Rep.

u

U

12

123

McKenzie, L.

1810

VA

VA

R-S

Whig

u

HP

33

1

McClean, W. P.

1836

MS

TX

D

Dem.

C

10

6

3

Mills, R. Q.

1832

KY

TX

D

Amer.

s

C

12

6

31+

Milnes, W., Jr.

1827

EN

VA

D

u

NP

37

8

Money, H. D.

1839

MS

MS

D

C

26

7

1+

Morey, F.

181+0

MA

LA

R-C

u

26

7

123!+

Morphis, J. L.

1831

TN

MS

R-S

C

21

3

12

Nash, C. E.

181+1+

LA

LA

R-B

u

63

Newsham, J. P.

1837

EN

LA

R-C

u

ll+

1+

Nitlack, S. L.

1825

GA

FL

D

c

12

3

Whig

U

1
&

2

11+

u
Whig

u
Whig

1+
0
1
2

1

1+
01
2

Niles, J.

lBlU

VT

MS

R-S

Whig

U

Norris, B. W.

1819

me

AL

R-C

Ban.

U

Paine, W. W.

3517

VA

GA

B

Pelham, C.

1535

NC

AL

R-S

Peree, L. W.

1836

NY

MS

R-C

Pierce, C. W.

1S23

NY

AL

R-C

Platt, J. H., Jr.

1837

Can.

VA

R-C

Porter, C. H.

1833

NY

VA

Price, W. P.

1835

GA

Prince, C. H.

1837

Puxman, W. J.

10

3

u

21

Ban.

c

10

1

Whig

c

11

3

U

u

10

u

u

U8

Rep.

u

u

30

R-C

Rep.

u

u

10

GA

D

Bern.

s

c

Ilf

ME

GA

R-C

u

u

39

l£lfO

PA

FL

R-C

u

u

15

Rainey, J. H.

1832

SC

SC

R-B

NP

6k

Pansier, A. J.

1831*

SC

SC

R-B

NP

65

Eapier, J. S.

1837

AL

AL

R-B

NP

21

3

Rawls, M.

1829

GA

GA

D

Ban.

u

C

29

if

Reagan, J. H.

1818

TN

TX

D

Ban.

s

NP*

12

Ridgeway, R.

1823

VA

VA

D

Nhig

u

NP

Ilf

Robbins, W. M.

1828

NC

NC

B

C

10

0
1
3
12
0

123

7

12
6

12
0
&

if

1234
3
3
'

3

4
3

1
3lf

Rogers, A. A. C.

1821

TN

AR

D

Whig

Rogers, S. H.

1B25

NC

NC

D

Whig

Roots, L. H.

IBM

XL

AR

R-C

Scales, A. M.

1827

NC

NC

D

Schleicher, G.

1823

Ger.

IX

D

Sexier, J. B.

1837

VA

VA

R-S

Sheats, C. C.

1839

AL

AL

Sheldon, L. A.

1828

NY

Sheridan, G. A*

18^*0

Sherrod, W. C.

U

30

7

c

10

3

U

u

29

5

u

c

10

1*

k

S

c

b9

7

k

Bern.

u

NP

Ik

3

R-S

Whig

u

NP

10

3

LA

R-C

Rep.

u

U

10

123

MA

LA

R-C

u

u

kb

3

1835

AL

AL

B

Bern.

u

c

21

7

1

Shoher, P. E.

1831

NC

NC

D

Whig

u

NP

28

8

12

Singleton, 0. R,

IBlk
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